body itself. It will alfo appear, from the moft obvious confiderations, that without a power of attraction, a power which has always been confidered as fomething quite diftinct from matter itself, there cannot be any fuch a thing as matter; confequently, that this foreign property, as it has been called, is in reality abfolutely effential to its very nature and being. For when we fuppofe bodies to be divefted of it, they come to be nothing at all.

T

Thefe pofitions, though not abfolutely new, will appear paradoxical to moft perfons, but I beg a candid hearing; and I appeal to the allowed rules of philosophizing above mentioned, being confident that they will fufficiently fupport my conclufions.

It will readily be allowed, that every body, as folid and impenetrable, must neceffarily have fome particular form or shape; but it is no lefs obvious, that no fuch figured thing can exift, unless the parts of which it confifts have a mutual attraction, so as either to keep contiguous to, or preferve a certain diftance. from each other. This power of attraction, therefore, must be effential to the actual exiftence of all matter; fince no substance can retain any form without it.

This argument equally affects the smallest atoms, as the largest bodies that are compofed of them. An atom, by which I mean an ultimate component part of any grofs body, is neceffarily fuppofed to be perfectly folid, B 3

wholly

wholly impervious to any other atom; and it must also be round, or fquare, or of some other determinate form. But the parts of fuch a body (as this folid atom must be divifible, and therefore have parts) must be infinitely hard, and therefore muft have powers of mutual attraction infinitely ftrong, or it could not hold together, that is, it could not exift as a folid atom. Take away the power therefore, and the folidity of the atom intirely disappears. In fhort, it is then no longer matter; being deftitute of the fundamental properties of fuch a fubftance.

The reason why folid extent has been thought to be a complete definition of matter, is because it was imagined that we could separate from our idea of it every thing else belonging to it, and leave these two properties independent of the reft, and subsisting by themfelves. But it was not confidered, that, in confequence of taking away attraction, which is a power, folidity itself vanishes.

But

It will perhaps be faid, that the particles of which any folid atom confifts, may be conceived to be placed clofe together, without any mutual attraction between them. then this atom will be intirely deftitute of compactness, and hardness, which is requifite to its being impenetrable. Or if its parts be held together by fome foreign power, it will fill be true that power is neceffary to its f lidity and effence; fince without it every particle would fall from each other, and be difperfed.

perfed. And this being true of the ultimate particles, as well as of grofs bodies, the confequence must be, that the whole fubftance will abfolutely vanish. For as the large bodies would be diffolved without fome principle of union, or some power, internal or external, fo the parts of which they are compofed would, in fimilar circumftances, be refolved into fmaller parts, and confequently (the fmallest parts being refolved in the fame manner) the whole fubftance muft abfolutely disappear, nothing at all being left for the imagination to fix upon.

It will be observed, that, in this difquifition, I by no means fuppofe that these powers, which I make to be effential to the being of matter, and without which it cannot exift as a material fubftance at all, are felf-existent in it. All that my argument amounts to, is, that from whatever fource thefe powers are derived, or by whatever being they are communicated, matter cannot exist without them; and if that fuperior power, or being, withdraw its influence, the fubftance itself neceffarily ceafes to exift, or is annihilated. Whatever folidity any body has, it is poffeffed of only in confequence of being endued with certain powers, and together with this caufe, folidity, being no more than an effect, muft cease, if there be any foundation for the plaineft and best eftablished rules of reafoning in philofophy. Though

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Though Mr. Locke confidered folidity as conftituting the effence of matter (fee Essay, &c. vol. ii. p. 141, where he says, "that "fubftance that has the modification of fo

lidity is matter,") yet it is plain he had an idea of fomething elfe, being in fact neceffary to its cohesion. "If God," fays he, Effay, vol. ii. p. 148, "cannot join things together "by connections inconceivable to us, we must

deny the confiftence, and being, even of "matter itself; fince every particle of it "having fome bulk, has its parts connected "by ways inconceivable by us."

Mr. Baxter, who, I believe, is confidered as the ableft defender of the ftrict immaterial fyftem, acknowledges that powers of refiftance and cohesion are effential to matter, and abfolutely make it a folid fubftance. But afferting, as he does, that these powers are the immediate agency of the Deity himself, it neceffarily follows that there is not in nature any fuch thing as matter, diftinct from the Deity, and bis operations. A ftrange opinion, but that in which Mr. Baxter's hypothefis neceffarily terminates; though, fince he was not apprized of it, it ought not to be imputed to him.

"Refiftance," fays Mr. Baxter, Effay, vol. ii. P. 345, " is fundamental in the nature of "matter, and this itself is the power of the "immaterial caufe, indefinently impreffed up

on, and exerted in, every poffible part of "matter. And fince without this, these least

parts

parts could not cohere at all, or make a folid, making resistance, it appears that "the power of this caufe thus inceffantly put "forth, through all its poffible parts, is that " which conftitutes the folidity and resistance "of matter.-Without this foreign influence to "effect cohefion, and folidity in it, we could 66 not conceive it to be at all a fubftance."

But it is certainly more agreeable to the rules of philofophizing, to confider all the conftant effects of any fubftance as produced by powers properly belonging to that fubftance, whether they be neceffarily inherent in it, or communicated to it; fo that the action of the Deity in preserving such a substance in being, will be a different thing from the Deity himfelf, by his immediate agency, performing all that we afcribe to that fubftance; which is in effect to annihilate the fubftance, and to make the Deity himfelf to do, and to be every thing.

The opinion that all the powers of matter are nothing but the immediate agency of the Deity, is not peculiar to Mr. Baxter, though it is that which chiefly distinguishes his writings. It was held by the famous Jordano Bruno, as his fentiments are represented by the author of Examen du Fatalifme, "All the "motions," fays he, "which ftrike our fenfes, "the refiftance which we find in matter, are "the effect of the immediate action of God. "The smallest parts of matter are united by a force; and as there is no active force in

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nature,,