Sidor som bilder
PDF
ePub

5

[blocks in formation]

is contained in two words: it is our CREDIT SYSTEM. But for this, our canals and our railroads, our great works of internal improvement of every kind, could never have been made. The Erie canal, the wonder of the age, must have remained a mere project in the imagination of its projectors. That stupendous work, which has added millions upon millions to the value of property within the extended sphere of its influence, must have remained unexecuted but for the credit system. But for this system, those great works throughout the Union, by which we have conquered time and space, could never have been accomplished. It is by this means that the giant arms of this young and growing republic have piled prosperity upon prosperity, mountains high, as the giants of old piled Ossa upon Pelion; not, like them, with a view to scale the heavens, but that she might place on its lofty summit the light of liberty, to shed its lustre and its benign influence throughout the world. Sir, that lustre has been shed, that influence has been felt, and is now being felt, in different portions of the globe. Under its magic touch thrones have trembled, dynasties have been overturned, and crowns have fallen. The credit system is the distinguishing feature between despotism and liberty; it is the offspring of free institutions; it is found to exist, and its influence is felt, in proportion to the freedom enjoyed by any people. By freedom I do not

[SENATE.

of the democratic party throughout the Union, when I say, I believe they neither expect nor desire any such thing. What, then, do they expect and desire? I answer, no more nor less than what every real friend to his country is willing to adopt, namely, a preservation, and, at the same time, a regulation of the credit system. In all such measures of reform I will go as far as he who goes farthest. Preserve and regulate, but not destroy, is my motto. Enlarge your specie basis; introduce, as far as practicable, a gold currency, by the prohibition of small notes; provide means for coining at the mint; take all proper measures to prevent excessive issues of bank paper, and the unnecessary increase of bank incorporations; repeal your restraining laws, so as to permit the free employment and investment of foreign capital. Whatever danger there may be, is to be found in the abuse of the system, and not in its existence. Guard against these abuses, and correct them when discovered. An entire abandonment of the credit system, and a return to a sole and exclusive metallic currency, if it were practicable, would produce desolation and destruction from one extremity of the Union to the other. Such notions ought not, cannot, must not, prevail.

Mr. President, I hope I shall be pardoned for this digression from the main subject of discussion. My apology will be found in the course and character of this debate. The question again recurs, what disposi

mean unregulated, unrestrained, natural liberty; but ❘tion shall be made of the surplus revenue? That there

that freedom which is founded on just and equitable laws; where the rights of personal security, of private property, and religious toleration, are guarantied to every individual; where there is a general diffusion of knowledge, and the existence of public and private morality. These are the elements, and they together form the basis of public confidence on which the credit sys. tem rests. This is the invention of modern times.

In the old Governments of Europe, where liberty never found a resting place, credit was unknown. To the United States has been left the honor of maturing and perfecting this system. To the United States, also, is the honor due of having first applied the system of i steam navigation. The effects on the general prosperity of the nation have been as sensibly felt in the one case as in the other; and he who should at this day recommend an entire abandonment of our credit system for a sole and exclusive metallic currency, would be deemed no less visionary than he who should attempt to substitute a Pennsylvania wagon for a locomotive or a canal packet, or should endeavor to stem the resistless current of the Mississippi in a flat boat, instead of those splendid palaces which now move majestically on its waters. Shall we, then, Mr. President, check this tide of prosperity, by the introduction of new and untried schemes? Shall we not be content with the necessaries, the comforts, the conveniences, and the luxuries of life, which are so widely diffused throughout this whole country? Shall we attempt to overthrow, subvert, and destroy, a system which has produced all these blessings; which has brought happiness and plenty to the door of every man; and that, too, for the purpose of adopting some of the exploded doctrines of the political economists of Europe? Sir, you might as well attempt to apply the common law of England, which was born and nurtured on the Thames, to the father of waters in this western world, and to our mighty inland seas, compared with which the boasted streams and lakes of Europe dwindle into rills and ponds beside them; yes, these vast inland seas, into which, in the language of a distinguished Senator of my own State, you might cast the whole land of the common law, without producing a ripple. Sir, I believe I speak the almost unanimous sentiment of my political friends in this Senate, when I say they intend no such thing. I believe I speak the sentiment

