We cannot speak of attraction or repulfion, for example, but as powers belonging to, and refiding in fome thing, fubftance, or ef fence, but our ideas do not go beyond these powers; and when we attempt to form any thing of an idea of the fubftance of matter, exclufive of the powers which it has, and exclufive of the impenetrability which it has not, all ideas vanish from the mind, and nothing, abfolutely nothing, is left for an object of contemplation. If it be ftill called a substance, it is, however, as immaterial a one as any person can wish for. In reality, the term immateriality never did, or could suggest any idea whatever. That the term fubftance and effence are of no use but as modes of expreffion, is evident from our speaking of the fubStance or effence of things, as if they themselves were only properties.

If then our ideas concerning matter do not go beyond the powers of which it is poffeffed, much lefs can our ideas go beyond powers, properties, or attributes, with refpect to the divine Being; and if we confine our definition of God to thefe, it is not poffible that we can make any mistake, or fuffer by our misconceptions. Now the powers and properties of the Divine mind, as clearly deduced from the works of God, are not only fo infinitely fuperior to thofe of the human mind, when there is fome analogy between them, but fo effentially different from them in other refpects, that whatever term we make use of to

denote

denote the one, it must be improperly applied to the other.

In two circumftances that we do know, and probably in many others of which we have no knowledge at all, the human and divine nature, finite and infinite intelligence, moft effentially differ. The firft is, that our attention is neceffarily confined to one thing, whereas he who made, and continually fupports all things, muft equally attend to all things at the fame time; which is a moft aftonishing, but neceffary attribute of the one fupreme God, of which we can form no conception; and confequently, in this refpect, no finite mind, or nature, can be compared with the Divine.

Again, the Deity not only attends to every thing, but must be capable of either producing or annihilating any thing. For fince all that we know of bodies, are their powers, and the divine Being changes thofe powers at pleafure, it is evident that he can take them all away, and confequently annihilate the very fubftance; for without powers, substance is nothing. And fince he can communicate powers, it is evident that he can produce fubftance. So that, in this refpect alfo, as the Divine powers, fo the Divine nature must be effentially different from ours; and confequently no common term except fuch comprehenfive terms as being, nature, &c, can be properly used to exprefs them both.

Again, as the Divine nature has properties incompatible with all created and finite natures, fo though there must be fome common property in all beings that have any action or influence upon one another, there is no evidence of the Divine nature being poffeffed of the properties of other fubftances in fuch a manner as to be intitled to the same appellation. For example, the Divine effence cannot be the object of any of our fenfes, as every thing that we call matter is. For though the divine Being, in order to his acting every where, must be every where, we are not sensible of his prefence by our fight, hearing, or feeling, &c.

There is, therefore, upon the whole, manifold reason to conclude, that the Divine nature, or effence, befides being fimply unknown to us, as every nature or effence is, has properties moft effentially different from every thing else; and therefore we fhall certainly deceive ourselves if we call things fo different from one another by any common

name.

Upon the whole, it is plain, that no proof of the materiality of man can be extended, by any juft analogy, to a proof or evidence of a fimilar materiality of the Divine nature; for the properties or powers being different, the fubftance or effence (if it be any convenience to us to use fuch terms at all) muft be different also.

If

If by the term immaterial we fimply mean to denote a fubftance that has properties and powers effentially different from those of created matter, it is plain that I have no objection to the term, and in this fenfe I do believe it is, in fact, used by the generality of mankind. But if, with modern metaphyficians, we intend to denote by it a substance. that has no property whatever in common with matter, and that even bears no relation to space, I muft deny that any fuch fubftance exifts; because, according to fuch a definition, the divine Being is neceffarily cut off from all communication with, and all action or influence upon, his own creation.

But let us make use of what terms we please to express the Divine nature, or mode of exiftence, we are not able to come any nearer to an adequate conception concerning them. God is, and ever muft remain the incomprehenfible, the object of our most profound reverence, and awful adoration. Compared with him, all other beings are as nothing, and less than nothing. He filleth all in all, and he is all in all.

I would obferve, however, and I think it but juftice to those who may happen to see this fubject in a different light from that in which I have here represented it, that should any person, on account of the very few circumftances in which the Divine nature resembles other natures, think proper to apply

the

the term material to both, the hypothefis advanced in this treatise concerning the nature of matter, which excludes impenetrability, or folidity from being a property of it, (by which, as we may fay, the reproach of matter is wiped off) makes this to be a very different kind of materialism from that groffer fort, which, however, has been maintained by many pious chriftians, and was certainly the real belief of most of the early Fathers.

It is only on account of the notion that matter is neceffarily inert, and abfolutely incapable of intelligence, thought, or action, that it has been deemed dangerous to afcribe it either to a finite, or to the infinite mind; but when this reproach is wiped away, the danger vanishes of courfe. It is the powers of fupreme intelligence, omnipotence, unbounded goodness, and univerfal providence, that we reverence in the Deity; and whatever be the effence to which we believe these powers belong, it must appear equally refpectable to us, whether we call it material or immaterial; because it is not the fubftance, of which we have no idea at all, but the properties that are the object of our contemplation and regard.

All that we can pretend to know of God, is his infinite wifdom, power, and goodness. We fee, and feel the effects and influence of these every moment of our lives; but it is impoffible we fhould fee or feel the fub ftance to which these powers belong; and,

2

there