CURSORY OBSERVATIONS.

NO. V.-ON FUTURE PUNISHMENT.

I HAVE hesitated about introducing this subject, in the present course of observations, because there is no question upon it that does, accurately speaking, divide Orthodox and Liberal Christians. The great question, about the duration of future punishment, has been brought very little into debate between the parties, and it has no particular connexion with any of the speculative questions that are in debate. If Universalism, considered as a denial of all future punishment, has more affinity with any one theological system than another, it undoubtedly is Calvinism; and it is a well known fact, that it originally sprung from Calvinism, and existed in the closest connexion with it.

Still, however, since it is latterly urged, by the Orthodox, that there is a great difference between them and their opponents, on this subject, and since, as I apprehend, a difference does exist in their general views and speculations, and one that deserves to be discussed, I have thought proper to bring it into the course of my remarks.

As the subject has been very little discussed among us, I shall treat it, not so much in the form of controversy, as with that calm and dispassionate disquisition, which more properly belongs to a theme so solemu and weighty.

I. The retribution of guilt is serious in the contemplation, and must be severe in the endurance. The penal suffering of a guilty mind, wherever, and whenever it comes, must be great. This, to me, is the first and clearest of all truths, with regard to the punishment of sin. Even experience teaches us this; and Scripture, with many words of awful warning, confirms the darkest admonitions of experience. If sin is not repented of, in this life, then its punishment must take place in a future world.

Of the miseries of that future state, I do not need the idea of a direct infliction from God, to give me a fearful impression. Of all the unveiled horrors of that world nothing seems so terrific, as the self-inflicted torture of a guilty conscience. It will be enough to fill the measure of his woe, that the sinner shall be left to himself that he shall be left to the natural consequences of his wickedness. In the universe, there are no agents to work out the misery of the soul like its own fell passions; not the fire, the darkness, the flood, or the tempest. Nothing, within the range of our conceptions, can equal the dread silence of conscience, the calm desperation of remorse, the corroding of ungratified desire, the gnawing worm of envy, the bitter cup of disappointment, the blighting curse of hatred. These, pushed to their extremity, may be enough to destroy the soul—as lesser sufferings, in this world, are sometimes found to destroy the reason.

But whatever that future calamity will be, I believe it is the highest idea we can form of it, to suppose that it is of the sinner's own procuring; that the burden of his transgressions will fall upon him, by its own weight; not be hurled upon him, as a thunder-bolt from heaven. If we should suppose a wicked man to live always on earth, and to proceed in his career of iniquity, adding sin to sin, arming conscience with new terrors, gathering and enhancing all horrible diseases and distempers, and increasing and accumulating the load of infamy and woe-this might give us some faint idea of the extent to which sin may go in another world.

This, then, is not a subject to be treated lightly, or with any heat or passion; but should be taken home to the most solemn contemplations and deep solicitude of every accountable being.

II. My second remark is, that the scriptural representations of future punishment are not literal nor definite.

That they are not literal is manifest from the consideration, that they are totally inconsistent, if taken literally. If there is a lake of fire, there cannot be a gnawing worm. If it is blackness or darkness, it cannot be a flaming deluge of fire. If it is death and destruction, literally, it cannot be sensible pain. If it is the loss of the soul, it cannot be the suffering of the soul. And yet all these representations are used to describe the future misery. It is plain, therefore, that all cannot be literally true. To suppose them literal, indeed, would be to make the future world like the present; for they are all drawn from present objects. Neither are these representations definite. It is not a definite idea, but "a certain fearful looking-for of judgment," that is given to us, in the present state. We know nothing about the particular place, or the particular circumstances of a future punishment. If these things are not literally described, it follows, indeed, that they are not definitely. For, the moment these descriptions cease to be literal, they cease to furnish ideas of anything that is tangible-of anything that can belong to place or circumstances of anything that has dimensions, shape, or elements. That is to say, they are figurative. They serve but to throw a deeper shadow over the dark abyss; and leave us, not to pry into it with curiosity, but to tremble with fear. Indeed, the very circumstance, that the future woe is unknown, is, in itself, a most awful and appalling circumstance. It may be, that the revelation of it comes to us in general and ambiguous terms, for this very purpose. There is really something more alarming in a certain fearful looking-for of judgment, than in the definite knowledge of it.

