Senator HUDDLESTON. Well, that was our intention, those specific

areas.

The matter of the press, do you have any concern that we have eliminated paid activities by American press but have permitted voluntary type cooperation?

Mr. KARAMESSINES. No, sir. I think that is perfectly appropriate in my view, although here again I think it is kind of unnecessary because I don't hold with those who feel that the Agency has tainted the American press. If anything, it may be the other way around.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I was going to say there are those who would suggest the other way.

Mr. KARAMESSINES. Some of our representatives overseas have spent a major portion of their incumbency in their stations feeding, I mean with information, feeding the American press because the American press has gone in and knocked on the door as soon as they arrive at a given place and said my editor told me to look you up, and you are the one that knows what is going on here. That has happened very, very often, and it happens far more often than the reverse, no question about it. And I think you know, Mr. Chairman, that the cases in which we have actually hired and paid representatives of the American press are few and far between. This doesn't go to foreign stringers. I am talking about bona fide representatives of established American press institutions.

But I don't have any great quarrel with the section as written now, and I think it is perfectly proper that between consenting adults it is quite permissible for a representative of the Agency to be in touch with, and vice versa, a representative of the American press. I think any other resolution of this would be unreasonable. Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you other gentlemen have any problems with that?

Mr. GODFREY. Well, I tend to agree with Mr. Karamessines, and I think I would go a step further. I look forward to-I think intelligence has to be thought of as an honorable business, first of all, and contacts with honorable-between honorable people seem to me the objective that we ought to be aiming for in the future sometime, maybe not right now, but I would like to think that the intelligence business was sufficiently important to this country so that if a journalist or anybody else wanted to make contact, that he would feel free and anxious to do so.

We are not there at the moment, perhaps, but that is what I think we ought to aim at.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I think there is no question that there is a problem of perception here on the part of the American public. When we talk of intelligence, I think because of the attention that the secret intelligence, clandestine intelligence receives, that the perception almost is immediately, it is all a cloak and dagger operation looking for sensitive military secrets or political secrets, when in fact much of it relates to economic information or a whole variety of information that any citizen might pick up by just traveling through a country.

Gentlemen, we have passed 12:30 and I promised not to keep you here all day. We do appreciate the length of time you have stayed. There are a number of further areas that we would like to question

you about because of your knowledge and experience, and I would hope that the committee might have an opportunity to come back to you again, either with written questions or perhaps ask you to come again as this process continues.

We certainly appreciate your being here this morning.

Thank you.

The committee will be in adjournment subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 1978

U.S. SENATE,

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room 6226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Birch Bayh (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Bayh (presiding), and Huddleston.

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for keeping our distinguished witnesses waiting.

The key question before us today is the proper relationship between the press media and intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. This is, of course, a fundamental question that impacts upon basic constitutional rights of individual American citizens. It goes far beyond the normal perception of intelligence and press relationships.

We have witnesses who are unusually qualified to speak to this question. They have served as foreign correspondents. Through their work, they have had occasions to observe the activities of our intelligence agencies abroad. They have also been assigned investigative work by their media organizations.

We appreciate particularly your willingness to share your personal experience with the committee, so that we can better understand the scope of this problem.

I believe the distinguished subcommittee chairman, Senator Huddleston, has a few opening remarks.

Senator HUDDLESTON. I would just greet our witnesses. I appreciate the fact that they are here, and I think we ought to proceed with their testimony, and we will have questions when it is time. The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, it is good to have you here. I do not know what the proper pecking order is. Shall we do it alphabetically? That is fine with me. I always find that that is a good way to proceed, unless you are someone whose name is Alfred or something like that.

Mr. Daniloff, why don't you start it off?

STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS DANILOFF, CONGRESSIONAL

CORRESPONDENT, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

Mr. DANILOFF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am Nicholas Daniloff, a correspondent for United Press International. I understand I have been asked to testify before the committee as a single working journalist.

I would say first a word about my own background to give you a better appreciation of my own particular perspective.

I have been employed by United Press International almost continuously since 1959. One of my first assignments for UPI was as a Moscow correspondent from 1961 to 1965. That span included such

events as the Berlin wall, the Cuban missile crisis, the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev, and the installation of the current Soviet leadership.

Since 1965, I have worked in Washington, covering at one time or another the State Department, the White House, the Congress, and traveling abroad on occasions with the Secretary of State or other officials.

