NO. 5.

More than one historian of repute has observed, that this is perhaps the first instance recorded in history, where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manoeuvre by which he expected they would prove victorious. These writers forgot Pharsalia, and by a lapse of memory have detracted from the laurels of Cæsar. He was the original after whom Napoleon, in other cases than this, adopted an ingenious and well-timed copy.

Napoleon at Austerlitz found him. self in a situation very similar to that in which Cæsar was placed at Pharsalia. By crossing the Danube, and plunging into Moravia, he had lent his flank to the enemy, endangered his rear, and thrown himself into a hostile country, with insurrection spreading far and wide in every direction. So in Thessaly, Cæsar's retreat from Dyrrachium, had given him the air of a fugitive, and began to make the surrounding nations mistrustful of his fortune. The great object of both leaders was to force an immediate battle on their opponents, who equally fell into the spare, when delay would almost have proved equivalent to victory. Napopoleon deceived his adversary by a

series of skilful manœuvres, calculated to impress the idea that he was weak, inclined to retire, and in a precarious posture. He carefully intrenched his left, by throwing up field-works, and held back his right in a semicircle, presenting a narrow front, which concealed his dense columns and the power with which they were concentrated. The allies believed that he had scarcely 40,000 men, when he lay immediately before them, within two cannon-shots of their outposts, at the head of 90,000, ready in hand, and eager to strike whenever an opening presented itself. Acting under this fatal miscalculation, the Russians extended their own left wing, leaving a large gap in the centre, with the purpose of turning the right of the French army, and taking them upon the flank and rear, so as to cut off their communications with Vienna, and drive them back on the mountains of Bohemia. The Russians commenced this dangerous movement at noon, on the 1st of December. Napoleon, with an eagle glance, foresaw the consequence. "Before tomorrow is over," he exclaimed, "that army is my own. Soldiers! we will finish the war with a clap of thunder."

The French delight to call the great battle which followed, "The Day of the Three Emperors," because three monarchs were actually present in the field. Napoleon, whose commanding genius directed everything; Francis of Germany, who did nothing at all; and Alexander of Russia, then only in his twenty-eighth year, who now found himself, for the first time, under fire, and led his Imperial Guards to the charge, with the personal bravery of an experienced veteran. The AustroRussians were nominally commanded by Kutousoff, an old soldier accustomed to fight against the Turks, full of ignorant prejudices, and worn out with long service. His present activity of mind and body were evidenced by his falling asleep at the council of war, which decided on the plan of operations. But the virtual direction of affairs was assumed by the Austrian Weyrother, who acted as quartermaster general, in which capacity he had before done his worst at Rivoli and Hohenlinden, and had materially assisted in producing those lamentable defeats. Neither experience nor disaster had improved his tactics, or taught him a correct estimate of the adversary to whom he was opposed. Napoleon threw dust in his eyes by not displaying his entire forces in an extended line, and led him to commit one of the most dangerous experiments in war-a flank march in columns, in front of a concentrated enemy.

On the 1st of December (see plan, No. 4), the two armies faced each other as follows:-The first column of the Austro-Russians, under Doctoroff, extended considerably beyond the French right, as far as Aujezd. The second column, commanded by Langeron, occupied the important heights of Pratzen, directly before the French centre and apparent right wing. A competent general would have seen at once that this was the key of his position, to be carefully watched and strengthened throughout every fluctuation of the coming battle. The third column, under Prybyszwerki (a name difficult to write, and impossible to pronounce), occupied the most elevated portion of the heights. These three columns, commanded in chief by Buxhowden, formed the entire left wing, and were destined for the ill-judged movement which involved the whole army in ruin. The fourth column, under Kollowrath, stood on

