94 N. J. L. Mausert v. Mutual Distributing Co. But this ground of appeal cannot be considered, for the reasons which we will proceed to state. The record shows that all that was done by counsel of defendant was "to pray an exception to what the court said upon the question of damages." It appears from the charge that the court commented at some length upon the question of damages in various phases of the case. The objection taken at the trial and the ground of appeal go to all that was said by the court on the question of damages. The attention of the trial judge was not directed as to the complaint now made that he had laid down an erroneous measure of damage in a particular phase of the case. It is very likely if the judge's attention had been called to the alleged error he would have recalled the jury and made the necessary correction. As there were several and separate legal propositions dealing with the question of damages laid down by the court, if any one of them was sound, a general exception to all that the court said on the question of damages is too broad and will not be considered. Addis v. Rushmore, 74 N. J. L. 649, and cases cited; Gerhardt v. Boettger, 75 Id. 916; Holt v. United Company, 76 Id. 585; Mittelsdorfer v. West Jersey Railroad Co., 77 Id. 702; Gannon v. Brady Brass Co., 82 Id. 411; Doran v. Asbury Park, 91 Id. 651. In Kargman v. Carlo, 85 N. J. L. 632, Mr. Justice Trenchard, speaking for this court (at p. 636), said: "Common sense and common fairness alike require that if counsel thinks the trial judge has fallen into legal error, he should call attention to it at a time and in such manner that the judge may know that his ruling is to be made a ground of appeal, and therefore afford an opportunity to the judge to revise his ruling and to opposing counsel to modify his position so as to save error." And in Miller v. Delaware River Transportation Co., 85 N. J. L. 700, this court (at p. 703) held: "The new Practice act does not relieve a party from pointing out at the trial to the judge the portion of the charge to which he objects as heretofore, nor making objection to a refusal to charge a reVOL. XCIV. 15 Boynton Real Estate Co. v. Woodbridge. 94 N. J. L. quest, if it is intended to make the same as a basis of appeal. The new Practice act has made no change in that regard, only in that bills of exceptions are no longer necessary." The other grounds of appeal have been examined and considered and we find them to be without merit. Judgment is affirmed, with costs. For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, PARKER, BERGEN, MINTURN, KALISCH, BLACK, WHITE, HEPPENHEIMER, WILLIAMS, TAYLOR, GARDNER, ACKERSON, JJ. 15. For reversal-None. THE BOYNTON REAL ESTATE COMPANY, RESPONDENT, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF WOODBRIDGE, IN THE COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, APPELLANT. Argued November 21, 1919-Decided March 1, 1920. 1. A notice given in pursuance of Pamph. L. 1917, p. 319, ¶ 9, as amended by Pamph. L. 1918, p. 484, ¶ 9, known as the Municipal Corporation act, which states that "notice is hereby given that an ordinance has been introduced for the improvement of the road from West Pond to Kinsey Corner by grading and paving the same in the manner described in the said ordinance, as amended." is insufficient. It does not "briefly describe the proposed improvement" as required by the statute. 2. Precision in describing the improvement may not be necessary under such a notice, but the substance of what the improvement is, is essential to be stated. On appeal from the Supreme Court. For the appellant, J. II. Thayer Martin. For the respondent, Russell E. Watson. 94 N. J. L. Boynton Real Estate Co. v. Woodbridge. The opinion of the court was delivered by BLACK, J. The facts of this case are quite fully set out in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bergen. He set aside the ordinance passed for the improvement of a road from West Pond to Kinsey Corner, in the township of Woodbridge. The ordinance provides for the grading and paving of the road to a width of seventeen feet, pursuant to the statute (Pamph. L. 1917, p. 319, 9, as amended by Pamph. L. 1918, p. 481, ¶ 9), known as the Municipal Corporation act. The only point involved in this discussion is the application of that section to the facts of this case. That part of the section drawn into the controversy reads as follows: "Public notice shall be given to all persons whose lands may be affected thereby or who may be interested therein, of the intention of the governing body to consider the undertaking of such improvement. Such notice shall state the time when and the place where such governing body shall consider the said ordinance, and shall briefly describe the proposed improvement." The