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not. We must study causes. The times call for a searching diagnosis which may disclose deep-seated difficulties—difficulties needing correctives produced only by patient study and designed adjustment-difficulties responsive neither to quack remedies nor to quick remedies.

For something has happened; something is happening. We are in the midst of a changing set of ideas; we are living through a change in direction; and a change in the thought and attitude of a people toward its national life must necessarily affect, as it always has affected, a large body of existing law.

We are not consciously the creators of these changes. Our changing opinions have been mostly effects, not causes. The fifty years since the Civil War have brought almost magical industrial growth. A vast nervous system of telephones and telegraphs has electrified our scattered country into one self-conscious unit. Radiating railroads have been the muscles which have pulled into a co-ordinate and articulate body the detached and sprawling members of our great domain. The concentration of life and activities in cities has scattered working ganglia throughout the nation. All these new physical forces, and the social changes which they produce, have brought increasing complexity in the problems of life. At the same time there has been a growing sense of obligation and increasing inventiveness to cope with these problems. Progress in education, growth of the scientific spirit, accumulation of scientific data affecting society, the advent of the specialist, national self-consciousness, social self-consciousness, have also come with these fifty years.

What does it all mean? Does it not mean that we are in the very midst of a definite shift of emphasis from individualistic ends to co-operative ends? Does it not mean that society is coming to the belief that the social purpose is to be attained not through individual self-assertion only, but through the conscious organization of society for social ends, guided by science and inspired by the democratic faith? Did the Marquis of Lansdowne, the Tory leader, have this in mind when he said before the Lords recently, “the old go-as-you-please system has broken down completely "?

And what of the law? These changes in the physical, economic and social aspects of life, all this new vast mass of facts,

are necessarily so much raw material for the law. The finished product should be the legal means for accommodating the various interests of life. For law is not outside of life; it is part of it. The purpose of law, Justice Holmes has been one of the first to tell us, must be found in some help which law brings towards reaching a social end. These radical changes in the facts of life and in the attitude of our people present one of the greatest challenges ever thrown down before our common law system. A body of law adapted to a sparsely settled and primarily agricultural country, with a fairly homogeneous population, with comparatively few disparities of wealth, has suddenly and sharply been confronted with the task of adjusting itself to a vast democracy, drawn from many peoples, a nation containing thirty million wage-earners, with increasing pressure of conflicting interests. When our courts encountered these problems and applied, without elasticity or adjustment, old ideas to new facts, there was bound to follow dissatisfaction not only with specific decisions but with the legal system itself. This fed the movement to tinker with the system, to attribute the causes for dissatisfaction largely to individuals, to throw the whole system overboard and start anew. Experience, however, has taught us to look deeper into causes. We now see more clearly that the difficulty is not primarily with the individuals who administer law, but with the accepted ideas consciously or unconsciously expressed

by law.

Nor has the law been metallic. It has during the last decade clearly begun to respond to the temper and ideas and needs of the times. We are witnessing changes practically in the whole domain of the law—from procedural law to property, the branch of law which, one would suppose, age cannot wither. The reports during the last few years teem with illustrations. Take the United States Supreme Court. Compare the opinion of that court annulling the New York ten-hour law for bakers with its opinion, at the last term, upholding the California eight-hour law for women, and you will find not so much a reconcilable difference of decisions upon two statutes, as a radical difference in mental attitude--you will find a marked difference in point of view towards the need of governmental activity in meeting the problems of the modern state. The difference spans a decade.

Take the Court of Appeals of New York. That state affords perhaps the most striking proof of a change in emphasis, of a modification, in those beliefs, mostly inarticulate, which largely determine judicial opinions. In 1907 that court animadverted upon the growing legislative activity of the time, emphasized the function of the courts to serve as barriers against such legislation, and declared unconstitutional a statute prohibiting nightwork for women. In 1915 the court expressly overrules that decision, recognizes the need of legislation for social ends, and refers to the economic and social facts justifying such legislative action.

