the heart and then shall every man have praise (that is, a right estimate of his person and deeds) from God.' If this were duly considered, many hard thoughts and many harsh words would be spared; men would not be so apt to damn those whom they have no skill to try. 7. Farther a judge should not undertake to proceed against any man, without warning and citing him to appear, or without affording him competent liberty and opportunity to defend and justify himself. Judgment should not be administered clancularly, in dark corners, but in open court: not suspiciously, in a muttering or whispering way; but frankly, with a clear and audible voice: not on surprise, but with allowance of leisure and advice, that the party may be able to apprehend his case and manage his plea for his best defence: for it may justly be presumed, that as he is most concerned, so he is best acquainted with his own proceedings, and may allege reasons for them, which no man can so well perceive as himself; it is therefore fit that he should be heard before he is condemned, that he may not suffer wrong; at least that he may be convinced that he doth not, and that our proceeding may be cleared from misprision; that also the world may be satisfied of justice being done; and that likewise false accusers may be liable to due shame and chastisement. The manner of proceeding used by the Romans, and reported by Festus in St. Paul's case, was full of reason and equity: It is not,' said that governor,' the manner of the Romans to deliver any man to die, before that he, which is accused, have the accusers face to face, and have licence to answer for himself, concerning the crime laid against him.' Otherwise indeed any innocence may easily be oppressed irrecoverably, without any defence, and consequently without any means of evasion or redress. We should never yield both ears to the accuser, but reserve one for the accused. The end of justice, we may consider, is not to condemn, nor to work mischief to any one, but rather, so far as may be, to acquit and prevent evil to all; at least it aimeth to clear the truth, and state the case indifferently; wherefore it is just that all advantage that well can be, should be afforded to the obnoxious party for his justification and deliverance; at least that he be not denied equal advantage with his prosecutors; humanity would allow him some favor; the most rigorous justice cannot refuse him leave to contest his cause on equal terms: wherefore it is fit that he should be acquainted with his case, that competent time and means should be afforded him to prepare for his defence, that his plea should receive, if not a favorable, yet a free audience: the contrary practice is indeed rather backbiting, whispering, supplanting, or sycophantry, than fair and lawful judging. The observation of this rule would also cut off many censures; for seldom it is that our censurers do charge men to their faces, but rather take all possible care that what they say may never come to the ears of those whom they accuse; they fear nothing more than being confronted and detected; they decline the shame and the requital due to their sycophantic practice; which is a manifest argument of their foul dealing; and they no less in reality do thence condemn themselves than they would seem to condemn others. 8. Moreover, a judge is obliged to conform all his determi. nations to the settled rules of judgment, so as never to condemn any man for acting that which is enjoined, or approved, or permitted by them; he must not pronounce according to his private fancy, or particular affection, but according to the standing laws: which, as they are the only certain rules of moral action, the only grounds of obligation, the only standards of guilt and innocence; so in reason they should be the sole measures of judging: he that proceedeth otherwise is an arbitrary and a slippery judge; he incroacheth on the right and' liberty of those with whom he meddleth, pronouncing them guilty whom God and reason do proclaim blameless. This is that which St. Paul doth reprove in the 14th to the Romans, and otherwhere. The case was this: some were of opinion, that abstaining from some kinds of meat, and observing some festival times, were matters of duty required by God; others thought it free to eat any thing, and to use any times alike these, according to such their private opinions, did censure the practices of each other; one party condemned the other as transgressing duty, the other contemned them as weak in judgment: but the Apostle reproveth both as irregular in their behavior, in taxing one another for matters which on BAR. VOL. II. D both hands were indifferent; the divine law having clearly neither enjoined those observances, nor prohibited them; so that each man had a liberty to do, or to abstain, as he thought good, or most agreeable to his duty, and conducible to his salvation. So is it culpable in us to blame any man for doing that which is not repugnant to God's express command, or to the plain dictates of reason. The observing this condition would smother many censures : for do we not commonly reprehend our neighbors for practices wholly blameless, perhaps commendable ? Do we not sometimes grievously reproach them for not complying with our desires, for not serving our interests, for not jumping with our humors, for not dancing after our pipe; for dissenting from us in any conceit, although dubious or false; for discosting from our practice, although bad or inconvenient? Say we not ordinarily, he is morose, peevish, singular, rude, because he would not run with us into the same excess of riot;' he is weak, nice, superstitious, because he constantly and strictly adhereth to his duty; he is negligent, loose, profane, because he useth his liberty in some matters indifferent? Bar such matters of obloquy, into how narrow a compass would it be restrained! 