tended republics of antiquity possessed, or even had a knowledge of the representative system. They accordingly all terminated in the least insupportable form of despotism, that of a single individual.

The second condition of a perpetual peace, according to Kant, is that the public law of Europe should be founded upon a confederation of free states. In the existing system of international relations, the state of nature, which has ceased as between individuals, whilst it still subsists as between nations, is not a state of peace, but of war, if not flagrant, at least always ready to break out. The code expounded by public jurists to nations has never had the obligatory force of law, properly so called, for want of an adequate coercive sanction. The field of battle is the only tribunal where states plead for their rights; but victory, which ends the litigation, does not finally decide the controversy. The treaty of peace which may follow is, in effect, a mere suspension of arms, the contending parties still remaining in a state of hostility towards each other, without being subject to the reproach of injustice, since each party is the exclusive judge in its own cause. The state of peace, must, consequently, ever remain insecure, unless guarantied by a special compact having for its object the perpetual abolition of war. Nations must renounce as individuals have renounced, the anarchical freedom of savages, and submit themselves to coercive laws, thus forming a community of nations, civitas gentium, which may ultimately be extended so as to include all the people of the earth. "It may be demonstrated," says our author, "that the idea of a confederation which shall gradually extend to all states, and thus lead them insensibly to universal and perpetual peace, is not an impracticable or visionary idea. It may be realized, if happily a single nation, equally powerful and enlightened, could once constitute itself as a republic, a form of government naturally inclined to perpetual peace. A common centre would thus be created for this federative association, around which other

states would cluster in order to secure their liberties according to the principles of public law, and this alliance would finally become universal."

He concludes that "if it be a duty to cherish the hope that the universal dominion of public law may ultimately be realized, by a gradual but continued progress, the establishment of perpetual peace to take the place of those mere suspensions of hostility called treaties of peace, is not a mere chimera, but a problem, of which time, abridged by the uniform and continual progress of the human mind, will ultimately furnish a satisfactory solution."b

In his metaphysics of jurisprudence published in 1797, treating of the science of international law in general, Kant insists upon the same views as to the practicability of a perpetual peace. In this work he observes, "that the natural state of nations, being like that of individuals, a state which must be abandoned in order to enter into a social state sanctioned by law, every right acquired by war previous to this transition must be considered as provisional merely, until confirmed by a general union of independent states, analogous to that association of individuals which forms each separate state. The establishment of perpetual peace, which ought to be considered as the ultimate object of every system of public law, may perhaps be considered as impracticable, inasmuch as the too great extension of such a federal union might render impossible that supervision over its several members and that protection to each member which is essential to its ends. But the establishment of those principles which tend to further this object, by forming such alliances between different states as may gradually lead to its accomplishment, is by no means an impracticable idea, since it is grounded upon the rights and the duties of men and of states.

b Projet de paix perpetuelle, essai philosophique par Emanuel Kant. Traduit de l'allemand avec un Nouveau Supplément de l'auteur, Koenigs berg, 1796.

§ 37. Hegel.

"Such a general association of states, having for its object the preservation of peace, might be termed the permanent congress of nations. Such was the diplomatic conference formed at the Hague during the first part of the eighteenth century, with a similar view, consisting of the ministers of the greater part of the European courts and even of the smallest republics. In this manner all Europe was constituted into one federal state, of which the several members submitted their differences to the decision of this conference as their sovereign arbiter. Since that epoch the law of nations may be said to have remained in the books of the public jurists a dead letter without practical influence on the actual conduct of governments, or else has been invoked when too late to correct the irreparable evils inflicted by the abuse of force.

"What we mean to propose is a general congress of nations, of which both the meeting and the duration are to depend entirely on the sovereign wills of the several members of the league, and not an indissoluble union like that which exists between the several states of North America founded on a municipal constitution. Such a congress and such a league are the only means of realizing the idea of a true public law, according to which the differences between nations would be determined by civil proceedings as those between individuals are determined by civil judicature, instead of resorting to war, a means of redress worthy only of barbarians."c

The principles of Kant on this subject are contested by another celebrated German philosopher, Hegel. According to the last named author, the sovereign independence of the state is the greatest good which men can enjoy as a consequence of the formation of a social union. The

Kant, Rechtslehre, Zweiten Theil, § 61. That part of this work relating to international law was translated into French and published at Paris in 1814, under the title of, "Traité du droit des gens, dedié aux puissances alliées et leurs ministres, extrait d'un ouvrage de Kant."

highest duty of a citizen is to sacrifice to the preservation of this independence his life, his property, his personal will, in a word all his possessions. That can only be considered as a very limited and one sided view which induces us to regard the state merely as a civil association, the sole object of which is to secure the lives and property of its members, since it is evident that the security of these benefits cannot be effected by the loss of that which is to be secured. War ought not to be considered as an absolute evil, and as an accidental event, the origin of which is to be attributed to the passions of princes and people, in a word to that which ought not to be. War is that state of things in which the hacknied phrase of the vanity of temporal goods becomes a reality, a state of things in which the moral health of nations is preserved by action, as the movements of the winds and waves preserve the sea from that complete stagnation which a perpetual calm would necessarily produce. A state of perpetual peace, if it could be realized, would produce a like moral stagnation among nations. History testifies that war strengthens the force of a people by directing its activity towards external objects, and in this manner preventing internal dissensions. Perpetual peace is often held up as a state of ideal perfection for the attainment of which humanity should perpetually strive. It was with this view that Kant proposed the formation of a general confederacy of princes and states for the adjustment of their mutual differences. The league called the Holy Alliance was founded in our own times with the same intention. But, says Hegel, a state is an individual, and the idea of negation is essentially implied in that of individuality. If then a considerable number of sovereign states were to unite in order to form, as it were, a family of nations, this association, as an individuality, would necessarily create opposition and hostility among the states excluded from the alliance. We often hear from the sacred desk eloquent declamations upon the vanity and instability of temporal goods; but however af

fected the hearer may be with the voice of the preacher every one says to himself that he will strive to keep whatever share belongs to him of these fleeting blessings. Let this instability of human affairs be brought home to men's conditions in the shape of hussars with drawn swords, and humble edification is changed into loud imprecations against the cruelty and injustice of conquerors. Wars do not occur the less frequently whenever the causes which produce then are put in operation, and the declamation of preachers and the dreams of philosophers are thus falsified by the reiterated lessons of history.

In almost every European state, continues this author, the direction of its external affairs is confided to the prince invested with the sovereign power of the nation. As chief of the state, he is exclusively invested with the authority of maintaining its relations with foreign powers, of declaring war, directing its operations, and concluding treaties of peace. It is nevertheless true that in constitutional governments the legislative chambers may participate in the exercise of the power of making war and peace, either directly, or indirectly in voting the budget. In England, for example, where the crown exercises these sovereign powers, no war can be commenced or continued without the consent of parliament. But if it be asserted that princes and cabinets are more liable to be influenced by prejudice and passion than popular assemblies, and if for this reason it be proposed to confide exclusively to these bodies the war-making power, it may be answered that the people are quite as liable to be carried away by gusts of passion and influenced by groundless prejudices as kings and princes. Thus England has often been involved in war against the true interests of the nation by popular clamour acting on the government with too much force to be resisted. The popularity of the younger Pitt was founded upon his skill in adapting his measures to the wishes of the nation and to the actual state of public opinion. These were at first favourable to the war commenced by him against France.