another range of heights, in rear of the third. This portion of the allied forces consisted of Austrians and Russian battalions, intermingled together. The cavalry, eighty-two squadrons, under Prince John of Lichtenstein, were formed on low ground, uniting the centre with the right wing, or fifth column, under Bagration. The reserve, under the Grand Duke Constantine, were posted in front of Austerlitz, and immediately behind the heights of Pratzen. The French were, probably, a little superior in actual numbers, but each army exceeded 80,000 men. The French, in condensed masses, were posted in advance of the fortress of Brunn, midway between that town and Austerlitz. Napoleon had foretold that this would be the battle-field, and said to his generals and marshals some days before, "Study this ground, for we shall shortly have to contest it.' His right, under Davoust, rested on the lakes Menitz and Satshchen, with strong reserves behind the Abbey of Raygern, thrown back out of sight of the enemy, and intended to lure him on by a semblance of weakness, when, in fact, there was strength adequate to any attack. The French left, under Lannes, extended to the Rosenitzberg, an elevated hill, intrenched and strengthened by artillery, and covered by an advanced patrol of horse. The front of the whole position was intersected by marshy grounds, through which passed the great road from Brunn to Olmutz. Opposite to the French centre, lay the heights of Pratzen, glittering with the enemy's masses, already in movement towards the left. The corps of Soult, in heavy columns, stood ready to rush into the gap at the critical moment. On the left of Soult, were placed in reserve the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat, and the Imperial Guard under Besseries, in a line behind them. The corps of Bernadotte was formed between the divisions of Lannes and Oudinot. A slight glance at the plan will show the superior concentration of the French army, and the power with which they could verge in so many radiating lines towards any particular point. In the arrange

ments on their side, may be traced "the magic of one mighty mind," controlling and directing the energies of the whole; in the camp of the allies, there was confusion arising from the multiplicity of ungifted counsellors;

but there was little wisdom, and neither safety nor resource.

When daylight broke on the morning of the 2nd December, the error of the Russian general became apparent. The heights of Pratzen were no longer glittering with the arms of many thousand men. The three divisions of his left were already far advanced on their wild march, to circumvent the right flank of the enemy, leaving an interval in their own centre, of which Napoleon availed himself with the shock of a thunderbolt. The division of Soult attacked, with an impetuous charge which baffled all resistance, carried the heights, and maintained themselves in that central position, entirely separating the enemy's columns, and rendering it impossible for them any longer to act in concert. At the same time, Bernadotte and Lannes, with the cavalry under Murat, engaged the Russian right, and gave them full employment, so that they could gain no opportunity of detaching succours to the centre; while the Imperial Guards, under Bessieres, were brought up to the front, to sustain the left of Soult, and preserve the compact alignment of the French army. The allies had irretrievably lost the battle, and compromised their entire force from the moment when the advance of Soult was attended by such complete success. Even the single corps of Davoust was found in strength enough to oppose effectually the three divisions by which it was miscalculated he would be cut off and surrounded. Everywhere the French Emperor opposed a superior force at the critical moment. Herein lies the distinction between lofty genius and simple mediocrity the pre-eminence of a master in his science over the pupils who are yet in their rudiments, and learning by dearly bought experience. The Russian Guards, led by the Emperor Alexander and his brother Constantine, fought with determined resolution, and did all that mere physical courage could effect, to atone for the mistakes by which they were sacrificed. It was no longer a struggle for victory, but a despairing effort to secure a retreat. This was at length effected with tremendous loss. The result proved as decisive as the most sanguine anticipations of the French autocrat could have desired; and faithfully had his army redeemed their pledge, tendered on the eve of battle, that they would celebrate

