of the sin, while the existence of the sin does not imply the remedy. In other words, sin, placed first in a series or system, would argue nothing in regard to remedy; while a remedy placed first is proof positive of sin. Moreover, man being, as he is, disinclined to admit a sinful, apostate nature, nothing is so natural, by way of convincing him, as placing the amazing provision for his recovery at the head of all argument; just as a view of the cross begets a sense of guilt deeper than is in the power of independent reasoning to do. Holding the Atonement in its full integrity and significancy as implying that "If Christ died for all, then were all dead," the Pelagians never could. have rejected substantially, utter human sinfulness, and utter human dependence on divine, gracious, gospel recovery.

The third step in this series downward is the absolute freedom of the human will to good as well as to evil.

"Pelagius admitted that man, in his moral activity, stands in need of divine aid, and could, therefore, speak of the grace of God as assisting the imperfections of man by a variety of provisions. He supposed, however, this grace of God to be something external, and added, to the efforts put forth by the free will of man; it can even be merited by good will." Hag. vol. i. p. 301.

"In the system of Pelagius, everything depends upon the principle of the freedom of the will; this is the determining and fundamental conception in his doctrine of sin and of grace. Freedom, as the absolute capacity of choice (liberum arbitrium), to determine equally for good or evil, appeared to him in such a degree to be the substantial good of human nature, that he even reckoned the capacity for evil as a bonum naturæ, since we cannot choose good without in like manner being able to choose evil." Ibid. p. 303.

A fourth step follows as a matter of course, namely, the denial of electing grace, effectual calling, divine decrees, predestination. "Man can withstand grace." It is easy to see that, in this system, God is well-nigh dethroned. Wherever it has had sway, piety has rapidly declined, and the way has been smoothed to the various forms of unblushing infidelity. Pelagian tendencies to exalt human freedom have ever been found to carry with them a natural antagonism both to the doctrine of man's apostacy and depravity, and of God's decrees; thus undermining every cardinal doctrine of the Gospel. And that

these tendencies have a logical and necessary connection with the previous perversion of the Atonement is plain, though it has not so often been pointed out. A wise remedy will correspond, in extent and character, with the extent and character of the disease to be removed. In proportion as the Atonement, as a provided remedy, is diminished, the human sinfulness and apostasy to be remedied are diminished. And in proportion as the human sinfulness and apostasy are diminished, the human ability and freedom of will may be untruthfully exalted; and to the same extent must the divine decrees and government give way, and become conditional or even nominal. Hagenbach, in speaking of the conflict of religious opinions to which the Reformation gave rise, recognizes this relation, except that he did not trace it back to the Atonement as we have done. He says, (vol. ii. p. 268):

"The more rigid the views of theologians on the doctrine of original sin and the moral inability of man, the more firmly they would maintain that the decrees of God are unconditional. Hence it is not surprising that Roman Catholics, Arminians, and most of all the Socinians, endeavored in a more or less Pelagian manner, to satisfy the claims of human freedom."

That Pelagianism tends downward to fatal scepticism and proves unsatisfactory to the pious, has been everywhere manifest, from the fifth to the nineteenth century. The "Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge" most justly sums up its earlier results in a sentence, (p. 919):

"The Pelagian controversy, which began with the doctrines of grace and original sin, was extended to predestination, and excited continual discord and division in the Church."

Bengel, in the seventeenth century, bitterly complains of the Pelagian tendencies of his age as leading men to become increasingly strangers to the effects of grace. Indeed, its steady and necessary approaches to Socinianism and infidelity became so early manifest that, before the close of the fifth century, its advocates devised a modified and more plausible form of it which was named semi-Pelagianism, and which, with slight variations, has prevailed widely among the secret rejecters of the expiatory nature of the Atonement down to the present time.

John Cassian, a disciple of Chrysostom, is said to have devised this"middle course" between Pelagianism and the orthodox faith. The germ of semi-Pelagianism consists in regarding "The natural man neither as morally healthy (as Pelagius did), nor as morally dead (like Augustine), but as diseased and morally weakened." The leading theses of the system have ever been," That God did not dispense his grace to one more than another, in consequence of predestination;" "That man, before he received grace, was capable of faith and holy desires;" and "That man was born free, and was, consequently, capable of resisting the influences of grace, or of complying with its suggestions." The design and use of this shrewd "improvement" in theology is sharply drawn by Hagenbach in his enumeration of different heresies. "2. The heresy of the Pelagians, who never were able to form a distinct sect, but by means of a modified system (semi-Pelagianism) kept a back-door open to creep now and then into the Church, from which they had been excluded by the more strict doctrinal decisions."