Neither, as I believe, are those terms, which describe the duration of future misery, definite. Indeed, why should they be more definite, than those which relate to place or circumstance? In passages where all else is figurative, and that in so very high a degree, why may it not be suspected that what relates to the time may be figurative? This suspicion, drawn from the connected phraseology, may derive additional strength from the subject, about which the language in question is employed. It is the future, the indefinite, the unknown state. What ever stretches into the vast futurity, is to us eternal. We can grasp no thought of everlasting, but that it is indefinite. You may bring this argument home to your own feelings, if you suppose that you had been called to describe some future and awful calamity, which was vast,

indefinite, unknown, terrible—if you consider whether you would not, with these views, have adopted phraseology as strong, as unlimited, as you find in the Scriptures on this subject. If, then, our idea of future punishment extends so far as to provide for the full strength of the language used-if our theory provide for the terms to be explained by it, is it not sufficient?-does it not go far enough?

To these considerations, relating to the language and the principles of interpretation that ought to be applied to it, let it be observed in addition, that the oriental style was habitually and very highly metaphorical, and is to be explained by the impression it would naturally make on those who were accustomed to it; and that even among us, with our cooler imaginations, the terms in question, such as "for ever,' &c. are used figuratively-are applied to limited periods, and this on the most common occasions and subjects. To take one instance for all, as being the strongest of all: there is no higher or more unqualified description of the endurance of future misery, than that which says, "their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Now it has been very plausibly argued thus-that "if ever the time comes when their worm shall die; if ever there shall be a quenching of the fire at all; then it is not true, that their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." And the argument might be as conclusive as it is plausible, were it not for a single passage in the Old Testament, which applies the same language to a punishment confessedly temporary. It is the closing passage of Isaiah: "And they shall go forth"-that is, from Jerusalem, and probably to the valley of Jehoshaphat, where it is well known that carcases were thrown, and an almost perpetual fire kept to consume them-" And they shall go forth, and shall look upon the carcases of the men who have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched, and they shall be an abhorring to all flesh."

I shall only remark farther, upon the Scripture representations, that there is an ambiguity, a generality, a vastness, a terror about them, that seems fitted to check our confident reasonings. It is enough for us to fear. To speculate much, seems not our wisdom. Yet if we will speculate; if we can dispute on such a subject; if we can wrangle about texts and interpretations, and claim the full amount and force of every passage and statement, it may be well for us to be reminded, that we shall only confound ourselves, in our haste, and destroy the positions we take, in our eagerness to defend them. For if any one shall insist on the full force of those declarations, that denounce everlasting misery; his adversary may as fairly take his stand on the opposite texts, which declare that God will have all men to be saved; that Jesus came to destroy death; that death is swallowed up of life. Or if any one shall confine himself to the words eternal, unquenchable, &c. and will allow them no modification, I see not how he can fairly deny to his adversary the equal right of adhering to the representations of death, destruction, loss of the soul, or in other words, of annihilation, which are applied to the same subject. Nay, the latter will seem to have the advantage in the argument, for annihilation is an everlasting calamity. But not to dwell on this, the ambiguity mentioned, furnishes an answer to an im

* Edwards.

portant objection to our views. It is said, if future misery is not literally eternal, what reason is there to think that future happiness is so?-for the same terms are brought to describe both. I answer that neither of them depend on general terms-that we are to look for our belief on all subjects to the scope and tenor of the sacred writings; and that, in particular, the promises of future happiness are all consistent, and leave no obscurity nor doubts. It is life, peace, rest; knowledge, perfection; glory, blessedness. But the threatenings of future evil are ambiguous, dark, obscure, and if taken literally, inconsistent. It is life, and death; being tormented, and being destroyed. It leaves therefore a vague but fearful impression. And such, it seems to me, were the Scriptures intended to leave, the impression of some vast and tremendous calamity, without precisely informing us what it is.

I cannot close this topic without offering one or two observations, independent of the scripture arguments, which seem to me of great weight.

