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their adjournment. So far we have fixed landmarks for determining sessions. In other cases, it is declared by the joint vote authorizing the President of the Senate and the Speaker to close the session on a fixed day, which is usually in the following form, "Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives, that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, be authorized to close the present session, by adjourning their respective Houses on the day of

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When it was said above, that all matters depending before Parliament were discontinued by the determination of the session, it was not meant for judiciary cases, depending before the House of Lords, such as impeachments, appeals, and writs of error. These stand continued of course to the next session.Raym. 120, 381; Ruffh. Jac. L. D. Parliament.

Impeachments stand in like manner continued before the Senate of the United States.*

SECTION LII.

TREATIES.

THE President of the United States has power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.-Const. U. S. Art. II. Sec. 2.

All confidential communications, made by the President of the United States to the Senate, shall be, by the members thereof, kept inviolably secret; and that all treaties, which may hereafter be laid before the Senate, shall also be kept secret, until the Senate shall, by their reso lution, take off the injunction of secrecy.-Rule 38.

Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is a law of the land. It differs from other laws only as it must

*It was held, in the case of Hastings, that a dissolution did not work the discontinuance of an impeachment.

have the consent of a foreign nation, being but a con tract with respect to that nation. In all countries, I believe, except England, treaties are made by the legislative power: and there, also, if they touch the laws of the land, they must be approved by Parliament. Ware, vs. Hilton.-3 Dallas's Rep. 199. It is acknowledged, for instance, that the King of Great Britain cannot, by a treaty, make a citizen of an alien.-Vattel, b. 1, c. 19, sec. 214. An act of Parliament was necessary to validate the American treaty of 1783. And abundant examples of such acts can be cited. In the case of the treaty of Utrecht, in 1712, the commercial articles required the concurrence of Parliament. But a bill brought in for that purpose was rejected. France, the other contracting party, suffered these articles, in practice, to be not insisted on, and adhered to the rest of the treaty.-4 Russell's Hist. Mod. Europe, 457; 2 Smollett, 242, 246.

By the Constitution of the United States, this department of legis. lation is confined to two branches only, of the enary Legislature; the President originating, and Senate having a negative. To what subject this power extends, has not been defined in detail by the Constitution, nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves. 1. It is ad mitted that it must concern the foreign nation, party to the contract, or it would be a mere nullity res inter alias acta. 2. By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to comprchend only those objects which are usually regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise regulated. 3. It must have meant to except out of these the rights reserved to the states; for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way. 4. And also to except those subjects of legis lation in which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives This last exception is denied by some, on the ground that it would Icave very little matter for the treaty power to work on. The less the better, say others. The Constitution thought it wise to restrain the

Executive and Senate from entangling and embroiling our affairs with those of Europe. Besides, as the negotiations are carried on by the Executive alone, the subjecting to the ratification of the Representatives such articles as are within their participation, is no more inconvenient than to the Senate. But the ground of this exemption is denied as unfounded. For examine, e. g., the treaty of commerce with France, and it will be found that out of thirty-one articles, there are not more than small portions of two or three of them which would not still remain as subjects of treaties, untouched by these exceptions.

Treaties being declared, equally with the laws of the United States, to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act of the Legislature alone can declare them infringed and rescinded. This was accordingly the process adopted in the case of France, 1798.

It has been the usage of the Executive, when it communicates a treaty to the Senate for their ratification, to communicate also the correspondence of the negotiations. This having been omitted in the case of the Prussian treaty, was asked by a vote of the House of February 12, 1800, and was obtained. And in December, 1800, the Convention of that year, between the United States and France, with the report of the negotiations by the Envoys, but not their instructions, being laid before the Senate, the instructions were asked for, and communicated by the President.

The mode of voting on questions of ratification is by nominal call.

Whenever a treaty shall be laid before the Senate for ratification, it shall be read a first time for information only; when no motion to reject, ratify, or modify the whole or any part, shall be received.

Its second reading shall be for consideration; and on a subsequent day, when it shall be taken up as in a committee of the whole, and every one shall be free to move a question on any particular article in this form: "Will the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of this article?" or to propose amendments thereto, either by inserting or by leaving out words, in which last case the question shall be, "Shall the words stand part of the article?" And in every of the said cases, the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present shall be required

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to decide affirmatively. And when through the whole, the proceed ings shall be stated to the House, and questions be again severally put thereon for confirmation, or new ones proposed, requiring in lıke manner a concurrence of two-thirds for whatever is retained or inserted.

The votes so confirmed shall, by the House or a committee thereof, be reduced into the form of a ratification with or without modifications, as may have been decided, and shall be proposed on a subsequent day, when every one shall again be free to move amendments, either by inserting or leaving out words; in which last case the question shall be, “Shall the words stand part of the resolution?" And in both cases the concurrence of two-thirds shall be requisite to carry the affirmative; as well as on the final question to advise and consent to the ratification in the form agreed to.-Rule 37.

When any question may have been decided by the Senate, in which two-thirds of the members present are necessary to carry the affirma. tive, any member who voted on that side which prevailed in the question, may be at liberty to move for a reconsideration; and a motion for reconsideration shall be decided by a majority of votes.—Rule 44.

SECTION ‘LIII.

IMPEACHMENT.

THE House of Representatives shall have the sole power of im peachment.-Const. U. S., Art. I. Sec. 3.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachment: When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concur rence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and

disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.-Const. U. S. Art. I. Sec. 3.

The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.Const. U. S. Art. II. Sec. 4.

The trial of crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by ury.-Const. U. S. Art. III. Sec. 2.

These are the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on the subject of impeachments. The following is a sketch of some of the principles and practices of England on the same subject.

Jurisdiction. The Lords cannot impeach any to themselves, nor join in the accusation, because they are judges.-Seld. Judic. in Parl. 12, 63. Nor can they proceed against a commoner, but on complaint of the Commons.-Ib. 84. The Lords may not, by the law, try a commoner for capital offence, on the information of the King, or a private person; because the accused is entitled to a trial by his peers generally; but on accusation by the House of Commons, they may proceed against the delinquent, of whatsoever degree, and whatsoever be the nature of the offence; for there they do not assume to themselves trial at common law. The Commons are then instead of a jury, and the judgment is given on their demand, which is instead of a verdict. So the Lords do only judge but not try the delinquent.-Ib. 6, 7. But Wooddeson denies that a commoner can now be charged capitally before the Lords, even by the Commons; and cites Fitzharris's case, 1681, impeached of high treason, where the Lords remitted the prosecution to the inferior court. 8 Grey's Deb. 325, 6, 7; 2 Wooddeson, 601, 576; 3 Seld. 1610, 1619, 1641; 4 Black. 257; 3 Seld. 1604. 1618, 9. 1656.

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