supposed tendency to such perplexity (if there by any force in it), is not vastly more against Mr. Williams's scheme, than mine. And, here by the way, let it be noted, that by these things it is again demonstrated, that the ninth objection, the great argument considered in the preceding section, concerning the necessity of a known right, in order to a lawful partaking, is exceedingly more against Mr. Williams's principles, than mine; inasmuch as, on his principles, it is so much more difficult for men to know whether they have a right, or have the prescribed qualification, or not. I answered this argument in the second place, by alleging that this doctrine of the necessity of saving grace in order to a right to the Lord's supper, is not properly the cause of the perplexities of doubting saints, in their attendance on this ordinance; though it may be the occasion: but that their own negligence and sin is the true cause; and that this doctrine is no more the cause of these perplexities, than the doctrine of the necessity of saving grace in order to salvation, is the cause of the perplexity of doubting saints when they come to die. Upon which Mr. Williams says, "There is no shadow of resemblance of these cases, because death is no ordinance," &c. But if death is no ordinance, yet it is the required duty of the saints to yield themselves to the Lord, and resign to the will of God, in their death. And in this respect the cases are exactly parallel, that perplexities are just so much the consequence of the respective doctrines, in one case as in the other; that is, the perplexities of a doubting saint on a death-bed, the difficulty and trouble he meets with in resigning himself to the will of God in dying, is just in the same manner the consequence of the doctrine of the necessity of saving grace in order to eternal salvation, as the perplexities of a doubting saint at the Lord's table are the consequence of the doctrine of the necessity of saving grace in order to a right to the Lord's supper. And this is sufficient for my purpose. Mr. Williams himself says, in his answer to Mr. Croswell, p. 122, “ Although there are comparatively few that obtain assurance; yet it is through their own sloth and negligence, that they do not. We fully agree with Mr Perkins that a man in this life may ordinarily be infallibly certain of his salvation." So Mr. Stoddard, in his sermon on One good Sign, says, "There is no necessity that the people of God should lie under darkness and temptation; they may obtain assurance." Now, if this be the case, then certainly there is no justice in laying the temptation and uneasiness, which is the effect of sloth and negligence, to the doctrine I maintain, in those that embrace it. It is a wise dispensation of God, that he has so ordered things, that comfort in ordinances, and in all duties, and under all providences, should be to be obtained in a way of diligence; and that slothfulness should be the way to perplexity and uneasiness, and should be a way hedged up with thorns, agreeable to Prov. xv. 19. That it is so ordered, is for the good of the saints, as it tends to turn them out of this thorny path, into the way of diligence. And so this doctrine, as it has this tendency, has a tendency in the end to that solid peace and comfort, which is the happy fruit of their holy diligence. And that, and not the saints' perplexity, is properly the effect of this doctrine. SECTION XVII. Containing some further Observations on what is said by Mr. Williams in support of the 13th Objection, concerning God's commanding all the Members of the visible Church, that are not ignorant nor scandalous, to attend all external Covenant Duties. It has been already demonstrated (sect. 8th of this third part) that in this argument the question is begged, notwithstanding what Mr. Williams has said to the contrary; which sufficiently overthrows the whole argument. Nevertheless, that I may pass by nothing, which such as are on Mr. Williams's side may be likely to think material; I will here make some further observations on this objection, as represented and supported by Mr. Williams. The chief thing that has the plausible appearance of argument in what Mr. Stoddard and Mr. Williams say on this head, is this; that" for God to require all who are in covenant to come to the Lord's supper, and yet to forbid them to come unconverted, is to suppose, that he both commands them, and forbids them at the same time." And this is thought to be the more manifest, inasmuch as conversion is not in men's power. Though it is not denied, but that God justly requires men to be converted, or to be truly holy. See p. 129, 130. To this I would say, (1.) If when they speak of commanding and forbidding at the same time, they mean God's commanding and forbidding the same thing, at the same time, no such consequence follows from my principles. For that thing, and that only, which I suppose God requires of any, is to come to the Lord's supper with a sanctified heart; and that this God requires at all times, and never forbids at any time; and that to come without this qualification, is what he always forbids, and requires at no time. So that what he requires, at the same time he forbids something, is not the same thing. that he forbids; but a very different and contrary one: and it is no absurdity, to suppose, that God requires one thing, and forbids a contrary thing at the same time. To illustrate this by an example: it was the duty of the Jews at Jerusalem, openly to confess CHRIST, to own him as the Messiah, at that hour when he was led away to be crucified, and openly to testify their adoring respect to him on that extraordinary occasion. But yet they did not believe him to be the Messiah, and could not believe it (many of them at least), since they looked on his present abject circumstances as a demonstration, that he was not the Messiah. It was beyond their power, at least at once, in that instant to give their assent, with all their hearts, to such a supposition. Nor was it in their power, to exercise