professionals in the field. I think that split between the operational and the policy and analysis side would not only allow academics to participate comfortably, it would also serve the interest of the agency.

Answer. I think what you're really saying, Bill, is that academics simply have a built in bias-that if they associate with the CIA they're tarnished. Even Norman Bimbaum is associating with us these days. Seriously, the connection between the analysts and the people who collect intelligence-whether they collect it from our technical system, whether they collect it from our human intelligence system, whether they collect it from our overt, open system-is absolutely fundamental to the process of intelligence. It would be like somebody doing research on geological strata out in the field and digging cores and not being willing to talk to the people back in the university who are analyzing it and writing the dissertation. What happens in this game is that the analyst needs some information. He walks across the hall and talks to the man who goes out and collects it. He describes it and the man says well, I've got this system and that system and I'll try a little of each and see what I get. He comes back and says here's what I have and the analyst oh no, you missed the point a little bit over here. I want to know the color of the nodes, not how thick they are. They go back and they try it again. Otherwise, we collect information about Country X and we analyze it on Country Y. It is utterly essential. I have in my time moved within the organization, somewhat in directions other than indicated. I am making a very clear division here, but I can't just separate them and even if I did, what difference would it make. I'd call one the CIA and the other one XIA or something like that and they'd still have to be there and work together. I think it's a subterfuge to simply tell you all that you are not working for the CIA because I call it the XIA.

Question. There is a second issue which is the compatability between operations by intelligence agencies and analysis. It seems to me very different that I would ask Admiral Turner to put a contemporary version on that-whether he does not think it would be an incompatability. Let's say the President of the United States was to simultaneously order him: one, to produce the best possible analysis of the Cuban role in Africa and two, conduct a worldwide propaganda campaign using CIA assets to exaggerate and to alarm people about the Cuban role in Africa; and whether an academic should not wonder about whether he should cooperate with CIA on the first question if they are simultaneously engaged in the second activity.

Answer. Let me make sure we are understanding our terms here because that's a very good question. He called covert action the influencing of events in a foreign country. It is not really an intelligence function. Clandestine collection is collecting information secretly overseas about foreign activities. The third function we do is research. They're all lumped together because the country decided some years ago that when it was going to do covert action-attempt to influence events overseas, which is simply one step further in the diplomatic process but not going as far as sending in the marines-it decided that the Central Intelligence Agency would be the one to do that. There have been many studious proposals to separate all covert action activities out of the Central Intelligence Agency and put them elsewhere. When I first arrived I thought that might have some real merit and I looked at it quite carefully. It has some inferences that you want to be careful about. So we do a covert action overseas, like the propaganda situation Morton described, and we concentrate on getting the truth out to other people. We're not out to do a dirty tricks game, we're trying to penetrate and get people to understand what's happening in the world when their media or society is closed. Now, the same people who will do that for us are marvelous sources of intelligence. What would we do if we separate the two. We would construct two bureaucracies-many of them working with the same individuals overseas. It would number one be confusing and difficult, but think of the effect of having a second bureaucracy just for covert action. Ladies and gentlemen you know as well as I that bureaucracies tends to perpetuate themselves and tend to grow. Today if you're in covert action in the CIA, tomorrow it may be an entirely separate section. You don't have to push covert action in order to be sure you have a job tomorrow or that you'll be active and fully employed. If you have an agency just to do covert action, I'm afraid it will be forced upon us and that it will be generated by that agency, whereas today that is not the case whatsoever. We in the Central Intelligence Agency look on this as a subsidiary function and we only respond to requests for assistance in the covert action field. Question. Admiral Turner, could you possibly answer one of Morton Halperin's questions about the Church Committee Report and the possible declassification of the censored parts?

Answer. I'd be happy to. I have not seen nor have access to the portions of the Church Committee Report that were not published. That's a matter of the United States Senate and its committees. I can only assure you that the senators who reviewed what the CIA recommended be published was not published, are by no means tools of the CIA, they made up their minds what was in the national interest to publish, and what was not in the national interest to publish. And if anybody is going to reverse their decision it will be the senators, not the CIA.