the anniversary of his coronation in a manner worthy of its glory. The Emperor Francis sued for peace, and submitted to the harsh and humiliating terms proposed by his conqueror. From a comparison of Austerlitz with Pharsalia, it will be seen that neither was a battle of any complicated manœuvres, but each was distinguished by one masterly stroke. In either case, the plan of attack adopted by the defeated generals, was entirely overthrown, and utter ruin hurled back upon them with an overwhelming force, which swept down resistance, and has left to future ages two of the most memorable examples of military skill in the annals of ancient and modern warfare. In the disastrous conflict at Austerlitz, the allied army lost 40,000 men, 180 pieces of artillery, and forty-five standards or colours: 20,000 were killed and wounded, and 20,000 prisoners remained in the hands of the victors. Many battalions (as at Blenheim) were pushed into a lake which was slightly frozen over, and perished from the ice giving way. The French diminished their own loss to 2,500 men in all; but a comparison of authorities fixes 10,000 as the more probable estimate. These systematic falsifications of the Imperial bulletins distance all ordinary ideas even of romance. They invariably claim a victory under the most undoubted defeat; they did so at Leipsic and Waterloo, and announced Trafalgar as a rash encounter on the part of the English, who had lost their admiral and half their fleet. This reminds us of the practice of an agreeable old lady of our early acquaintance, an inveterate whist-player, who always marked two by honours and the odd trick, after every deal, no matter whether she had won or lost. On being remonstrated with, she said in elegant vernacular—“ Sir, I always does it, and its your business to find me out if I am wrong." "To lie like a bulletin❞ passed into a proverbial expression with the French themselves: and as Napoleon is well known to have caused these authentic documents, in most instances, to be written from his own dictation, the credit they have acquired reflects back on their originator. From Austerlitz, Napoleon proceeded to the campaign of Jena, where he prostrated the armies of Prussia, and almost reduced that kingdom to a province. Too late in the field, taken in detail, and badly commanded, they

were beaten easily, and never allowed themselves a chance. It required many campaigns, and a long experience of the constancy of England, before the nations of the Continent woke up to a conviction, that a vast combined effort, with overwhelming numbers, could alone break down the colossal power their own errors bad assisted to amalgamate. Even after the resources of their great enemy were exhausted, they allowed him to terrify them by the shadow of his reputation, and had more than once almost submitted to his name. It proved so at Chatillon, in 1814, when the advance on Paris was suspended, and terms were offered, which, fortunately for the peace of Europe, were rejected, in the presumption of a momentary

success.

It has been computed that in the wars of Cæsar and Napoleon, six millions of their fellow-creatures were sacrificed to the Moloch of personal ambition. A fearful agglomerate of crime, and a tremendous responsibility. When we think of the misery entailed on the existing generations, reflection sickens at the name of glory, and pronounces such military renown a Satanic delusion. The laurelled diadem is too much clotted with gore to be an enviable ornament. The warrior who fights to preserve his country from invasion and to secure her independence, is compounded of more refined materials (" the precious porcelain of the human clay ") than the despot who seeks only to raise himself above his fellow man, and deals with human life as so many steps in the ladder of his own advancement.

But

so long as the constitution of the world is framed as it is at present, there will continue to be "wars, and rumours of wars," and the history of battles will be invested with an absorbing interest; whatever may be the influence of religion, the advance of civilisation, or the efficacy of peace congresses. Even unmilitary readers wish to understand, and have explained to them, the skil ful combinations by which great results are obtained, and to follow the track of the commanding genius, which, like the destroying angel in Addison's panegyric on Marlborough, at Blenheim :

Rides in the whilrwind, and directs the storm."

The insatiable temperament of Napoleon, and his belief that he was a man of destiny, led him to Moscow, from

whence his fall may be dated. Cæsar, with equal desire of self-aggrandisement, had more collected prudence. Napoleon, when he entered on the Russian campaign, violated all his own military maxims. He left the Spanish war in full operation in his rear, and suffered both his flanks to be uncovered, by the defalcation of Sweden and the peace of Russia with the Turks. Cæsar, on the other hand, did not cross the Adriatic to settle affairs with Pompey, after he had driven him from Italy, until he first extinguished the revolt in Spain, and entirely dissipated all danger from that direction. Napoleon on every occasion found an apology for the actions of Cæsar, and was fond of instituting a comparison between himself and the illustrious Roman. Both having first risen into notice by victories over the enemies of the republic, ended the struggles for power between conflicting parties, by reducing all under their own absolute dominion. In the events of their lives, as in personal character, there were many points of resemblance, and others diametrically opposed. In the parallels of Plutarch, he places in relief the opposite qualities of his selected heroes, as minutely as those in which he traced coincidence. In the resources of war, in the application of new principles, the irresistible weight of attack, the power of concentrating a superior force on a given point, and in the rapidity of following up an advantage, the abilities of Cæsar and Napoleon were equal and similar. As generals they stand in the same line, unless it may be conceded that the French Emperor was more original in his conceptions, and more grandly comprehensive in his plans of carrying them out. He built himself on Frederic the Great and other renowned warriors of recent history, whose examples, as they existed not for the instruction of Cæsar, the Roman was unable to apply in support of his own genius. Modern warfare, too, is a more complicated science than it was amongst the ancients, and the result of battles since the invention of artillery depends more on the skill of the general, and less on the individual prowess of the common soldier. Cæsar was more careful of his men, and as he generally fought with inferior numbers, the lives of his veterans were too valuable to be rashly imperilled. Napoleon had no thought of loss if the sacrifice attained his ob