notice stated: "Notice is hereby given that an ordinance has been introduced for the improvement of the road from West Pond to Kinsey Corner by grading and paving the same in the manner described in the said ordinance as amended. Said ordinance as amended further provides for financing such improvement and for assessment of one-half of the cost thereof on the property benefited;" then states the time and place, where and when the ordinance would be considered. We concur with the Supreme Court on the point that the notice is not sufficient to satisfy the terms of the statute. It does not briefly describe the proposed improve ment. It may be difficult; it seems impossible to formulate a definition of the words in the statute "briefly describe the proposed improvement" that will fit all cases or that would have any practical value: perhaps, the sufficiency of the notice can only be determined from concrete cases as they may arise. The meaning of the word "notice" in a statute is knowledge or information-whatever puts one upon inquiry amounts to notice. 5 Words and Phrases 1840. "Briefly" Clark v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. 94 N. J. L. means concisely, in a few words. Webster's Dictionary. A short or abridged statement. Standard Dictionary. To "describe" means to narrate, express, explain. Webster's Dictionary. At all events, precision in describing the improvement under such a notice may not be necessary, but the substance of what the improvement is, is essential to be stated. That cannot be ascertained from the notice in this record. Some facts relative to the grading and paving should be stated, so that the property owner may know how he is to be affected by the improvement. As we concur with the Supreme Court in holding the notice in this case insufficient, we deem it unnecessary to express any opinion upon any other point. The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed, with costs. For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, PARKER, MINTURN, KALISCH, BLACK, HEPPENHEIMER, WILLIAMS, GARDNER, ACKERSON, JJ. 12. For reversal-None. ELEAZER E. CLARK ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. LEHIGH VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT. Argued November 24, 1919-Decided March 1, 1920. Where the charter party of a schooner on a voyage from Buenos Ayres to New York provides that the vessel should be paid freight on the cargo, at so much per ton, delivered at New York harbor the schooner was destroyed by fire before it had unloaded or delivered its cargo-it was not error for the trial judge to admit evidence at the trial to show how much freight money was due, which the consignee refused to pay, by reason of the non-delivery of the cargo caused by the fire. The defendant is responsible for the natural and probable consequences of the fire. This was a jury question. 94 N. J. L. Clark v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co. On appeal from the Supreme Court. For the appellant, Collins & Corbin, Gilbert Collins, Lindley M. Garrison, George S. Hobart, and Edgar H. Boles and Richard W. Barrett (of New York). For the respondents, Congleton, Stallman & Hoover, Edwin F. Smith, Jerome T. Congleton and Maximilian M. Stall man. The opinion of the court was delivered by BLACK, J. There is one point involved in this case not discussed and decided in the case of Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. (post p. 236). This is one of the twelve cases tried with that case, growing out of the Black Tom explosion, consolidated by the trial judge with that case for trial and tried with it, before the same jury. The point involved is, that over the objection of the defendant, the trial judge admitted testimony showing the amount of the uncollected freight money due on the cargo of six hundred and ninety-one tons of Quebracho wood, which was burned on the schooner "Walcott." The voyage was from Buenos Ayres to New York. For this, there was a separate verdict for $5,874. The amount of the verdict for this item is admitted to be correct by the appellant, if anything at all should be allowed. The charter party of the schooner provides the vessel should be paid freight, on the cargo, at so much per ton delivered at New York harbor. The schooner was destroyed by the fire before it had unloaded or delivered that portion of the cargo represented by the amount of freight money awarded by the jury. The consignee refused to pay this part of the freight, because the owners of the vessel had not completed their contract, by delivering that part of the cargo which was burned. The claim was therefore made on the defendant, that the negligence of the defendant prevented the plaintiff from performing its contract and becoming entitled to the stipulated |