Question. My name is Norman Birnbaum, and I was just embraced by Admiral Turner. I would, with respect, distance myself a little bit. As some of you may know, I'm in litigation with the CIA in a mail opening case. This happened under the administration when directorship of the CIA was not an Amherst but a Williams graduate, Richard Helms. The point is this: The nearness to the CIA, on which Admiral Turner spoke on my part, is represented by a consulting appointment to the National Security Council of the Executive Office of the President. It's quite true that in this function as consultant presumably the reports I do could be read by the CIA, they could also xerox my articles and send them around. But the fact is that this relationship is an open relationship which my students and colleagues know about and I must say that I am pleased to be helping the administration in foreign policy-it needs help. I must say that if I had been asked to be a consultant to the CIA, I would refuse. And I would refuse not out of any disinclination to do a public service but because of and I'm candid at this point-the CIA's record in covert operations and manipulations. It's really very, very difficult if not impossible for anybody interested in contemporary politics or social affairs to approach another colleague and say, look I'm working for the CIA but I'm only asking for local information. It makes it very, very difficult and this is the reason I think that the question raised by the Church Committee and also by Mort Halperin about the separation of covert operations from intelligence, is a question which is in the national interest and would it seems to me be of interest to all of us.

Answer. Let me start by reaffirming my written apology on behalf of my predecessor to Professor Birnbaum for his mail having been opened. There isn't one of us in the Agency today who doesn't believe that was a reprehensible mistake and we're very apologetic. At the same time, the professor's remark in attempting to distance himself from the CIA while he is working on the NSC, of which the CIA is a component part, strikes me as surprising. Although his relationship with the NSC is open, let me assure you he cannot work there without having access to secret information which he will not share with any of the rest of you or we will have to terminate his employment.

Question. Admiral Turner, I'm addressing a concern to you in your capacity not simply as the Director of the CIA but as head of the Intelligence Community, a position you alluded to yourself. You spoke of research and research is very dear to our hearts. So is science and I think it has to be made clear that research is even steven with science, but not quite the same thing. I'll try to make clear what I mean in a moment. That difference was very pointedly illustrated in several recent occurrences which involved attempts to preempt publication of the results of scientific research. One case I know of was supported by the National Science Foundation. Now the essence of science is not simply research, it is the availability of results to the scientific community and it seems to me that attempts to suppress this result, particularly when the Intelligence Community is not involved at all in financing or funding of these things, is to put it mildly insidious to the health of the scientific community and the academic community. And I don't understand how it could possibly be justified by anyone in the Intelligence Community.

Answer. To begin with, I looked into this and I know of no authorized intelligence community effort to suppress those pieces of information. It was apparently somebody from the Intelligence Community acting as a member of the association or something who did try to discourage that. At the same time, I hope you are not stating that the man who worked so diligently during the 1940s under Stack Stadium at the University of Chicago should not have been allowed to keep their scientific research secretive. We're only allowed to have secrecy in times during war, is that correct? The distinction between peace and war is not that clear cut. And you certainly don't wait until the day the war starts to start building tanks. Our objective today is to ensure that we don't get into war and we have to have both scientific development and good intelligence information in order to achieve that objective which is what drives all of us in government and international relations.

Question. I have been personally aware of Stan Turner's career for a good many years and I was pleased with his appointment and wish to assure him I would have

voted for the President had I known his intention to assign Stan to his present duty. (inaudible) ... Do you feel that we do in fact have a balance of national intelligence effort to make proper use of that.

Answer. Thank you Dave. I do. As far as the reduction of clandestine intelligence operators is concerned, I would like to make it very clear that we did not reduce our clandestine people overseas where they are working on the important things. What we did was cut the overhead at headquarters. We were overstaffed and people were underemployed, and I don't see how I can challenge promising young people to make the future intelligence community unless we really challenge them and they were not being so challenged because of the excess number of people. The second part of your question was are we working with the academic community, and the answer is no to that. That is what I am striving to improve and I think it is most important to both of us. About once every six weeks I get out on a college campus and speak and talk with students, both in small groups and also big public audiences. I'm trying to open up these channels of communication again because I think there is so much benefit to both sides.

