real thing, and has no positive cause. If it is NOT a real thing, and has no positive cause, why does God positively send the wicked to hell for a privation, which they have not positively caused? And if sin is a real thing, or a positive moral crookedness of the will of a sinner, and as such has a positive cause; can that positive cause be any other than the self-perversion of Free Will, or the impelling decree of a sin-ordaining God? If the positive cause of sin is the self-perversion of Free Will, is it not evident, that so sure as there is sin in the world, the doctrine of Free Will is true? But if the positive cause of sin is the impelling decree of a sin-ordaining, sin-necessitating God; is it not incontestible, that the capital doctrine of the Manichees, the doctrine of Absolute Necessity, is true; and that there is in the Godhead an evil principle, (it signifies little whether you call it matter, darkness, everlasting free wrath, or devil,) which positively ordains and irresistibly causes sin? In a word, is it not clear, that the second gospel-axiom is overthrown by the doctrine of Necessity; and that the damnation of sinners is of God, and not of themselves ?

While Mr. T. tries to extricate himself from this dilemma, I shall produce one or two more passages of this book, to prove that his scheme makes God the author of sin, according to the most dangerous error of Manes. The Heathens imagined, that Minerva, the goddess of Wisdom, was Jupiter's offspring in the mos peculiar manner. Diana was indeed Jupiter's daughte but Latona, an earthly princess, was her mothe Whereas Jupiter was at once the father and mother Minerva. He begat her himself in the womb of 1 own brain, and when she was ripe for the birth, his fo head opened after a violent head-ache, which answe to the pangs of child-bearing, and out came the lo female Deity. Mr. Toplady, alluding to this Heat fiction, represents his Diana, Necessity, as proceed from God with her immense chain of events, whi has among its adamantine links, all the follies, heresie „murders, robberies, adulteries, incests, and rebellion

of which men and devils have been, are, or ever shall be guilty. His own words, (p. 50,) are, "Necessity, in general, with all its extensive series of adamantine links in particular, is, in reality, what the poets feigned of Minerva, the issue of Divine Wisdom: [He should have said, the issue of the supreme God, by his own wise brain,] deriving its whole existence from the free will of God; and its whole effectuosity from his neverceasing Providence." Is not this insinuating, as plainly as decency will allow, that every sin, as a link of the adamantine chain of events, has been hammered in heaven, and that every crime" derives its whole existence from the free will of God?" Take one more instance of the same Manichean doctrine:

Page 64. Mr. Toplady having said, that "He [God] casteth forth his ice like morsels-and causeth his wind to blow,' &c., adds, "Neither is material nature alone bound fast in fate. All other things, the human rill itself not excepted, are not less tightly bound, i. e., effectually influenced and determined."-Hence it is evident, that if this Calvinism is true, when sinners send forth vollies of unclean and profane words, Calvin's God has as "tightly bound" them to cast forth Manichean ribaldry, as the God of nature binds th clouds to cast forth his ice like morsels."

I would not be understood to demonstrate b preceding quotations, that Mr. T. designs to make the author of sin. No: On the contrary, I do him the justice to say, that he does all he can to clear his doctrines of grace from this dreadful Imputation. I only

produce his own words to all his endeavours, th unavoidably flows from

SECTION II.

Mr. T. attempts to support his Scheme of absolute Necessity by Philosophy-His philosophical error is overthrown by fourteen Arguments.-What Truth comes nearest to his Error.

WE have taken a view of the Scheme of Necessity, and seen how it represents God, directly or indirectly, as the First Cause of all sin and damnation. Consider we now, how Mr. T. defends this scheme by rational arguments as a philosopher.