Another process downward from the true Scriptural Atonement may be designated the Universalist stairway. In this general class of Universalist theories a great variety of sceptical opinion is included, especially among German speculatists. But these sceptical opinions may all be traced back to original perversion of the Atonement, either in relation to its nature, or its design and application. The radical defect consists in such superficial views of the character of God, and of divine justice, as renders any expiation, or proper satisfaction to immutable justice, unnecessary. Constitutional abhorrence of sin prompting inexorably to punish, or proper and benevolent justice, is set aside from the Divine character. Consequently Atonement is a pledge, a moral instrumentality, an expedient; and sin must be a trifling thing, comparatively, certainly not to be regarded with infinite wrath on the part of God, nor deserving of capital, endless punishment.

The Restorationists argue that the Atonement is, either from its nature, or by divine and special appointment, the absolute and unconditional release of the race from all penal suffering or proper punishment; though disciplinary sufferings, for the purification of character, may be inflicted either in this world

or the next, or both. It is not the providing a way whereby prisoners may become "prisoners of hope," but it is the utter demolition of the prison. With them, the atoning provision is not that of the gracious King, staying his just wrath, and sending the herald to throw open the prison-doors and proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord, and the day of vengeance of our God; but it is the mighty conqueror unconditionally and arbitrarally breaking down all walls, and destroying the prison itself instead of the prisoners.

Others interpret the Atonement not as the ground, but simply the means for accomplishing reconciliation; an expedient, either for public, perhaps governmental, ends, or an expedient to satisfy moral feelings, in the purpose of accomplishing reconciliation which might have been accomplished without it. It is not expiatory, satisfactory, or substitutionary; it is not the rendering of pardon and salvation consistent and possible; they say it was consistent and possible before; but it is the means and expedient for bringing about what is of itself consistent and proper. It is not the providing of the bread and water of life, but the ministration of them, rendering them palatable and effectual. Some affirm that Christ died merely to convince men of God's saving and eternal love. Others go still farther, and make the whole object of Christ's death to be a touching

and powerful means of exciting and quickening man's natural virtues. In none of these cases is the Atonement avowedly rejected; it is rather gloried in as if made broader, more rational and effective for good. Rejection is far down the scale, and on the borders of acknowledged infidelity.

The steps of this broad, downward way in theological reasoning may be marked somewhat as follows, beginning at the top of the series. First, Semi-Arminianism. In this class are embraced those who, in reality, adopt the characteristic error of full Arminianism, but attempt to stop short of some of its logical sequences and practical tendencies. The fundamental principle of this system is that Christ in the Atonement did not make satisfaction to divine justice in any proper sense, but simply to the governmental justice of God. It is essential to this theory that justice, as an absolute and controlling attribute, should be denied a place in the nature of God. Justice, which

prompts God to punish for sin because it is sin, is rejected, and the prevention of crime, regard for the law, and the maintenance of the order and welfare of the universe, are made the whole object of punishment, even in the divine government. Accordingly the Atonement, which is to take the place of punishment, has merely the same object. That the tendency of this system is to put the doctrine of eternal punishment upon the ground of expediency, and into the shade, is manifest; for it has covertly wrapped up in it the germ of Universalism, whose adherents are uniformly and instinctively arrayed against capital punishment in all governments.

We have already stated that the fundamental principle of this first step downward from the Atonement is, that the prevention of crime and the promotion of order and government constitute the great end of punishment, and consequently of Atonement. When these ends are answered, justice is satisfied. That sin deserves punishment for its own sake is denied, and hence the evil and wrong of sin are fundamentally diminished. This will account for the prevailing decrease of deep and pungent conviction for sin wherever the semi-Arminian theology is countenanced.

How utterly opposed this theory is to the whole tenor of Scripture may be seen by referring to the earlier parts of this discussion, where Christ is constantly presented in the Bible as a sacrifice. He bore our sins; the chastisement of our peace was upon him. He propitiated God; became a ransom; was made sin that we might be made righteousness. But this theory logically denies that Christ in the work of Atonement wrought out any righteousness which may constitute the ground' of the sinner's justification. It merely makes pardon possible, and opens the way for the sinner to create a righteousness of his own, whereas Paul's whole hope is in being found in Christ, not having his own righteousness, but the righteousness which is by faith of Jesus Christ. It annihilates the Scripture doctrine of justification, that "Act of God's free grace, wherein he pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight only for the righteousness of Christ, imputed unto us, and received by faith alone;" and leaves to us only the hope that the demands of public justice have been so met in Christ that