Question. Admiral Turner, for the sake of this question let's grant that proposition that it is essential from your perspective that the Intelligence Community and academia work together. It is a two part question: What is the professional identity status of the person who is recruited by the CIA as to the CIA's corps of professional and moral integrity? How is this relationship resolved where the contract with the person's university has a disclosure stipulation in other types of employment? Answer. That is a very interesting and good question. We believe with great sincerity that we are as moral and have as much integrity at the Central Intelligence Agency and Intelligence Community in general as any profession. The moral conflicts that are generated in intelligence work are neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different than the moral conflicts that are faced by most other professions and lines of work in our country. I come to this job as a former military officer. Look at the moral conflicts a military man faces when he asks the question-will he shoot to kill. There is no greater moral conflict that a man must face in life. Look at the moral conflicts that have been exposed in recent years about the American business community. Will you lose that contract or will you offer a bribe to that foreign company, or country with whom you are dealing. So too, we in the intelligence have moral conflicts. But they are not different. They are tough and we work hard to get our people to understand basic ground rules under which they work, the standards which the President of the United States will accept, that I will accept, and it is not easy and it puts a tremendous load on the young people who come in and accept the sacrifices of being in the intelligence business. I assure you there are real sacrifices, but we do have a great sense of integrity and moral standards. I intend to insure that those are rigorously enunciated to all the people who join our organization. And I would like you to know that at this moment I am very engrossed in a project with the leading academics and the leading universities in writing a specific code of ethics for the intelligence community. I found when I took this job that this man had written an article in a leading journal he said there was a code of ethics needed in the intelligence community. I called him up and asked him if he would work. That was a year and a quarter ago, we are still working on it. You can laugh, but it is not easy to do. It is not easy to write something that will be specific enough to give guidance and not so specific as to tie people's hands. Yet, I owe it to my people to give them moral and ethical guidance, because the man in the field has got to take that responsibility on his shoulders. They're young men and women out there who are doing it for you. They are brave, they are capable and they are moral. I am trying hard to give them explicit guidance to help them on their course. I thank you for the privilege of being with you today. I look forward to more interchange between all of us in the intelligence community of our country and all of you in the academic professions we all hold in such high esteem.

APPENDIX VIII

Washington DC 20105

OGC 78-2261

10 April 1978

Stephen B. Burbank, Esq.

General Counsel

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19174

Dear Mr. Burbank:

Thank you again for your letter of 20 February 1978 forwarding for our review. draft statement setting forth "General Policies Regarding Issues of Concern in Relationships Between the University of Pennsylvania and Members of the University Community, and Intelligence Organizations."

At the outset, let me say that in several major respects current CIA practices are already largely consistent with the thrust of many of the proposed policies contained in the draft statement. For instance, as is noted in the statement, it is contrary to established CIA policy to obtain the unwitting services of staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions. In addition, CIA will enter into classified and unclassified contracts and other arrangements with U.S. academic institutions of higher learning only if senior management officials u: the institution con- ; corned are made aware of the Agency's sponsorship. Furthermore, pursuant to Federal law, CIA will neither solicit nor receive copies of identifiable school records relating to any student (regardless of citizenship) attending a United States academic institution without the express authorization of the student or, if the student is below the age of 18, his parents.

I might also say that this Agency supports the principle espoused in the draft statement that a university's "policies applicable to intelligence organizations should be identical with those applicable to all other extramural organizations." As you may know, it is our firm belief that at a minimum it is both unfair and illogical for any set of such guidelines issued by an academic institution to attempt to regulate the private lives of its

membership in a manner which discriminates against or singles out any particular group, profession or segment of society. We do find it regrettable, therefore, that the draft policy statement stops short of applying this principle in a uniform, across-the board fashion and instead in at least one area (i.e, the disclosure of factual information about a member of the University community) imposes more stringent restrictions on intelligence organizations than on other extramural organizations.

All of the above comments notwithstanding, our overriding difficulty with and objection to the draft statement stem not from any requirements which are directly imposed on CIA (there are none, as best as we can judge) but rather are based on what seems to us to be excessive, arbitrary, and potentially chilling restraints which some of the policies place on the right of privacy and freedom of choice of individuals covered by the statement's broad and somewhat ambiguous definition of the term "University community." Our concern in this area is largely prompted by this Agency's experience in dealing with staff and faculty members of U.S. academic institutions. As you are no doubt aware, CIA enters into personal service contracts and other continuing relationships with individuals in many walks of life, including academics. As previously indicated, Agency policy require all such individuals to be made aware that they are dealing with CIA, so that under no circumstances do we seek or obtain services or assistance from such individuals on an unwitting basis. On occasion, security considerations preclude the disclosure of these relationships to any third parties. More frequently, however, these relationships remain confidential at the insistence of the individuals themselves, their concerns being that they might otherwise be exposed to harassment or other adverse consequences. In the case of academic staff and faculty, as in other cases, we see no reason and feel no responsibility to overrule these individual preferences by requiring that relationships be disclosed to the institutions for prior approval. Rather, we believe that the decision as to disclosure should be left to the discretion of the individuals involved.

We note that the draft statement specifically acknowledges that "University policies regarding issues of concern in relationships between members of the University community and intelligence organizations must also be consistent with the maintenance of individuals rights and freedoms." Ironically and unfortunately, however, much of the actual substance of the statement appears to undercut this principle by flatly requiring, for example, full-time faculty or staff members to adhere to the policies articulated therein "at all times" so as to cover any activities which they may choose to pursue in a strictly off-duty or off-campus capacity and which have no effect or connection whatsoever with their official relationship with the University. In another