deficiency in his military character, may be formed from the following extract from Marshall's account of the battle of Brooklyn, which occurred on the 27th August, 1776.

About half past eight o'clock, the British right having then reached Bedford, in the rear of Sullivan's left, general De Heister ordered colonel Donop's corps to advance to the attack of the hill, following himself with the centre of the army. The approach of Clinton was now discovered by the American left, which immediately endeavoured to regain the camp at Brooklyn. They were retiring from the woods by regiments, with their cannon, when they encountered the front of the British, consisting of the light infantry and light dragoons, who were soon supported by the guards. About the same time the Hessians advanced from Flatbush, against that part of the detachment which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn. Here general Sullivan commanded in person; but he found it difficult to keep his troops together long enough to sustain the first attack. The firing heard towards Bedford had disclosed to them the alarming fact, that the British had turned their left flank, and were getting completely into their rear. Perceiving at once the full danger of their situation, they sought to escape it by regaining the camp with the utmost possible celerity. The sudden route of this party enabled De Heister to detach a part of his force against those who were engaged near Bedford. In that quarter, too, the Americans were broken and driven back into the woods, and the front of the column led by general Clinton, continuing to move forward, intercepted and engaged those who were retreating along the direct road from Flatbush. Thus attacked both in front and rear, and alternately driven by the British on the Hessians, and by the Hessians back again on the British, a succession of skirmishes took place in the woods, in the course of which, some parts of corps forced their way through the enemy, and regained the lines of Brooklyn, and several individuals saved themselves under cover of the woods; but a great proportion of the detachment was killed or taken."

Though unequal to the achievement of a great victory with his present troops, Washington was eminently successful in conducting the retreat of his army from Long Island; and on the night of the 28th of August, he conducted his troops across the East river, unperceived and unmolest

ed by the enemy, having secured all his stores, baggage and ammunition.

Marshall, commenting upon this retreat, says, "without loss, to withdraw a defeated, dispirited and undisciplined army from the view of an experienced and able officer, and to transport them in safety across a large river, while watched by a numerous and vigilant fleet, require talents of no ordinary kind; and the retreat from Long Island may justly be ranked among those skilful manœuvres which distinguish a master in the art of war.

According to this sentiment, retreat, not victory, is the test of great generalship! But this is fallacious; and Washington is in every military aspect of his character, too great to require a fallacy to sustain him-he was a prudent general, perhaps too prudent for his own glory, but not too prudent for the salvation of his country; for which we stand entirely indebted to that saving quality of his great mind. For had he indulged in the ambition of victory only, independent of the fatal consequences of the risk attendant upon an impetuous system of perilous warfare, a doubt cannot be entertained, that under the defective organization of the continental army which subsisted throughout the whole of the war, the result must have proved fatal to the cause of liberty and independence.

It must, however, strike the reader with peculiar force, that this prudence and discretion was the characteristic of the military genius of Washington; and that his judgment cannot be praised for the exercise of a quality, which being purely constitutional, was independent of all volition on his part. It was, perhaps, only after much experience, that Washington himself discovered, that he was not fully qualified for those bold and daring achievements of war, which are peculiar to men of other and less tender structure of the constitution and sympathies.

The battle of Brooklyn, no doubt, opened a wide field for reflection to the great commander who had lost the battle, and who, with the paternal affection of a father, had wept over the slaughter of his best troops, the flower of his army, and the hope of the nation. It could not have escaped the penetration and sagacity of the commander in chief, that the design of meeting in the open field, and in pitched battles, the disciplined and compact army of the British empire, in the energy of its colossal structure. and the pride

of its well paid battalions, would be little short of the chimerical project of Don Quixote; and experience, as well as observation and foresight, had now convinced him that the only method of carrying on the war which promised ultimate success, was a defensive policy; an attitude of prudent reserve, and a position of alternate attack and defence, as circumstances might warrant, or opportunity induce; to hang on their skirts, pouring upon them like a torrent in their moments of supineness, when lulled into langour by contempt, security and triumph; and at less auspicious times, retreating before their greater numbers and superior discipline. To have a full perception of the wisdom and utility of such a policy, is to rise higher in the scale of greatness than to be a mere consummate general; for it implies a concentration of great qualities, which no exclusive military commander ever united in his own person.