ject. He even sometimes dispensed with hospitals, discontinued the luxury and impediment of tents, and was termed by Moreau, a conqueror at the rate of ten thousand men a day. The sarcasm was as just as it was bitter, and the system removed many obstacles by which a less impassable spirit (to use his own expression) would have been checked or foiled. "Il me faut des hommes impassables" was one of his constant admonitions in directing the affairs of Spain. By this he meant men that would carry out his views without scruple of conscience, or any interfering weakness in the guise of ordinary feeling. A laxity of discipline after conquest, and indulgence in indiscriminate plunder and spoliation, was thus introduced, which degraded the character of the soldier, and almost reduced him to the level of a bandit. Cæsar and Napoleon possessed equally the rare talent of attaching their troops by personal affection. Under their command, men looked to victory as certain, and followed them with a devoted love which amounted to fascination. In legislative acquirements, it is difficult to assign a palm of superiority to either. In oratory and scientific knowledge, Cæsar stood above the modern at a great elevation. Napoleon uttered pithy sentences on the eve of battle, but his speeches were all artifieial, theatrical, and got up for effect. What in the former was natural eloquence, in the latter was studied charlatanerie. Cæsar was, perhaps, on the whole, the most merciful and forgiving conqueror that ever lived. His natural generosity of mind, and clemency of temper, made him superior to personal enmity or private jealousies. He conquered to command, and pardoned without fear of consequences. Lord Bacon qualifies this generosity, and says "it was an affectation of popularity. For nothing," he observes,

is more popular than to forgive our enemies." Napoleon, although not habitually ferocious, suffered passion sometimes to supersede his reason, and gave way to ebullitions of temper to which Cæsar never yielded. The French Emperor considered it a weakness in the character of his favourite hero, that he suffered his enemies to retain the power to injure him. The

physician, Antommarchi, who reports the observation, admitted that when he looked on the person before him, he could not but acknowledge that he was unlikely to fall into such an error.* Yet Cæsar sometimes became cruel, and almost treacherous. He put to death many eminent officers whom he had taken after the battle of Thapsus (perhaps he already repented the leniency of Pharsalia), and violating his recent peace with the Germans, massacred in one day three hundred thousand men. Napoleon's execution of the Duke d'Enghein was an act of unprovoked barbarity, a deliberate murder, which no sophistry can palliate, and from the odium and responsibility of which, no special pleading can deliver his memory. But on one point of comparison he stands high above the Roman. In the austere propriety, the stoical regularity of his early life. At thirty-one he had made himself absolute master of France, from a subaltern officer of artillery. Up to thirty-five, Cæsar was only known by his turbulence, his debaucheries, and his extravagant waste. Napoleon was ever methodical, careful, and calculating, in matters of finance. Cæsar lavished millions, without caring whence they proceeded or how they were bestowed. As an author, the palm must be awarded to the Roman. Napoleon's memoirs and maxims, dictated to his companions in exile at St. Helena, are not to be compared to Cæsar's commentaries, composed by his own hand, amidst the abstraction and turmoil of his campaigns, and comprising a perfect specimen of military annals. Cæsar was never defeated in a pitched battle, or foiled in the result of a campaign. The glory of Napoleon was qualified by several reverses, and the battles he lost were at least as remarkable, though not so numerous, as those he gained. Cæsar always acknowledged his errors, and laid them freely to the account of his own imprudence. Napoleon, by his own statement, was never in the wrong. In his successes, fortune had no share; in his defeats, he was destitute of blame. They either arose from the fury of the elements, the combination of impossible circumstances, the incapacity of his deputies, or the obstinate blundering of his op