a further modification or evolution of the modified common law systems which have always been in use in these states. The Michigan and Vermont acts abolish all the common law forms of action, except assumpsit, trespass, replevin and ejectment (assumpsit and trepass being called contract and tort in Vermont), a step taken in Pennsylvania nearly 30 years ago. Both of these acts as well as a Wisconsin act (219) permit liberal amendments so that substantial sufficiency takes the place of technical nicety of form, and they also expressly provide that an action at law may be so amended or transferred as to become a bill in equity or vice versa. The Michigan act also adopts the practice long established in Pennsylvania that summary judgment may be rendered in contract actions on the plaintiff's affidavit of claim, unless the defendant files an affidavit of merits or defense. A somewhat similar provision applying to actions arising out of contract, whether in equity or at law, is found in Chapters 74 and 78 of the laws of West Virginia.

The most notable feature of the Pennsylvania act, which applies to all actions in contract or tort, except actions for libel and slander, is its extension of the use of the affidavit of defense. The act abolishes special pleadings and demurrers, extends the affidavit of defense (which has always been a characteristic and essential part of an action of assumpsit in Pennsylvania but never considered a pleading) to all actions, and confines the pleadings to the plaintiff's statement, the affidavit of defense, and, in cases in which a counterclaim or set-off has been pleaded, the plaintiff's reply thereto. Mere general denials in an affidavit or reply are insufficient, and each party must answer specifically each allegation of fact, the truth of which he does not admit. Under the present practice in assumpsit it is very usual for judgment to be entered by the prothonotary for want of an affidavit of defense or by the court for want of a sufficient affidavit; but, as recognized in the act, this practice will seldom be practicable in trespass, because the amount of the judgment can seldom be determined from the plaintiff's statement and provision is made that in such actions, on failure to file an affidavit of defense, the case shall be deemed to be at issue, but certain specified facts shall be taken to be admitted.

3. Judgment Notwithstanding Verdict.

Another Michigan act (217) provides that where at the close of testimony a motion is made for a directed verdict and is denied, the trial court on motion, or the appellate court on appeal, may render in favor of the party lawfully entitled thereto a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Chapter 31 of the Minnesota laws is very much to the same effect, and Chapter 133 of the Wyoming laws provides that where, upon a trial a case presents only questions of law, the judge may direct the jury to render a verdict subject to the opinion of the court, and may at the same term set aside the verdict and direct judgment for either party with like effect and in like manner as if such direction had been given at the trial. These acts, in connection with a Massachusetts act of which mention is about to be made, probably represent the most important single tendency in the legislation of the present year relating to the administration of justice.

The Michigan and Minnesota acts follow the practice which has been sustained by the courts of some six or seven states; but which was, by the vote of a single judge, held unconstitutional as applied to the federal courts in Slocum vs. Insurance Company, 228 U. S. 364. The strong dissenting opinion of Justice Hughes, however, has aroused much favorable comment and it is notable that the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has, since this decision, unanimously upheld the constitutionality of this practice in Bothwell vs. Railway, 115 Mass. 467. Massachusetts, has, however, gone even further and has added to its legislation a provision, which it is thought, will overcome the objection discovered by the majority of the Supreme Court. The only difficulty which the majority of the court found insuperable-the lack of a verdict of a jury—is probably met by the provisions of Chapter 185 of the Massachusetts laws to the effect that:

"When exceptions to any ruling or direction of a judge shall be alleged, or any question of law shall be reserved, in the course of a trial by jury, and the circumstances shall be such that, if the ruling or direction at the trial was wrong, the verdict or finding ought to have been entered for a different party or for larger or smaller damages or otherwise than as was done at the trial, the judge may reserve leave, with the assent of the jury, so to enter the verdict or finding, if upon the question or questions of law so

raised the court shall decide that it ought to have been so entered."

As this leave is reserved at the trial and by the consent of the jury the verdict finally entered pursuant to the leave is the jury's verdict. This practice has already been followed in the United States District Court in that state. Insofar as practice in the federal courts is concerned the Wyoming act is perhaps not so open to the objection sustained in the Supreme Court in the Slocum case as are the Michigan and Minnesota acts.