will be a surplus, seems to have been conceded or taken for granted on all hands, except by the Senator from Missouri. It was anticipated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and he recommended a mode of disposing of it. What was that proposition? Why, sir, in substance, that the Secretary should go into the market, by himself or agent, and invest it in the State stocks. This proposition was introduced by my honorable colleague; and if a surplus was not anticipated, why introduce a proposition to dispose of that which it was supposed would have no existence? The proposition received but little favor in the Senate. I will not attempt to recapitulate the objections which were made to it. Some of them struck me as more imaginary than real. I did not appreciate them as other gentlemen did. In the vote which was taken upon my honorable colleague's proposition, we found ourselves in a lean minority of four. Being satisfied that something ought to be done, I determined to unite in a proposition which should be more generally satisfactory to my political friends. The one reported by the select committee was

"That the money which shall be in the Treasury of the United States on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, reserving the sum of five millions of dollars, shall be deposited with the several States, in proportion to their respective amounts of population, as ascertained by the last census, according to the provision of the second section of the first article of the constitution; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver the same to such persons as the several States may authorize to receive it, on receiving certificates of depos. ite, signed by the competent authorities of such State, each for such amount, and in such form, as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, which shall set forth and express the obligation of the State to pay the amount thereof to the United States, or their assigns; and which said certificates it shall be competent for the Secretary of the Treasury, in the name and behalf of the United States, to sell and assign, whenever so directed by any act of Congress; all sales and assignments, however, to be ratable, and in just and equal proportions among all the States, according to the amounts received by them,

respectively; and all such certificates of deposite shall be subject to, and shall bear an interest of five per centum per annum, payable half yearly, from the time of such

[blocks in formation]

sale and assignment, and shall be redeemable at the pleasure of the States issuing the same."

That part of it which required an act of Congress before the Secretary could sell and assign the certificates was deemed objectionable. The object was to keep the money so far under the control of the Secretary as to enable him to use the means when necessary. I accordingly offered an amendment, which was adopted, by which the Secretary was authorized, on behalf of the United States, to sell and transfer the certificates whenever it should be necessary, for want of other money in the Treasury to meet appropriations made by Congress. This amendment removed the principal objections to the bill. It placed the avails of the money in the power of the Secretary, whenever it should be required to meet such appropriations. If there should be means sufficient in the Treasury to meet them, then of course the money would not be wanted. It would never be called for until there was a deficiency of means.

Let us now inquire, Mr. President, whether this proposition, so amended, is one which ought to be adopted. The idea of returning to the States any surplus revenue which has been collected from the people, by indirect taxation, is neither unheard of nor novel. We have high authority as to the expediency of the measure; and if the proposition under consideration, which is a mere deposite, and not a distribution, involves no constitutional dif. ficulty, then we have the same authority in favor of its adoption. This authority is one which no friend of the administration will lightly disregard. President Jackson, in his message of December, 1829, has the following language:

"After the extinction of the public debt, it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what may be required for its current service. As, then, the period approaches when the application of the revenue to the payment of debt will cease, the disposition of the surplus will present a subject for the serious deliberation of Congress, and it may be fortunate for the country that it is yet to be decided. Considered in connexion with the difficulties which have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of internal improvement, and with those which this experience tells us will certainly arise whenever power over such subjects may be exercised by the General Government, it is hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some plan which will reconcile the diversified interests of the States, and strengthen the bonds which unite them. Every member of the Union, in peace and in war, will be benefited by the improvement of inland navigation and the construction of highways in the several States. Let us, then, endeavor to attain this benefit in a mode which will be satisfactory to all. That bitherto adopted has, by many of our fellow. citizens, been deprecated as an infraction of the constitution, while by others it has been viewed as inexpedient. All feel that it has been employed at the expense of harmony in the legislative councils.

"To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the several States according to their ratio of representation; and should this measure not be found warranted by the constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the States an amendment authorizing it. I regard an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of all our obligations."