Another example of a change in the point of view of courts is found in their present attitude towards the distribution of governmental functions. The law books continue to repeat as immutable doctrine that there can be no delegation of legislative power, but the Supreme Court sustains the tremendous power given by Congress to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Of course, the form of non-delegation may be preserved by dialectics, but the effect of the court's decisions is to recognize the pressure of economic facts and give the commission substantial control over interstate carriers. Within a decade throughout the country, in increasing variety of administrative commissions with what amounts to legislative power have been created. This means,

, in effect, the application of technical knowledge, developed by authoritative investigation and fair hearing, to modern complex industrial conditions. The creation of these commissions and the exercise of their power have, broadly speaking, been sustained by the courts as proper instruments for achieving appropriate ends.

So far as control over public utilities is concerned, it is only the machinery which is new. The principles of law supporting such control can be found in the Year Books. The machinery for exercising such control cannot be found in the Year Books. Means for making control effective have had to be devised. As a result, problems of law enforcement, the relation of administrative action to legislature and courts, have brought to the fore a cloud of important questions calling for separate treatment as a substantially new branch of law in this country-administrative law.

The need for legislation has been amply responded to. Of making statutes there is no end. We have had a mass of legislation, some wise, some very foolish. Yet this mass of legislation, ill-considered and well-considered, apparently at times haphazard and piecemeal, constitutes on the whole, as Mr. Jethro Brown has shown, a body of law with common aims and a set of underlying principles.

But present conditions demand much more than new machinery, devised by legislation, for the effective application of old principles. And, to the extent that statutes effect changes in the substantive law, judicial decisions should not be uninfluenced by the reasons back of this legislation. For statute law and law developed through judicial opinions are, in reality, but two sides of the same activity. The two should harmonize. Both should express the same underlying premises, the same ends sought to be achieved by law. Particularly, in this country (passing for the moment the British self-governing dominions), in the last analysis, the whole field of law is for judicial development, because of the reviewing power of the courts.

These are conditions which demand new premises to fit the accumulation of new facts, from which to formulate new legal principles, just as the law, flexible common law, in Mansfield's day, absorbed the customs of merchants.

What have we done to work out new.premises to fit present needs? To apply tried methods to new problems? To test new difficulties of adjustment by past experience? To remove what is obstructive or wasteful in old principles or old applications? Said Maitland a few years ago :

"Are we facing modern times with modern ideas, modern inachinery, modern weapons ? I wish that I could think so. Some of our ideas seem to be inadequate, some of our machinery seems to me cumbrous and rusty, some of our weapons I would liken to blunderbusses, apt to go off at the wrong end.”

What answer has this country for Maitland ? Listen to one whose devotion to our legal system is best measured by the greatness of his contribution to it:

“ Jurisprudence," writes Roscoe Pound, " is the last in the march of the sciences away from the method of deduction, from predetermined conceptions. The sociological movement in jurisprudence, the movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of

law, the movement for the adjustment of principles and doctrine to the human conditions they are to govern rather than assumed first principles, the movement for putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true position as an instrument, has scarcely shown itself as yet in America."

Thus spoke Roscoe Pound in 1909. What has been accomplished? What further can be done? Can the law schools and law school teachers contribute anything?

As we have seen, the modern social conceptions have already begun to affect our courts. But this immense work of readjustment, the task of assimilating social and economic facts, of adapting old principles to present needs, of working out modern premises necessitated by new conditions, should not devolve upon the courts alone. They are already laboring under too heavy a pressure. Let figures tell their tale. The United States Supreme Court in the October term last year disposed of 472 cases. For the same period 100 years ago, the court passed on only 58 cases. In 1914 the Massachusetts Supreme Court wrote opinions in 470 cases, while during the same period 100 years ago a single volume of Massachusetts reports contains but 134 opinions. Johnson's reports for 1814, covering both law and chancery cases decided by two courts, disclose 228 cases, whereas the single New York Court of Appeals in 1914 disposed of 679 cases. These are the dry statistics of a fact known to all the Bar, that our supreme courts suffer from overburdening labor, putting cramping limits upon argument and deliberation and study. Their time and energy are exclusively devoted to deciding specific controversies submitted for their decision. To a very large degree they are practically compelled to choose from what is offered to them.

Nor is the need of working out the law as an entirety primarily a function of the Bar. By tradition and theory the American lawyer contributes to the development of law as the partisan in a controversy. An overworked and absorbed Bar can only assist in the problems now confronting the law so far as any concrete litigation demands consideration beyond the fringe of the field which it touches. Those few who do free themselves from the absorption of practice and turn their time into constructive contributions to the law are indeed of invaluable assistance to courts and practitioners.

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