facts in the case are still the same. Somehow sin managed to creep in, and it has wrought in the great mass of the events of human history, from Adam to the present moment. To say that God did not will its existence is to say that there are some things of which God is not the controlling cause, and thus give it an existence independent of God. To say that God desired to prevent it, but could not, and thus it came in against his will, is to say that God is subject to a power higher than himself, and thus to propound the most naked Fatalism. In either case the result is inevitable-that all the large portion of human history which records the doings of sin, comes to pass by a "course of things independent of God and of a controlling cause" ordained of him; and this is substantially Fatalism. We may say that this course of events was directed by fate, or by chance, or that it was not directed at all; but the moment we exclude from it God and his will, we admit that it is a "course of things independent of God."

If it be said that this course of things was not fixed and unalterable, but that it might have been otherwise, and herein consists the difference between this position and Fatalism, we reply, this makes a bad matter still worse. Because, whether or not this "course of things by which sin came into the world and maintained its ground, contrary to the will of God, was fixed and unalterable, it is quite certain that it is so now; for it is too late to alter it, or make it otherwise than as it is. If, therefore, it was not unalterable, to all intents and purposes it might as well have been so; for no good can result from any real or imaginary possibility that it might have been otherwise. Moreover, if this "course of things" was not fixed and unalterable, and made so by the will of God, then he did not reign in and over it, and it is still

"independent of him and without a controlling cause;" and in this wide domain, with which God has nothing to do, and in which his will is not done, there is room enough for any reasonable amount of fate or chance.

If, again, it be said that, although this "course of things" is not absolutely pervaded by the will of God as its supreme law, nevertheless, sin does not work in spite of the will of God to the contrary, because he permits it, though he does not order it, the answer is somewhat as follows: The idea of permission involves the thought of two separate and distinct parties, or powers, each acting per se. One man can not be said to permit another to do a thing, unless that other be a distinct party, having in himself power to do. One party may, indeed, be stronger than the other, and have power to hinder the other from doing a given act. Voluntary forbearance to exercise the power of hinderance is permission, and that permission is an absolute acknowledgment of the independence of the other in the premises. When, therefore, we say that God permits sin, we mean, if we mean any thing: 1, That man is as much a separate and distinct power in himself as God; 2, That God is stronger than man, and could, if he would, hinder him from the performance of all sinful acts; 3, He chooses not to exercise the power of hinderance, and thus practically acknowledges man's independence in the premises. So, then, through the doctrine of permission we come to a wide and long "course of things" which do actually take place "independent of God." We may call it Fatalism, or what we please, the identity of the thing itself is unmistakable. In any or all these views, it is plain that the door to Fatalism is opened wide, and if it does not enter and find a lodgment there, it is not that there is not room enough and to spare.

The only way that we can conceive it possible to close this door effectually, and shut out Fatalism beyond all hope of admission, is to place God before all, and above all, and in all, and thus make the will of Infinite Wisdom and Goodness the supreme law, the controlling cause of all causes, and thus deny utterly that there is any such possible phenomenon as a "course of things, independent of God, or any controlling cause." To shut out Fatalism we must propound Theism, and make God the ruler, not in part only, but in all things, and his divine and intelligent will the law that molds, shapes, controls, and directs, the "course of things" every-where and always. In such a system it is manifest that there is nothing left for fate to do, and fatality is an impossible thought. And yet, after having labored this matter, and done our best to establish the doctrine of pure Theism, to the utter exclusion of the idea of Fatalism, we must be permitted to regard it as a little remarkable that the first and most frequent objection we have to meet, is that we teach the very thing that we have toiled to overthrow.

The next objection is that this view of the subject makes God the author of evil, and especially of the monster evil, sin. But before we proceed to answer this objection, there are certain preliminaries that must be settled. We must first determine what evil is, and what sin is; and not until these questions are definitely answered, can we decide whether or not God is their author, or whether it is an impeachment of his character to attribute their origin to him. These matters will come up in due season, and then this objection will be considered.

CHAPTER X.

FREE AGENCY.

Free Agency a Question of Anthropology-Definition of Terms-Liberty and Freedom--Liberty Under Control-The Laws of Being-Distinction Between Freedom of Action and Freedom of Choice--Choice the Effect of Causes-Reasoning in a Circle-The Will Depends on Antecedent ActsHereditary Proclivities Human Volitions Effects from Causes God Reigns In and Over All Volitions-Efficient Causes-No Choice Without a Cause "The Liberty of Indifference"-Statement of Position-The Sovereignty and Efficiency of God-Conclusions.

WE have before remarked that the question of Free Agency belongs properly to the domain of Anthropology, and not to Theology. It relates to the nature and powers of man, and not to God. Nevertheless, it is so incorporated into the religious systems of the world, and the latter are so modified by it, that it must needs be introduced into a treatise that is intended to be theological in its character. Especially does it become us to give it a respectful attention, because it occupies the front rank in the array of objections urged against the views of the divine government that we have endeavored to unfold. At every turn we are met with the cry that we destroy man's free agency and reduce him to a mere machine. Nay, worse, we thus deny man's accountability and make God the author of all the sin there is in the world. It is possible that the premises may be correct and the conclusions

legitimately drawn.

purpose calmly and

Whether they are so or not, it is our seriously to inquire, and our aim will

be not so much to remove an objection as to search for truth in the case. The first and most important step to be taken, is, clearly to define and correctly to understand the terms we employ.

What do we mean by the term Free Agency? An agent, in the common use of the word, is a man who acts in the room and stead of another, and who is expected to be under the direction of his principal, and to obey his orders. Philosophically speaking, the means employed to a given end are the agents of its accomplishment. Thus, there are chemical and mechanical agents. And so, wind, water, steam, and fire, are agents. In metaphysical science, and in theological works, an agent is an intelligent being, who has the power of acting and doing. That power may exist in the being per se, as in the case of God, or it may be derived from and dependent upon another, as in the case of man, all whose powers are derived and not original; and in either case the being who possesses the power to act is an agent. A free agent is an actor who is at liberty to act in accordance with the will, choice, or determination of his own mind. Or, in more philosophical phrase, a free agent is one who is at liberty to act according to the internal laws of his being, as those laws are modified and affected by the external circumstances in which he is placed.

We have done our best to condense our idea of a free agent into a brief definition. And yet we are aware that our definition needs explanation and illustration. We have used the term liberty as a synonym for freedom, and we mean by that term simply the absence of arbitrary resistance or hinderance. In common discourse we are in the habit of speaking of liberty, or freedom, as if it were a