Official Accountability Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, on H.R. 3665 ... June 15, 1988, Volym 4U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989 - 164 sidor |
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Sida 7
... Presidential authority under which he operated authorized him to ignore Congressional mandates . And on many occasions , we were subjected during the hearings to the President's own protestations that he had heard no evidence of ...
... Presidential authority under which he operated authorized him to ignore Congressional mandates . And on many occasions , we were subjected during the hearings to the President's own protestations that he had heard no evidence of ...
Sida 17
... presidential authority is protected by the Constitution , and that by purporting to oblige the President under any and all circumstances , to notify Congress of a covert action within a fixed period of time , S. 1721 infringes on this ...
... presidential authority is protected by the Constitution , and that by purporting to oblige the President under any and all circumstances , to notify Congress of a covert action within a fixed period of time , S. 1721 infringes on this ...
Sida 37
... Presidential scandals , but across the spectrum of foreign policy concerns - war powers , treaty affairs , military aid , economic power , arms sales , and covert actions - what you recog- nize is that the relevant historical precedent ...
... Presidential scandals , but across the spectrum of foreign policy concerns - war powers , treaty affairs , military aid , economic power , arms sales , and covert actions - what you recog- nize is that the relevant historical precedent ...
Sida 42
... Presidential leadership or over Presi- dential vetos . Take , for example , the 1986 South African sanctions bill ; the War Powers Resolution ; the Trade Act of 1974 , all of which passed into law without Presidential leadership . So ...
... Presidential leadership or over Presi- dential vetos . Take , for example , the 1986 South African sanctions bill ; the War Powers Resolution ; the Trade Act of 1974 , all of which passed into law without Presidential leadership . So ...
Sida 45
... presidential scandals , but across the spectrum of recent U.S. foreign policy concerns war powers , treaty affairs , emergency economic power , arms sales , military aid , and covert operations one recognizes that the relevant ...
... presidential scandals , but across the spectrum of recent U.S. foreign policy concerns war powers , treaty affairs , emergency economic power , arms sales , military aid , and covert operations one recognizes that the relevant ...
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Sida 58 - We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Sida 57 - Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations as approved in Public Law 357, 80th Congress, approved August 4, 1947 (61 Stat.
Sida 21 - Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities — the Church Committee — regarding the gross abuses in covert activities that were the concern of that committee. In my testimony in 1975, I said: The lack of proper controls has resulted in a freewheeling course of conduct on the part of persons within the intelligence community that has led to spectacular failures and much unfortunate publicity. A new approach is obviously needed, for it is unthinkable that we can continue to commit the egregious...
Sida 54 - ... did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlawful.
Sida 45 - Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee: I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before you today.
Sida 62 - We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.