9. Hence farther it is to be supposed that a judge should be a person of good knowlege and ability; well versed and skilful in the laws concerning matters under debate; endued with good measure of reason, enabling him as to sift and canvass matters of fact, so to compare them accurately with the rules of right: for nothing is more absurd than an ignorant and unskilful judge. Men therefore of weak capacity, of mean education, of small experience, are qualified to judge in few cases, most things being placed above their reach; such never should presume to censure actions, the worth or moral quality whereof depend on the stating and resolution of abstruse, intricate, or subtle questions. It is not therefore for mechanics or rustics to judge about difficulties of science, about controversies in religion, about mysteries of policy, or reasons of state; or to censure those who deal in them: in so doing they hugely trespass beyond their calling and sphere; they do strangely misbecome the bench, and will very untowardly misbehave themselves thereon; the decision of such matters is to be re served to those, who by study and experience have attained peculiar faculties to do it respectively. Observing this point would draw many down from their usurped seats of judicature, and stop numberless vain sentences; we should have very few judges left, if all men would be so modest and so wise as not to meddle beyond their skill and ability. 10. Again it is proper for a judge not to make himself an accuser; not to seek for misdemeanors, not to draw more causes under cognisance than are in course presented before him he should rather judge as out of constraint than of choice; rather as sorry to find a necessity, than glad to snatch an occasion of condemning offenders. So should we rather decline than seek the office of censuring our brethren, rather conniving at and concealing their faults, than being forward to expose them; absolute reason only should induce or indispensable necessity force us thereto. This also greatly would diminish the trade of censuring; for if we should never censure without great reason or necessity, how seldom should we do it? Do we not rather affect to do it causelessly and needlessly? Do we not eagerly search after and greedily embrace all occasions to do it? Is it not a pleasant entertainment to us, to be carping and cavilling at any body we meet, at any thing we see done? Farther, 11. He that pretendeth to judge others should himself be innocent; under no indictment, and not liable to condemnation. Is it not very improper for a criminal, for one who is not only in truth and in his own conscience guilty, but who standeth actually convicted of heinous offences, to sit on the bench, determining about the deeds and the states of others? It is the case of us all, we are all notoriously guilty of heinous crimes before God, we all do lie under the sentence of his law; we do all stand in need of pardon from our Judge, his mercy is our only hope and refuge and shall we then pretend to be judges, or be passing sentence on our brethren? If only those who are free and guiltless should judge, who could undertake it? There would surely be no more than there appeared then, when in the case of the woman taken in adultery our : : Lord propounded the like condition ; Ὁ ἀναμάρτητος ὑμῶν, ' he that is without sin among you, let him cast the first stone at her' on which proposition the sequel was; And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even to the last; and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst;' so infallibly should no man be allowed to judge, who were not himself void of like guilt, would every man escape censure. 12. Lastly it is the property of a good judge to proceed with great moderation, equity, candor, and mildness; as a general friend, a friend to justice, to the public, to mankind, to the party impeached. As a friend to justice, he should be careful that the defendant receive no wrong in his credit or interest; as a lover of the public, he should wish that no offences or scandals be found; out of humanity he should desire that no man may incur the blemish of guilt, or pain of suffering; he should tender the party's case as compassionable, and desire that he may be delivered from the evil threatening him this should render him willing to acquit and free the party, apt to apprehend and interpret all things favorably, ready to excuse and mollify the business what he can; far from picking faults out of obscure surmises or slender pretences, from aggravating the miscarriages that are detected, from stretching the blame farther than it will reach of itself, or making the case worse than it needs must be, from pronouncing a harsh or heavy sentence thereon. He should always be of council to the defendant, pleading his cause so far as truth and equity will permit; putting himself in his case, and thence nowise dealing with him more rigorously than he, according to impartial judgment, should in the like case deem it equal that himself should be dealt with in fine, however the matter in the result appear to stand, he should avoid rigor and extremity, he should exercise clemency and mercy. If this course were observed, innumerable causes, which now are severely judged, would never be mentioned, or come under trial, but would presently be cast out; many would soon, after small discussion, be voided; few would pass that extremity of |