From this it would seem that a surplus was anticipated after the extinction of the public debt, and that it

[JUNE 17, 1836.

repre

would continue to a remote period, beyond the current expenses of the Government. The importance of in. ternal improvements was duly appreciated; but, inas. much as the appropriation of money for that purpose by Congress was necessarily unequal, and inasmuch as some entertained doubts as to the constitutional power of Congress thus to appropriate it, the President very properly expressed the opinion "that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the several States according to their ratio of representation, and should this measure not be found warranted by the constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the States an amendment authorizing it." The President seemed fully to appreciate the expediency of the measure of apportionment of the surplus revenue among the States, but cautiously and properly reserved the constitutional question. After the delivery of this message, public attention was turned to the subject. Coming from so high a source, it received due consideration, and those who doubted its expediency, suggested their objections. Here the matter rested till the next session of Congress, when the President, in his annual message of December, 1830, again recurs to the subject. He adverts to the opinion expressed in his previous message, that there would be "a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what may be required for its current service," and adds, "I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it." He again repeats the recommendation of "the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds which may, at any time, remain in the Treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the States in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal improvement." The President then proceeds to answer the objections which have been made to the recommendation contained in his former message, and repeated in this. Those objections are the same which have been urged against this bill, and he refutes them satisfactorily and triumphantly.

It is due to him that I should give his views in his own language. They are as follows:

"I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds which may at any time remain in the Treasury, after the national debt shall have been paid, among the States, in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal improvement.

"Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it has also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A brief notice of these objections here, will not, therefore, I trust, be regarded as out of place.

"They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following grounds: 1st, an objection to the ratio of distribution; 2d, an apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution; 3d, that the mode proposed would lead to the construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of such as are general, and as would, consequently, be of a more useful character; and, last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious dependance on the part of the State Governments upon the Federal power. Of those who object to the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the importations of the respective States would constitute one that would be more equitable; and others, again, that the extent of their respective territories would furnish a standard which would be more expedient, and sufficiently equitable. The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one of obvious equity, because of its

[ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

being the ratio of contribution, whether the funds to be distributed be derived from the customs or from direct taxation. It does not follow, however, that its adoption is indispensable to the establishment of the system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the subject which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribution proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution be confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is to fix it, it be deemed politic and just to give it that character, have regard to several.

"In my first message I stated it to be my opinion that it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what may be required for its current service.' I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it. Should these expectations be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced for the plan under consideration to operate upon; and, if there be no such fund, its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest; for I cannot assent to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment of the proposed system would tend to the encouragement of improvident legislation of the character supposed. Whatever the proper authority, in the exercise of constitutional power, shall at any time hereafter decide to be for the general good, will, in that as in other respects, deserve and receive the acquiescence and support of the whole country; and we have ample security that every abuse of power in that regard, by the agents of the people, will receive a speedy and effectual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded on the obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellow-citizens in intelligence and in public and private virtue, leave me without much apprehension on that head.

"I do not doubt that those who come after us will be as much alive as we are to the obligations upon all the trustees of political power to exempt those for whom they act from all unnecessary burdens; and as sensible of the great truth, that the resources of the nation, beyond those required for immediate and necessary purposes of Government, can nowhere be so well deposited as in the pockets of the people."

I am glad that my friend from Virginia [Mr. RIVES] referred to this message as containing the grounds of his argument. I should have referred to it, if he had not; for this recommendation was strongly impressed on my mind, although I had not seen it from the time it was delivered till this day. But I was a member of the Senate of New York at that period, and well remember that the doctrines of this message formed the basis of our Governor's message on this subject. The reports of our committees on internal improvements, in both Houses, assumed the same ground. I believe the constitutional question was all along reserved; but, aside from that, no one at that time seemed to doubt the expediency or the policy of the measure. I have been subsequently led to doubt both the expediency and policy of a general system of distribution amongst the States of the surplus revenue of the Government. I have feared that it might create a too great dependance of the States on the General Government. I will not now say any thing of the constitutional question, farther than to express my opinion that Congress has no power to raise revenue for the purpose of distribution. But when we find a surplus on our hands, without any design from our legislation to produce it, it presents a different question. The time has now arrived, the contingencies have now happened, when the President anticipated such a

[SENATE.

