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thing, and above all things; that he is in all things by his operation, but that his act being his fubftance, one may truly fay he is, both in act and fubftance, every where. Dupin, vol. vii. p. 109.

Gautier of Mauritania, in the twelfth century, maintained against Thierry, that God is omniprefent by his effence, as well as by his power. Ib. vol. x. p. 173.

T. Aquinas, alfo, and the other schoolmen, fay that God is every where by his effence, as well as his power. Summa, p. 281, He fays farther, that God is a pure act, purus actus; p. 7, that he is in all places and all things, not excluding other things, but as containing them, not contained by them and as the whole foul is in every part of the body, fo the whole Deity is in all, and every thing. Deus totus eft in omnibus et fingulis. p. 7, 16. If they had any ideas to this language, which indeed is not eafy to fuppofe, they must have confidered the divine effence as not deftitute of extension, and in this ftate the opinion continued till the reformation. omida a

Crellius, giving a fummary view of what was generally afferted concerning God, mentions the following positions, which he juftly confiders as contradictory; that God is infinite (with refpect to immenfity) and yet wholly contained in the smallest particle of duft, or point of space; that he fo exifts in any whole body, that there is no part of the body that is not full of God, nor, on the

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other hand, is there any part of the divine effence that is not in the body. De Deo, cap. 27.

Bayle fays that, till Descartes, all doctors, divines and philofophers gave extenfion to fpirit, an infinite one to God, and a finite one to angels and rational fouls. He and his followers, fay the writers of the Encyclopedie (Article Immenfité) first denied that God was present any where by his fubftance, but only by his knowledge and power, having no relation to place; that otherwife he would be extended and corporeal, for he made extenfion to be a proper definition of matter.

Beaufobre, indeed, fays, vol. i. p. 482, that philofophers before Defcartes made the extenfion of fpirits not to be material, nor compofed of parts, and that spirits are, with respect to the place that they occupy, tóti in toto, et toti in fingulis partibus. The Cartefians, fays he, have overturned all these opinions; maintaining that spirits have no extenfion, nor local prefence. But he adds this fyftem is rejected as abfurd. It has appeared, however, that local prefence was not admitted by all the writers here referred to.

Some very refpectable writers, fince Defcartes, have rejected his metaphyfical notions. Thus Beza, in anfwer to Marnix, who maintained that the divine omniprefence refpected his power and majefty only, afferted his proper and fubftantial immenfity. Beaufobre, vol. i. P. 507.

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We shall the lefs wonder at Defcartes's metaphyfical refinements with refpect to the di-.. vine effence and prefence, when we confider the manner in which he proved the being of God: He difcovered within himself the idea of an eternal, infinite, and all-perfect being. But every idea having an archetype, this muft have one; and existence being a perfection, this perfect being, or God, must actually and neceffarily exift.

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An Account of the different Opinions that have been maintained concerning the SOUL.

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HE ftate of opinions relating to the divine effence is a fufficient guide to us with refpect to the doctrine concerning the human foul, and other finite intelligences, as they neceffarily correfpond to one another. But for this reafon, in order to gain intire fatisfaction with respect to either fubject, we must examine them both feparately. I fhall, therefore, in this fection, go over the fame ground. as in the laft, in order to felect what has been advanced concerning the human foul, as diftinct from the Divine Being. And this will be the more useful, as it will, at the fame time, shew the derivation of the philofophical doctrine on this fubject in the Western part of the world, from the Oriental fyftem. So that in

the

the more ancient times, there was no material difference of opinion with refpect to it. And the many wild opinions that have been entertained in later times will be an inftructive warning to us, of the confequence of departing from the dictates of revelation; which are indeed thofe of the foundeft philofophy, and of common fenfe.

PART. I.

The Opinions of the HEATHENS and Jews.

THE opinion of the ancient Perfians concerning the foul is clearly enough expreffed in the following verfe from the Oracles of Zoroafter, whether they be genuine or not.

Εισι πανία πυρος ενος εκδεδαώα. L.. 29.

They are all produced from one fire. Souls were, therefore, of the nature of fire. We find, however, in later times, feveral diftinctions with refpect to the foul in the Eaftern part of the world; and these alfo were copied, with fome variation, by the Greeks and chriftians. The hypothefis of two Jouls, one of a celeftial fubftance, or the rational foul, and the other material, the feat of the paffions, was very generally received. It was, fays Beaufobre (vol. ii. p. 420.) that of the Magi, the Chaldeans, and Egyptians; O

and

and Pythagoras and Plato had it from them. It was alfo an old opinion in the Barbaric philofophy, that man derives his body from the earth, his foul, ux, from the moon, and his fpirit, vua, from the fun; and that after death each of them returns to its proper origin. ib. vol. i. p, 309. We find, alfo, some difference of opinion with respect to the place where the fouls were disposed of after death. The Chaldeans thought that the place of departed spirits was above the world, but the Greeks thought it was below. Stanley by Le Clerc, p. 175.

We have no very fatisfactory account of the philofophy of the Chinese. It appears, however, that Confufius believed no future ftate of rewards and punishments. Being asked what angels or spirits are, he answered they are air, and this fays Leland (Neceffity of Revelation, vol. ii. p. 295,) is the notion that the Chinese have of the foul. They look upon it to be a material thing, though highly rarefied.

When we come to the Greek philofophy, we find a confiderable variety of opinions with refpect to the effence of the foul; but all of them, who believed that there was properly any fuch thing as a foul, held the opinion of its being an emanation from the Divine Being. Cudworth fays, p. 38, 39, that all the ancients who afferted the foul's immortality, held that it was not generated, or made out of nothing ; for that then it might return to nothing, and therefore

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