It was only when the public enthusiasm began to cool that the nation became convinced that the war had been undertaken without necessity and carried on without advantage.

According to Hegel, the fundamental principle of international law, considered as that universal law which should prevail between states, in contradistinction to the particular stipulation of positive compacts, is the faithful observance of treaties as morally binding upon the contracting parties. But as the mutual relations between states are founded upon their separate sovereignty, they still remain in what is called a state of nature with respect to each other. Their mutual rights are not guarantied by any superiour authority. Their rights depend upon their separate wills. There is no supreme judge and sovereign arbiter between states. Such a supreme judge and sovereign arbiter can only be constituted by special compacts dependent for their execution upon the separate sovereign wills of the contracting parties. The conception of Kant relating to a perpetual peace, resting upon the basis of an association of states, with power to decide as a supreme authority recognized by all the members of the league, upon all controversies between them, and to prevent the termination of these controversies by arms, necessarily supposes the consent of the associated states. But as the duration of this consent, founded upon whatever religious and moral considerations it may be, depends upon the separate wills of these several states, it is ever subject to be interrupted. The controversies between sovereign states can therefore only be decided by war, unless their separate sovereign wills concur in some agreement for the settlement of these controversies. The great and insurmountable difficulty must ever be to determine what are the acts, which in the complicated relations of nations, are to be considered as violating the obligation of treaties, the acknowledged independence, or the national honor of a particular state. Every state may consider its honor and security as depending upon circumstances infinitely varying, of which it alone

is the exclusive judge, and which are often aggravated by the susceptibility of the nation and its earnest desire to direct its activity towards external aggrandizement. The reality of the provocation to hostilities may often depend upon conjectures, or a calculation of the probabilities of an eventual danger against which it is necessary to provide.

Hegel terminates this part of his work, by stating that the principle of the mutual recognition of sovereign states subsists even in time of war. The relation of enemies is transitory, and the law of nations always supposes the possibility, and even, the hope of the restoration of peace. From this supposition is derived the usage of limiting the extreme rights of war to the combatants only, and of exempting therefrom the persons and property of private individuals who take no part in the contest. This usage, as well as that of exchanging prisoners, of respecting the privileges of ambassadors, and of observing conventions of truce, have all derived their origin from that identity of race, of legislation, of manners, and of civilization, which has formed the nations of Europe into one great family. It is in this manner that the conduct of these nations in their mutual relations is modified during war, where else there would be no other rule than that of doing each other as much harm as possible. The mutual intercourse of the citizens of different countries in time of peace is regulated by the same principles. Nevertheless the relations of amity are subject to continual fluctuations and may be suddenly interrupted by unforseen accidents. In this case there is no other ultimate arbiter and judge between sovereign states than the universal, self-existing spirit who animates and rules the universe.d

a Hegel, Grandeinien der Philosophie des Rechts, heransgegeben von Gans, §§ 321-339.

CONCLUSION.

We have thus endeavoured to trace the progress of the law of nations in Europe and America since the peace of Westphalia. The general results of this retrospect may be summed up as follows:

That the pacific relations among nations have been maintained by the general establishment of permanent missions, and the general recognition of the immunities of public

ministers.

Although the right of intervention to preserve the balance of power, or to prevent the dangers to which one country may be exposed by the domestic transactions of another, has been frequently assumed; yet no general rules have been discovered by which the occasions which may justify the exercise of this right, or the extent to which it may be carried, can be laid down; and that it remains, therefore, an undefined and undefinable exception to the mutual independence of nations.

The exclusive dominion, claimed by certain powers over particular seas, has been abandoned as an obsolete pretension of barbarous times; the general use of the high seas, without the limits of any particular state, for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and fishery, has been conceded; and the right of search on the ocean limited to periods of war except certain conventional arrangements applicable to the African slave trade.

The navigation of the river Scheldt, which was closed by the treaty of Westphalia in favour of the commerce of Holland, has been reöpened to all nations; and the general right to navigate the Rhine, the Elbe, the Danube, and other rivers, which separate, or pass through different states, has been recognized as a part of the public law of Europe.

The colonial monopoly, that fruitful source of wars, has nearly ceased; and with it, the question as to the right of

neutrals to enjoy in war a commerce prohibited in time of

peace.

The African slave trade has been condemned by the opinion of all Christian nations, and prohibited by their separate laws, or by mutual treaty stipulations between them.

The practices of war between civilized nations have been sensibly mitigated, and a comparison of the present modes of warfare with the system of Grotius will show the immense improvement which has taken place in the laws of

war.

Although there is still some uncertainty as to the rights of neutral navigation in time of war, a conventional law has been created by treaty, which shows a manifest advance towards securing the commerce of nations which remain. at peace, from interruption by those which are engaged in

war.

The sphere, within which the European law of nations operates, has been widely extended by the unqualified accession of the new American states; by the tendency of the Mahommedan powers to adopt the public law of Christendom; and by the general feeling, even among less civilized nations, that there are rights which they may exact from others, and, consequently, duties which they may be required to fulfil.

The law of nations, as a science, has advanced with the improvements in the principles and language of philosophy; with our extended knowledge of the past and present condition of mankind resulting from deeper researches into the obscurer periods of history and the discovery of new regions of the globe; and with the greater variety and importance of the questions to which the practical application of the system has given rise.

And lastly, that the law of nations, as a system of positive rules regulating the mutual intercourse of nations, has improved with the general improvement of civilization, of which it is one of the most valuable products.

INDEX.

African slave trade, case of Virginia cited, id.

refusal of America to continue the slave
trade, one of the causes of her quarrel
with England, 590.
denounced by William Penn, 591.
resolution of congress of 1776, against
the purchase of slaves from Africa, id.
prohibited by several state governments,
592.

act of federal government in relation to
it, id.

act of British government as to the sub-
ject of the, id.

abolished by Denmark, 593.
various penal sanctions in U. S. laws, id.
importing slaves punished with death,