surplus; the surplus is on hand, and it will continue to increase far beyond our appropriations. It is in vain to shut our eyes to the fact; we may deceive ourselves, but we cannot deceive others. This surplus cannot be disposed of by appropriations, unless of the most extrava. gant character. Will the people tolerate appropriations for the mere purpose of getting rid of a surplus? No, sir, I apprehend not. They will justify their representatives in making liberal appropriations for all objects of national defence. Extravagant expenditures, for the sole object of disposing of the surplus revenue, are, in my judgment, far more dangerous than any objections which I have heard urged against a distribution amongst the States. These expenditures beget the necessity of continuing them, and by and by we shall be obliged to raise the tariff, and increase the burdens of the people, for the purpose of carrying out the extravagances with which we improvidently commenced. Sir, the people of this country will never approve such a principle. What, then, shall be done? We have a large surplus on hand. It will be much larger on the 1st of January next. It is in vain to wish we had it not. It is in our hands, and we must dispose of it. No matter by what means we got it-no matter whether by indiscreet or improvident legislation. We have the surplus-call it accidental, or incidental, or unavoidable. The question is, What shall we do with it? Shall we throw it into the ocean? No. Shall we burn it up? No. What, then, shall we do with it? Shall we leave it to accumulate in the deposite banks? There are weighty objections against it. There is no reason for keeping in those banks any more than is required for the current disbursements of the Government. That will always be a large amount. Beyond that, it is neither profitable to the banks nor useful to the people. Most of the banks are limited in their discounts by their charters. The elements which enter into their discounts are, their capital, their circulation, and their deposites. In the city of New York their deposites are large and their circulation small. In fact, their circulation is a mere bagatelle. Well, sir, when their discounts run up to the limit prescribed by their charters, the surplus deposites are of no further use to them nor to the public. It is true, in the city of New York, they have been used so far as prudence and a due regard to the calls of the Government would permit.

The surplus, beyond what the deposite banks could use, and beyond what was required to meet the drafts of the Treasury, has been loaned, without interest, to other banks, on which they have discounted; and the community have thus had the benefit. After the late calamitous fire in the city of New York, I have no doubt the banks have discounted on these funds, and thereby essentially relieved the commercial interests of the city. The idea that these funds, to the amount of millions, have been hoarded up by the banks, is as improbable as it is untrue. They have been used, so far as prudence would permit; but still their benefits in this way are very unequally distributed amongst the whole people. If the money has been collected, by indirect taxation, from the people, it is right that they should participate, in the same ratio, in its benefits. This cannot be done through the deposite banks. I see no mode left so just and proper, and so unexceptionable, as the one prescribed in this bill, namely, a deposite with the States. If there were any thing objectionable in a distribution, as recommended by the President, there would not be, as it appears to me, in a deposite with the States. The Presi dent, in all his messages, has been perfectly consistent. He has never recommended a general system of distribution. He has merely pointed out a mode of disposing of any surplus which might be unavoidably on hand be yond the wants of the Government, after the extinction

[blocks in formation]

of the national debt. He has always contended against the policy of raising revenue for the purpose of distribution, but has, at different times, suggested the expediency of such a disposition of any surplus which might be in the Treasury, without any design on the part of the Government to produce it for such a purpose. This distinction has been kept up all along by the President, in all his messages in which he has had occasion to touch the subject. It is a distinction by which he has stood justified, and will stand justified, before the people, as long as he maintains that consistency, that upright, hon est course, which has thus far characterized all his public acts, and which, I trust, will characterize them in future. His doctrines, thus far, on this subject, have been approved; and the distinction to which I have alluded, and which can be traced through all his messages, is one sound in itself, and one perfectly understood by the people of the United States. In his veto message on the land bill, in 1832, I find the same distinction; and here, too, it is proper to add that he suggested doubts, as he had done before, of its constitutionality; but the distinction between returning to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue, paid in by them, and creating a surplus for the purpose of distribution among the States, is clearly taken and kept up, in perfect accordance with what he had said on former occasions. I most heartily approve of the doctrines contained in that message. I am fully sensible of the dangers to be apprehended from a general distribution system in regard to a surplus created for the purpose of such distribution. The President's reasoning on that subject is perfectly conclusive to my mind. Amongst other things, he says:

perfectl

"It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our revenue which could be speedily effected by Gongress, without injury to the substantial interests of the country, there might be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the Treasury, and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal accomplish ment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them over to the State Governments, the more immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The principle and the object was to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by them under a system which could not at once be abandoned; but even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to save the General Government from grasping un. limited power over internal improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.

"But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire pro ceeds of one source of revenue, and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise the moneys for supporting the Government, and meeting the general charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public lands a perpetual charge upon the Treasury. It does not return to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the Government, by which they are not wanted; but compels the people to pay moneys into the Treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for distribution to their State Govern

ments."