an adoring respect to him: for besides their strong prejudices, most of them were judicially hardened, and given up to a spirit of unbelief and obstinate rejection of him; as appears by that account, John xii. 39, 40,"Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes," &c. See also Luke xix. 41, 42, and Matt. xiii. 14, 15. And yet it would have been unlawful for them to have made a lying profession; to profess, that they believed him to be the Messiah, and that they received and loved him as such, when at the same time they hated him, and did not believe he was the Messiah. But here is no requiring and forbidding the same thing at the same time for the only thing required of them was, to have faith and love, and to testify it; which was not at all forbidden. (2.) None of the difficulties which Mr. Stoddard or Mr. Williams objects, either God's supposed requiring impossibilities, or his requiring and forbidding at the same time, do follow, any more on my principles, than on Mr. Williams's Mr. Williams maintains, that God calls men this moment to enter into cove nant with him, and commands them to do it, p. 28. One thing implied in this, according to his own frequent explanation of visibly entering into covenant, is professing a belief of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity. Now therefore we will suppose a man to be a candidate for baptism, who has been brought up in Arianism; and is strongly persuaded that the doctrine of the TRINITY is not true: yet he is this moment required to profess that doctrine; but has no ability in a moment to believe the doctrine, because he does not at present see the evidence of it. For as Mr. Williams himself says, in sermon on Christ a King and Witness, p. 91, 92, "The understanding cannot be brought to yield its assent to any truth, which it does not see the truth or apprehend the evidence of. If you would hire him with cart-loads, or ship-loads of gold and silver; if you would imprison him, whip him, burn him; you cannot make him believe a thing to be true, which he apprehends to be incredible, or which he sees no sufficient reason to believe." Now, therefore, what shall the man do, on Mr. Williams's principles? He is commanded to profess the doctrine of the Trinity, which must be professed in order to be lawfully baptized in the name of the Trinity; and on Mr. Williams's principles, he is commanded to do it this mớment yet also on his principles, if the man professes it, and is not morally sincere, or knows he does not believe it, he is guilty of horrible falsehood and prevarication; which God doubtless forbids. Therefore here is certainly as much of an appearance of commanding and forbidding the same thing at the same time, as in the other case. Every husbandman in Israel, that lived even in Christ's time, was required to offer a basket of the first fruits; and was commanded, when he offered it, solemnly to make that profession, concerning the principal facts relating to the redemption out of Egypt, which is prescribed in Deut. xxvi. 5-10, " A Syrian ready to perish was my father," &c. Now supposing there had been an Israelite, who did not believe the truth of all these facts, which came to pass so many ages before (as there are now many in Christendom, who do not believe the facts concerning Jesus Christ), and continued in his unbelief, until the very moment of his offering; God peremptorily requires him to make this profession; yet none will say, that he may lawfully profess these things, at the same time when he does not believe them to be true. However, here is no commanding and forbidding the same thing at the same time: because, though God required the Jews to make this profession, yet the thing required was to believe it and profess it. Though some might not believe it, nor be able for the present to believe it; yet this inability arose from depravity and wickedness of heart, which did not at all excuse their unbelief, for one moment. Mr. Williams himself owns, p. 129, that God may require those things which are out of men's natural power. Now this may be laid down as a truth, of easy and plain evidence: if God may require what wicked men, while such, are unable to perform, then he may also require those things which are connected with it, and which, if the other be done, they would be able to do, and might do, and without which they may not do it. So if God may require an unsanctified man to love him, then he may require him to testify and profess his love, as I suppose Christians do in the act of partaking of the Lord's supper; and yet it may not be lawful for him to testify and profess love, when he has it not. * This instance may show us, that God's requiring all Israel to enter into covenant with him, and seal their covenant in the passover, will not prove, that it was lawful for any to avouch the Lord to be their God, and promise and swear they would perform universal and persevering obedience, when at the same moment they had no love to God, and even then, while speaking the words, continued in a habitual, wilful disobedience to God's commands, and were willing slaves to the devil. Nor will it follow, from these commands given to the Israelites, concerning their covenanting with God, and sealing their cove nant, that God ever did, since the foundation of the world, appoint or command any other covenanting with him, than as giving up themselves wholly and without reserve, both soul and body, both heart and life; or that ever he appointed or commanded any covenanting, wherein men give a part, and keep back a part, give him the outside, and keep back the noblest and best part, the heart, will and affections, for sin and Satan; or that there is any such covenant of God in being; or that such covenanting has not always been as much without foundation in any institution of God, as any of the spurious sacraments of the church of Rome; or that it has not always been strictly forbidden of God; or that it is not absolutely and in itself sinful and unlawful, as truly as the act of Ananias and Sapphira. |