4. Equity Practice.

The New Jersey "Chancery Act of 1915" (116) is probably the most important passed this year affecting equity practice. It is based largely upon the English rules under the judicature act and the new equity rules of the United States Supreme Court. The act is very short and probably its most important provision is that giving the chancellor additional power to prescribe rules, " to give effect to the provisions of this act, and otherwise to simplify procedure in the Court of Chancery. Such rules shall supersede (so far as they conflict with) statutory and other regulations heretofore existing."

Act No. 381 of the Pennsylvania laws makes a radical change in the theory of equity practice although its practical effect may not be so great. The act provides that a suit in equity may be begun as in an action at law by summons without first filing a bill. It might be noted in this connection that, while a bill in equity may be served by any one, a summons must be served by the sheriff.

5. Appeals.

Another Michigan act (89) prohibits setting aside a verdict or granting a new trial on account of mere technical errors, and a Montana act (149) simplifies procedure on appeals to the Supreme Court.

Chapter 111 of the Massachusetts laws, relating to the dismissal of frivolous appeals, provides that whenever an appeal is claimed after the entry of a decree following a rescript from the full Bench of the Supreme Judicial Court in equity or probate proceedings, the justice by whose order the decree was entered

may order the appeal dismissed if, in his opinion, the decree conforms to the terms of the rescript and the appeal is claimed for purposes of delay. If a further appeal is claimed from an order so dismissing an appeal it shall not operate to suspend or supersede the carrying into effect of the terms of the decree.

6. Service of Process.

Of the acts relating to the service of process Montana (22) provides that if none of the persons named in the act can be found within the state service of a summons against a corporation may be made upon the Secretary of State, who shall accept on behalf of the corporation. North Carolina (48) authorizes the service of "subpoenas and summonses for jurors" by telephone.

7. Trial.

A number of acts relate to trial of cases. Perhaps the most radical of these is in Pennsylvania (367), which authorizes in any action at law a written demand by either party for a jury trial and further provides that if neither party files such a demand, he shall be deemed to forfeit "his right and the court shall proceed to try the cause without a jury." A California act (403) adds as new methods of waiving trial by jury in certain actions a failure to announce at a given time that a jury is required and a failure to deposit the jury fees. South Dakota (241) provides for a verdict by five-sixths of a jury in civil

cases.

Nebraska (147) passed another radical act. It provides that every litigant shall be deemed to have excepted to any judgment order or other ruling made at any stage of a case or proceeding, and material and prejudicial to his substantial rights, and that he shall not be required, in order to preserve his rights, to actually take or cause to be noted upon the record any such exception. This permission to raise objections not noticed at the trial seems to open the way to the multiplication of appeals. Less open to criticism is Chapter 245 in the same state, which provides that where an objection to the admission of testimony has been made once and overruled by the court, it shall be unnecessary to repeat the same objection to further testimony of the same sort by the

same witness in order to save the error, if any, in the ruling of the court whereby such subsequent testimony is received.

A Wisconsin act (219) provides that a defendant showing by affidavit that if held liable he will have a right of action against a third party who is not a party to the action may make the third party a party defendant in the same suit. The act expressly provides for its liberal construction so that as far as possible all closely related controversies may be disposed of in one action even though in a strict sense there are two controversies.

Of acts relating to the competency of witnesses and the admissibility of evidence, Minnesota (283) provides that abstracts of title duly certified by a bonded abstractor or by a registrar of deeds may be introduced in evidence in actions in which the title to land is in controversy. In this connection it might be noted that Montana (43) makes it a misdemeanor to compile abstracts of title for compensation without first filing a bond for the protection of any person dealing with the abstractor. An Illinois act (page 440), provides that the handwriting of a deceased or absent person may be proved by the comparison of specimens of such person's handwriting whether such specimens are relative to the issue or not.

Acts passed in Kansas, Missouri and Oklahoma provide that a continuance shall be granted whenever a party or attorney is serving as a member of the legislature; and the Oklahoma act even goes so far as to provide that a refusal to grant such a continuance shall constitute an error and entitle the party to a new trial as a matter of right. These acts are in marked contrast to the English practice where such continuances are never granted. American courts have always been lenient in the matter of continuances on the grounds of public engagements and it would seem that the legislators have gone out of their way to provide for their own convenience at the expense of the speedy administration of justice.

8. New Remedies.

The acts providing new remedies are not of great importance, but a few deserve mention. Nebraska (210) creates a physician's lien against any party, except claimants under the workmen's compensation act. Montana (23, 25) provides for liens upon