[blocks in formation]

[JUNE 17, 1836.

of distribution. Viewing this bill as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the Treasury among the States without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every State Gov. ernment and institution, as well as for making every local improvement, however trivial, I cannot give it mys assent."

From all this it appears that the President is in favor of a disposition of an incidental or unavoidable surplus, provided, always, it can be constitutionally done. I will not stop to inquire whether such a distribution of such a surplus be constitutional or not. It is not necessary in reference to the proposition contained in this bill. This proposition is not a distribution by which the money becomes absolutely the property of the States, and which is never again to be returned, and which the States are under no obligation to return to the United States; but it is a mere deposite with the States of the surplus revenue, incidentally and unavoidably on hand, by which the States acquire no property in it. It remains the property of the United States just as fully and as perfectly as if it were in the immediate custody of the Secretary of the Treasury. The States become the mere depositories. Now, as to the constitutional power of Congress to direct the surplus revenue of the Government, incidentally and unavoidably in the Treasury, to be deposited whenever and wherever it pleases, I can. not for one moinent entertain a particle of doubt. It is the duty of the administration of the Government, whenever they find such a fund on hand, to take care of it and preserve it to keep it safely till it is wanted for the legitimate uses of the Government. Those uses are to be judged of by Congress, and its appropriations are indicative of what it deems proper objects to which it should be applied. Until it is wanted for such appropriations, it is the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury, acting under the advice of the Executive, to keep it safely. Unless the places of deposite are prescribed by law, he takes upon himself the responsibility of selecting them; but if Congress sees fit to act, it may direct such places as, in its wisdom, shall seem most meet and proper. Now, sir, I hold that Congress can constitutionally direct the public money to be deposited wher. ever it pleases. It may direct it to be deposited in the Bank of England, in the State banks, in the mint of the United States, or in the treasuries of the several States. Congress, whenever it undertakes to direct on this subject, is the sole judge of the place of deposite. It would intend, unquestionably, to select such places as are perfectly safe; it would not discharge its duty to the people, whose representatives they are, and whose money it is, unless it selected places of deposite which were perfectly safe. Let me ask, Can there be any safer depositories than the States? I answer, No. The stability of this Government depends on the stability of the States; it cannot exist without them. They, therefore, afford the very best and highest security which we can have for the safe keeping as well as the safe return of the money which may be intrusted to them, respectively. It is no objection ion to the constitutional power of Congress thus to dispose of the public money, that it is deposited ratably with the States. So far as constitutional right is concerned, looking at this matter as a mere deposite, Congress could order it to be deposited in such proportions as it pleased; but the very object of thus depositing the surplus with the States is, that we thereby have the best security for its safe keeping, and the best guarantee for its sure return when required; and inasmuch as this incidental or unavoidable surplus, as the President terms it, has been collected by indirect taxation out of the people, it is but just and equitable that some rule

[blocks in formation]

should be adopted, in depositing it with the States, that shall give to them equal benefits, so far as incidental benefits are to be derived from becoming the depositories of it.

If we should adopt the same ratio that we would in an absolute distribution, provided we had the constitutional power to distribute it, it would be no argument against the constitutional power of Congress thus to deposite it. As to the constitutional power of Congress over this subject, I cannot for one moment doubt; I will not suffer myself to doubt. No one I have heard has suggested any constitutional doubt, and no one, in my judgment, can place such an objection before the people in a way that they can comprehend it, or feel the force of it. From this view of the matter, I feel justified in saying that I am sustained in my support of the proposition contained in this bill, by the principles laid down in the several messages of the President to which I have referred; and backed by such authority, and from a deep settled conviction of the importance of the measure, I cannot hesitate as to the vote I shall give. If this plan be not adopted, I ask gentlemen by what mode will they dispose of this surplus? If there be any who do not believe there will be a surplus, (and this number must be very small,) to them I say, the plan proposed can do no harm in that event, because there will be nothing on which it can operate. If the sentiment were unanimous, or any thing like it, that there will be no surplus, I would not then adopt any measure in relation to it, when there was no probability of its being required. But this is a very different case. No rational man can doubt but that there will be a large surplus, unless our appropriations are made for the express purpose of getting rid of it; and, of course, in a very extravagant manner. I again ask, what shall we do with it? It is in vain to make objections to this proposition, unless gentlemen will condescend to point out some other mode of disposing of the public money. If none is suggested, and the present bill be not adopted, the money must remain in the deposite banks, without legal regulation, and subject to all the clamor which has been, and which will hereafter be, made against them. I here repeat, as I have before said, I have entire confidence in the deposite banks. But no one can hesitate to say, and it is no disparagement to any banks to say, that this vast and accumulating treasure is more secure in the treasuries of the several States. With the confidence which I place in the security of the deposite banks, it would not be surprising if I should be in favor of leaving it there; but that gentlemen who profess to look upon all banks with more or less distrust should be willing to leave it there, in stead of depositing it with the States, is to me a matter

of astonishment.