Marshall extenuates the conduct of Washington on that occasion, by alleging the total destitution of cavalry, to act as Videts, in conveying information of the approach of the enemy, apparently not recollecting that the cause of this deficiency must have been in the commander in chief; for, it can hardly be supposed that Congress were to attend so minutely to the details of the army as to provide by a specific law for Videts. It was competent to Washington, to mount his own Videts; or, not having the means to do so, he would naturally avoid such a disposition of his army as required their indispensable assistance and co-operation to avoid defeat, or to secure a victory. It must be admitted that he attempted too much for his limited means to accomplish, or his peculiar genius to control and direct.

The effect upon the army was dismaying: whole regiments marched home; and it was a common occurrence for companies of militia to take their departure, without shame and without leave. The prevailing sentiment was that of despair. A dark and awful cloud hung over the destiny of the country.

Lord Howe availed himself of the despondency of the Americans, produced by this defeat, to proffer terms of harmony and peace; but the negociations were transitory and ineffectual, and both parties returned to their belligerent operations.

After some inconsiderable skirmishing, in which the American troops entirely failed to preserve their character

for cool and collected courage, an incident almost unavoidable when raw soldiers are opposed to regulars, Washington entirely evacuated New York, of which General Howe took possession on the 15th September, 1776.

Washington now moved his troops towards the White Plains, and conceived the plan of habituating his men to stand fire, by accustoming them to skirmishing. The British forces having followed him, occasion soon offered to test the value of the experiment; a detachment of three hundred Hessians and British were attacked, repulsed and beaten; the spirits of the American soldiers revived; the tone of feeling throughout the army rose higher; and Washington personally exerted himself to improve the impression, and deepen the consciousness of their own valour and good conduct, so as to convince them that they possessed equal courage to their enemies, if they were only resolved to

-exert it.

Devoting his days to the discipline and improvement of his soldiers, and his nights to the composition of letters to Congress, exhorting them to improve the organisation, and add to the efficiency of the army, this good man and virtuous patriot exhibited a rare example of love of country, seldom equalled and never surpassed.

In one of his letters to Congress at this period, I have noted a very extraordinary sentiment, which Washington alleges as one of the causes of the inefficiency of the army. He says 'I see such a DISTRUST AND JEALOUSY OF MILITARY POWER, that the commander in chief has not an opportunity, even by recommendation, to give the least assurances of reward for the most essential services.' In many other of his letters, this effect of the principles of liberty upon the minds and conduct of the soldiers, as loosening the bands of discipline, and unfitting them for the control of their officers, is mentioned with feelings of eloquent lamentation; and no doubt the evils he endured from this source were great! But it was by contrast only with the slaves of the royal army that it appeared an evil; and great as that evil no doubt was, still it was to be preferred to that servile and mercenary spirit which bound the Hessians in fetters of iron to the commands of their masters. Had the Americans been capable of this servile spirit, they never would have rallied under the banners of liberty, from the love of independence, to defend the country against foreign tyrants.

The battle of the White Plains, on the 26th of October, 1776, was of inconsiderable moment, but left rather a favourite impression on the American troops, although the loss on both sides was about equal.

The capture of Fort Washington, by the British and Hessians, on the 16th November, was a more serious affair, in which, however, Washington did not personally command. It was carried by storm, owing to some deficiency of skill and address in Colonel Cadwalader, who, as he retreated towards the fort, suffered his detachment to be intercepted and made prisoners. The garrison of two thousand men were made prisoners of war. This severe loss was ascribed to the want of firmness and gallantry in that part of the forces under the command of Cadwalader.

General Washington now commenced his memorable retreat through New Jersey; his army daily melting away, from the expiration of their terms of enlistment, as well as the despair which began to pervade the minds of all, as to the final success of the cause of Independence. Gloom and despondency hung over the American army, as well as the sacred cause of American Liberty: all seemed to despair but Washington, who, erect and undismayed, still reposed on the goodness of his cause for final success; and, amidst all the difficulties and darkness that environed him, cast his hopes high above human agency, still confident that heaven would prosper the just. He was not disappointed: that feeling sustained him-it gave him fortitude under adversity-it stimulated his energies to fresh exertion-it infused hope into his bosom, gave tone to his mind, vigor to his actions, sharpened his invention, multiplied his resources, and added a sublime heroism to the moral and intellectual power of the man. To this sentiment and this trait of his mind, are we indebted for the final triumph of the cause of Independence; for the crisis was awful and decisive. Had Washington quailed, or faltered then, universal despair and submission to the royal power would have followed: but when the little band of ragged and half-starved patriots, who still clustered about him, sought in his countenance, with an anxious and scrutinising glance, for the index of their fate, and beheld him serene, unmoved, and undismayed, not only void of fear, and above the weakness of complaint, but apt to encourage the drooping, and inspire with hope and confidence the desponding hearts of others,