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reference whatever to the immateriality of the divine nature, but only to his intelligence, and moral perfections; and therefore requiring truth in the inward part, or a spiritual, as opposed to a corporeal homage; and this very paffage is alledged by fome of the fathers as an argument for the corporeity of the divine

nature.

When the Divine Being compares himself with idols, which is frequent in Ifaiah, Jeremiah, and other prophets, on which occasion they are faid to be wood and fione, incapable of motion, knowledge, or fenfe, it is never faid, by way of contraft, as might naturally be expected in this connection, that the true God is altogether immaterial, and incapable of local prefence. On the contrary, we find nothing on thefe occafions but declarations concerning the divine power and knowledge, especially with refpect to future events, on which fubject the true God more especially challenges the falfe ones.

I think I may conclude this fection with obferving, that our modern metaphyfical notions, concerning the ftrict immateriality of the Divine Being, were certainly not drawn from the fcriptures. In thofe facred books we read of nothing but the infinite power, wif dom, and goodness of God; and to imprefs our minds with the more awful ideas of him, he is generally reprefented as refiding in heaven, and furrounded with a fplendor, through which no mortal eye can pierce. But he is L

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fo far from being faid to be what we now call immaterial, that every description of him, even in the New Teftament, gives us an idea of fomething filling, and penetrating all things, and therefore of no form, or known mode of existence.

For my part, I do not fee how this notion. of immateriality, in the ftrict metaphyfical fense of the word, is at all calculated to heighten our veneration for the Divine Being. And though, as is no wonder, we are utterly confounded when we attempt to form any conception of a being properly pervading, and Supporting all things, we are still more con

founded when we endeavour to conceive of a being that has no extenfion, no common property with matter, and no relation to space. Alfo, by the help of thefe principles, which I have been endeavouring to cftablish, we get rid of two difficulties, which appear to me to be abfolutely infuperable upon the common hypothefis, viz. how an immaterial being, not exifting in fpace, can create, or act upon, matter; when, according to the definition of the terms, they are abfolutely incapable of bearing any relation to each other.

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Of the Arguments for the BEING and PERFECTIONS of GOD, on the System of Materialifm.

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OTWITHSTANDING the opinion of the materiality of man has, in reality, nothing at all to do with the doctrine concerning God, yet as it has often been charged with leading to Atheism, I fhall fhew, in this fection, that our practical knowledge of God ftands independent of any conception whatever concerning even the divine effence; from whence it will clearly follow, a fortiori, that it must certainly be altogether independent of any opinion concerning human nature.

The arguments for the being and attributes of a God stand precisely upon the fame footing on the material or the immaterial system, except the single article of materiality or immateriality itself, which relating to the effence of the Deity only, is no attribute that any way refpects us, and cannot in the leaft contribute to heighten, or to leffen, our love and reverence for him, our obligation to obedience, or our fubmiffion to his will. Confidering, however, the prejudices that may arife on this subject, it may not be amifs to review some of the arguments, as laid down in my Inftitutes of Natural Religion, where I made fuch

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fuch a diftribution of the fubject, as I hope will make the difcuffion of it more eafy than it had been before.

By a God, I mean an intelligent firft caufe. This being proved, I confider what other properties or attributes are neceffarily connected with the idea of a firft caufe, and afterwards those which the examination of the works of God leads us to afcribe to him. Laftly, the divine goodness being the only moral quality that we directly discover, I confider how it is neceffarily branched out into the different modifications of justice, mercy, veracity, &c.

In the proof of an intelligent cause of all things, it is impoffible that the confideration of the divine effence can be at all concerned. For the fame reason that the table on which I write, or the watch that lies before me, must have had a maker, myself, and the world I live in muft have had a maker too and a defign, a fitness of parts to each other, and to

an end are no lefs obvious in the one cafe than in the other. I have, therefore, the very fame reason to conclude that an intelligent mind produced the one, as the other (meaning by the word mind the fubject of intelligence) and my idea of the degree of intelligence requifite for each of these productions rifes in proportion to the number of particulars neceffary to be attended to in each, and the completeness with which they are adapted to the ends which they manifeftly fubferve. Judging by this obvious rule, I neceffarily

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conclude, that the intelligence of the being that made myself and the world muft infinitely exceed that of the perfon who made the table or the watch.

This fimple argument for the being of a God, or an intelligent maker of all things, notwithstanding Dr. Ofwald, out of his great zeal for religion, has muftered up all his logic to invalidate it, I confider as irrefragable, whether we be able to proceed any farther in the inquiry or not,

Again, for the fame reafon that the maker of the table, or of the watch, must be different from the table or the watch, it is equally manifeft that the maker of myself, of the world, and of the universe (meaning by it all the worlds that we fuppofe to exift) must be a being different from myfelf, the world, or the univerfe; which is a fufficient anfwer to the reasoning of Spinoza, who, making the universe itself to be God, did, in fact, deny that there was any God. I am not acquainted with any arguments more conclufive than thefe; that is, fuppofing a God to exift, it is not in nature poffible, that there could have been more, or ftronger evidence of it than we find. This argument is, in fact, the foundation of all our practical and ufeful knowledge concerning God, and in this the confideration of materiality or immateriality has certainly no concern.

The argument alfo against an eternal fucceffion of finite beings, of men, for inftance,

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