Some gentlemen, when pressed upon this point, and asked, what will you do? are ready to say, leave it till the next session of Congress. Why leave it till the next session of Congress? I emphatically ask. If there is to be a large surplus in the Treasury on the 1st of January next, it is our duty to the banks themselves, as well as our duty to our country, to make early arrangements for its disposition. If it is to be deposited with the States, the banks ought to know it, that they may be prepared for it at the time fixed for that purpose. If it is to be left with them, and no change is hereafter to be made, they ought equally to know it; for their arrangements relation to the management of their own means would depend more or less on the fact, whether they were to retain the means of the Government. So that, in any point of view, it is all-important that the question be now settled. Every important interest of the country requires it. If it be not now arranged, it will be productive of the most alarming consequences. If this money is thus suffered to accumulate in these banks, the

in

[SENATE.

people will never rest satisfied that it shall behoarded up there; and it would in that case be of no use to the banks to have it. I take it for granted, then, it must be used. How far such a use of money, which has been collected from the people, would be deemed a just and equitable use of it in regard to the great body of them, I leave to the American people to judge. In the use of such means there is more or less favoritism; and the desire of the banks to make the most of it, especially if an interest is to be charged on it in their hands, would tend strongly towards those extravagant and wild speculations, about which gentlemen have so feelingly declaimed. If this money should be loaned out to the communities where these deposite banks are located, will it not be seen at once that the business of those places will be more or less extended, according to the means employed! Suppose, then, when these funds to such an enormous amount are thus loaned out, and the Government should want the money, can these banks respond, on notice given, to the call? If they can, it will be by reason of a sudden call on their debtors. What will be the consequence of such a call? We can readily foresee it. The whole money market will be disturbed. Like the sudden expansion and contraction of bank issues and bank discounts at all times, they would convulse the whole commercial community. Those convulsions are not confined to the communities in which they happen; their effects are felt every where. You cannot strike a blow at the city of New York, which will not be felt, not only through the whole State, but throughout the whole Union.

But it may be said, and I believe has been said, in the course of this debate, that this money will not be needed by the Government, and will not be called for from the banks. So much the worse. The longer such an immense sum is left to accumulate and to be used by them, the worse it is. But, Mr. President, public sentiment, which is generally right, demands that some other disposition be made of this surplus revenue. The people are jealous enough of banks at all times, but are peculiarly so of those, at this time, which hold such vast treasures which belong to them. Unless some other disposition be made of this surplus, suspicions will go abroad that the money is kept there for improper purposes, and from improper motives. We know there is no ground for such suspicion. But if it exist, whether true or false, the effect is the same. Its tendency is to agitate the public mind, and a consequent derangement of the moneyed concerns of the country. I can readily foresee that, if Congress adjourns without regulating the deposite banks by law, and without disposing of this surplus revenue, the whole country will be agitated by this all-important question, and we shall have to encounter another scene of panic and distress, and thereby derange the currency, and more or less affect every interest in the country. No matter whether there be any just ground for such agitation or not, such is the state of parties and of party feeling that we cannot hope to be rid of it, however much we may deprecate its existence. Sir, I live in a commercial community. I feel that I know something of its interests, and I am unwilling, for any consideration whatever, that this all-engrossing topic should any longer be made the sport of party, to the great detriment of the paramount interests of society. I am unwilling that such considerations shall, by designing politicians, be mingled in the approaching presidential contest, and that the commencement of the next session of Congress shall be the singal for increased and increasing excitement till it is closed. Sir, public confidence in our banks,

as

well as in

our political institutions, becomes im

paired by such constant assaults; and when that is impaired, every interest must suffer. I cannot, therefore,

« FöregåendeFortsätt »