I should add, perhaps, that my interest in the journalistic community at large, beyond my immediate professional cares, is illustrated by my service as president of the State Department Correspondents Association, and as president of the Overseas Writers Club. Since 1975, I have also been teaching a course at the American University on "The Press and Foreign Policy." For the purpose of this testimony, I have consulted several respected colleagues and my wife Ruth who shared the many difficulties and rewards of a Moscow assignment, but the views I am about to express I consider to be solely my own.

As I contemplate S. 2525, I am struck by the vast scope of the legislation you are proposing. Considering the complexities of the international scene, and the ruthlessness of potential adversaries, I instinctively wonder how wise it may be to attempt to legislate in overly great detail. Valuing the artfulness and brevity of the first amendment, I approach legislation relating to journalists with some trepidation.

Nevertheless, on balance, I believe it would be useful for the proposed charter to include a prohibition on paid, regular, or contractual relationships between intelligence agencies and journalists.

I come to this conclusion out of a concern for the integrity of the press as an institution, as well as a concern for the integrity of individual journalists.

The major purpose of the press, as I understand it and as I try to practice it, is to convey to the public an accurate and timely description of significant and interesting events.

The press, admittedly, is not a perfect institution, and its news gathering and news distributing processes are not without fault, but on the whole, the press tends to be self-correcting. I do not believe it would help the press in its essential purpose to be charged, in some covert manner, with ferreting out secrets for the benefit of intelligence agencies. Indeed, the notion of a secret assignment is quite antithetical to the openness and the truthfulness for which, I believe, the American press strives.

Furthermore, the investigations of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1976 and 1977 disclosed how, in the past, intelligence agencies manipulated the daily and weekly press, as well as respected publishing houses, through which they succeeded in disseminating biased, propagandistic, or inaccurate information. Some of this information, or misinformation, was intended for consumption abroad, but it was picked up by American news agencies and transmitted back to the American public in what is sometimes called the "flowback phenomenon". Such flowback and such manipulation, when it eventually becomes known, cannot enhance the credibility or the integrity of the press.

Much of what can be said about the assault of intelligence agencies on the integrity of the press as a whole can be said, too, about the integrity of the individual journalist. To carry on a covert intelligence assignment as a journalist, or to masquerade as a journalist when one is actually a spy, can only promote the impression that journalists are not what they say they are.

Furthermore, a paid relationship between an intelligence agency and an individual journalist will inevitably create a powerful incentive in the newsman's life, and this incentive can serve as a lever of manipulation.

There is another consideration, too, which past and present Moscow correspondents will appreciate. If a journalist is perceived by a foreign government to be a possible spy, all sorts of obstacles will be placed in his way. In countries hostile to the United States, the foreign correspondent always treads a perilous path in which he may suddenly find himself faced with charges of espionage and criminal activity.

In recent years, authorities in Moscow have scurrilously denounced several American reporters as agents of the CIA, a charge I fear Soviet officials may actually begin to believe if they repeat it to themselves too often.

As a Moscow correspondent I was occasionally arrested by vigilant citizens or authorities for such activities which I consider to be relatively innocuous, such as investigating a train wreck, photographing the Kremlin Hospital, or taking notes of an evening rehearsal of the November 7 military parade. The next time this happens, I will take some slight comfort if I can immediately argue that it is well known the United States does not hire journalists to be spies.

I do not wish my remarks to be interpreted to mean that I am calling for the abandonment of all contact between journalists and intelligence officers, however.

There are two categories of activities which, I believe, are permissible. I shall call these "public information exchange" and "extraordinary service."

As to the first: It is typical of journalists that they believe they may talk to whomever they wish, whenever they wish, and about whatever they wish. I believe, therefore, journalists may benefit by seeking out intelligence officials for the purpose of eliciting information which is to be made public through newspaper articles, magazine dispatches, and broadcasts.

As to the category of "extraordinary service": In the past crises journalists have occasionally played the role of intermediary, passing on messages from one hostile side to the other. This is usually not a function, the function of being an intermediary is usually not a function which either side considers essential, but it can be useful insofar as it confirms the validity and sincerity of messages coming through other channels. I see no reason why the United States should deprive itself of this type of extraordinary conduit in times of crisis.

I would like to close with two additional remarks relating to the integrity of the press as a whole, and to the integrity of the individual.