There is one tremendous bearing of the doctrine of literally eternal punishment, the bare statement of which seems to me almost enough to decide the question. Take the instance of a child-who has just begun to be a moral agent; let the age be what it may-we need not now decide-suppose that it has just come to the capacity of being sinful or holy; that it has possessed this capacity one hour or one day; that during this brief period, it has been selfish, passionate, unholy-a case not uncommon, I fear; that in short it has possessed, during this brief period of its probation, a character, which the gospel does not approve, which it condemns, which it threatens :-and can you believe that this child, in ignorance, in imbecility, in temptation; with passions unconsciously nurtured in the sleep of infancy, which are now breaking forth; with scarcely any force of reason to restrain them; with but a slight knowledge of God, with not a thought of futurity-that this child, the creature of weakness and ignorance, is actually, and in one single day, setting the seal to a misery that is eternal, and eternally increasing to a misery which must therefore, in the event, infinitely surpass all that the world, in all the periods of its duration, has suffered or will suffer? Yet this is the doctrine-this is one essential form of the doctrine of literally eternal punishment; and if you cannot believe this, as I am persuaded if you feel the case you cannot, you cannot believe the doctrine at all, in any form.

There is another observation which seems to me equally conclusive. The doctrine, as it appears to me, destroys the natural proofs of the goodness of God. Let it be observed, that every question about this subject may be resolved into this: Is human life a blessing? If not, to what purpose is all that can be said about the order, beauty, richness, and kindly adaptations of this earthly system? What is it to me, that the heavens are glorious to behold, that the earth is fair to look upon― what to me, that I dwell in a splendid mansion-if on the whole I have more reason to be sorrowful than to be happy; if I have more to fear than to hope; if life is more to be lamented than desired; if it is a subject more of regret than gratitude? Is human life, then, a blessing? To deny it, is impiety. To deny it, is to take away all grounds of religious trust and devotion-all grounds of believing in the Sacred Scriptures, and in Jesus. For if God is not good, we can have no con

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fidence in his rectitude or veracity. If God is not good, we cannot know but he may deceive us, with even miraculous proofs of falsehood. Our life, then, is a blessing:-that is, it is a thing to be desired. Now the question is, whether, when it is so difficult to form the character which is required for future happiness; when it is so possible to fail; when the unerring Scriptures are so full of awful warnings; whether any rational being would desire existence, on the terrible condition, that if he did once fail, he would fail for ever-that if he did fail in this short life, he must sink to a helpless, remediless, everlasting woe. word eternity passes easily from our lips, but consider what it importsconsider it deeply, and then say who would think it a favour to take so tremendous a risk? Could any one of us have been brought into being, for one moment, in the maturity of his faculties, to decide on such a proposal, to decide whether he should take such a hazard, surely, he would make the refusal, with a strength of emotion, with a horror of feeling, that would be enough to destroy as it passed over him. "No! no!" he would exclaim, "save me from that tribunal: let me be the nothing that I was; there at least is safety:-save me from the paths of life, that conduct such multitudes-and why not me?-down to everlasting and everliving death!" Now, let us ask, can it be that the all-powerful and infinitely benevolent God has brought beings into existence in circumstances that deserve to be thus regarded!-that he has given them life so fated, so perilous, that if they could comprehend it-if it were not for their ignorance-they would abhor the gift as an infinite curse?

There are various degrees and shades of religious belief, and much that is called such is so low upon the scale, as scarcely to differ from downright scepticism. And I have often been ready to ask, when I have surveyed the aspects of life around me, whether men do really believe on this subject, what is written in their creed. There are those, I know, who have found a great difference between asserting and believing in this case-who, when they came to be impressed with this doctrine, felt as if all the cheerfulness of life was the most horrible insensibility; and as if all the light that was around them, the light that rested on the fair scenes of nature, was turned into darkness and gloom;-felt as if all that is bright and gladdening, in the general aspects of society and of the world, was the most treacherous and terrible illusion! And is it not so, if the popular doctrine be true? I see a busy, toiling, and oftentimes joyous multitude, thronging the villages and cities of the worldhundreds of millions of human beings, to whom happiness is more than life, and misery more than death-I see childhood, dear and lovely childhood, with its opening moral faculties, in ten thousand bosoms, throbbing with new and glad existence-I see the whole world, dwelling in an ignorance, or a moral unconsciousness, almost like that of childhood-and are they, all around me, every hour, by hundreds and by thousands, dropping into a region of woes and agonies and groans, never to be relieved or terminated? Gracious heaven!-if one tenth part of the human race were the next year to die amidst the horrors of famine, that evil, light as it is in the comparison, would cover the earth with a universal mourning!

How evident is it, then, that men have nothing approaching to a belief, of what the popular creed avers on this awful subject. I do not