Page 22. "The soul is, in a very extensive degree, passive as matter is"-Here Mr. Toplady, in some degree, gives up the point. He is about to prove that the soul is not self-determined; and that, as our bodily organs are necessarily and irresistibly affected by the objects which strike them; so our souls are necessarily and irresistibly determined by our bodily organs, and by the ideas which those organs necessarily raise in our minds, when they are so affected. Now, to prove this, he should have proved that our souls are altogether as passive as our bodies. But, far from proving it, he dares not assert it: For he allows that the soul is passive as matter, only " in a very extensive degree;" and therefore, by his own concession, the argument on which he is going to rest the notiou of the absolute passiveness of the soul with respect to self-determination, will be at least in some degree groundless. But let us consider this mighty argument, and see if Mr. T-'s limitation frees him from the charge of countenancing materialism, "in a very extensive degree :"

Page 22. "The senses are necessarily impressed by every object from without, and as necessarily commove the fibres of the brain; from which nervous cominotion, ideas are necessarily communicated to, or excited in the soul; and by the judgment, which the soul necessarily frames of those ideas, the will is ne

cessarily inclined to approve or disapprove, to act or not to act. If so, where is the boasted power of selfdetermination ?"

This Mr. Toplady calls "a Survey of the Soul's dependance on the Body." Page 27, he enforces the same doctrine in these words: "The human body is necessarily encompassed by a multitude of other bodies. Which other surrounding bodies, animal, vegetable, &c., so far as we come within their perceivable sphere, necessarily impress our nerves with sensations correspondent to the objects themselves. These sensations are necessarily, &c., propagated to the soul, which can no more help receiving them, and being affected by them, than a tree can resist a stroke of lightning.

"Now, (1.) If all the ideas in the soul derive their existence from sensation; and (2.) If the soul depend absolutely on the body, for all those sensations; and (3.) If the body be both primarily and continually depeudent on other extrinsic beings, for the very sensations which it [the body] communicates to the soul ;the consequence seems to me undeniable, that neither man's mental, nor his outward operations are self-determined; but on the contrary, determined by the views with which an infinity of surrounding objects necessarily, and almost incessantly impress his intellect." These arguments bring to my mind St. Paul's caution, Beware, lest any man spoil you through philosophy, and vain deceit." That Mr. T.'s scheme is founded on a vain philosophy, will, I hope, appear evident to those who weigh the following remarks:

1. This scheme is contrary to genuine philosophy, which has always represented the soul as able to resist the strongest impressions of the objects that surround the body; and as capable of going against the wind and tide of all the senses. Even Horace, an effeminate disciple of Epicurus, could say, in his sober moments,

Justum et tenacem propositi virum, &c.

"Neither the clamours of a raging mob, nor the frowns of a threatening tyrant ;-neither furious sto

nor roaring thunders can move a righteous mau, who stands firm to his resolution. The wreck of the world might crush his body to atoms, but could not shake his soul with fear." But Mr. T.'s philosophy sinks as much below the poor Heathen's, as a man, who is perpetually borne down and carried away by every object of sense around him, is inferior to the steady man, whose virtue triumphs over all the objects which strike his senses.

II. This doctrine unmans man. For, reason, or a power morally to regulate the appetites which we gratify by means of our senses, is what chiefly distinguishes us from other animals. Now, if outward objects necessarily bias our senses, if our senses necessarily bias our judgment, and if our judgment necessarily bias our will and practice; what advantage have we over beasts? May we not say of reason, what heated Luther once said of Free Will; that it is au empty name, a mere non-entity? Thus Mr. Toplady's "Scheme of Philosophical Necessity," by rendering reason useless, saps the very foundation of all moral philosophy, and hardly allows man the low principle of conduct which we call instinct in brutes: Nay, the very brutes are not so affected by the objects which strike their senses; but they often run away, hungry as they are, from the food which tempts their eye, their nose, and their belly, when they apprehend some danger, though their senses discover none. Beasts frequently act in full opposition to the sight of their eyes; but the wretched scheme, which Mr. T. imposes upon us as Christian philosophy, supposes that all men necessarily think, judge, and act, not only ' according to the sight of their eyes,' but according to the impressions made by matter, upon all their senses. How would Heathenish fatalists themselves have exploded so carnal a philosophy!

III. As it sets aside reason, so it overthrows conscience, and the light which enlightens every man that comes into the world.' For, of what use is con science? Of what use is the internal light of grace,