LECTURE IX. ON CERTAIN ANALOGIES BETWEEN THE BIBLE AND "THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE." IF there are many peculiarities in the Bible which seem in contrariety to what might be naturally expected of man, there are also many peculiarities which seem in analogy with the "works and ways of God;" and the concurrence of such contrariety and analogy is not insignificant in this argument. It has been generally and justly asserted that the chief use of Analogy, and especially in relation to theology, is in the refutation of objections; and Butler's book shows what a powerful solvent it is. But it is not without force on the positive side, in proportion to the number, closeness, and subtlety of the observed analogies.' At first sight it may seem strange that an argument, In a passage, justly commended by Bishop Hampden, Dugald Stewart observes: "I may be permitted to express my doubts whether both of these ingenious writers (Reid and Campbell) have not somewhat underrated the importance of analogy as a medium of proof and as a source of new information. I acknowledge, at the same time, that between the positive and negative applications of this species of evidence there is an essential difference. . . . . In some instances, however, the probability resulting from a concurrence of different analogies may rise so high, as to produce an effect on the belief scarcely distinguishable from moral certainty." the very same in substance and direction, should appear to be so cogent in one aspect, and so much less cogent, or even feeble, in another. The reason is that, though the argument is the same in itself in either case, it derives its principal force, as an answer to objections, precisely from the objector's own state of mind. So employed, it is strictly an argumentum ad hominem. An illustration or two will make this plain. If it were contended that a man could not have written a certain letter, on account of some supposed incompatibility between its sentiment or expression, and some indications of the character of the writer otherwise known, then it would demonstrate the absolute futility of this conclusion if we could produce an undoubted letter of the same man, in which similar sentiments had been expressed, and in identical terms. Or the other hand, if it were contended that the man did write the letter, merely because it was marked by modes of thought and expression which harmonised with what he was known to have thought and said, then the conclusion would at best be but probable, and in many cases precarious. Similarly, if it were contended that a certain painting could not be by Raphael, from some supposed enormous incongruity of subject, or from the mode of treatment, then it would be sufficient to annul that objection, if we could produce a genuine work of that same artist to which the same objections might be made. But if it were argued that the work was a genuine painting of Raphael, because it had many characteristics of his style, then it would be but a probable conclusion, and in many cases open to much. doubt. Once more: if a being, happily ignorant of our own planet, and familiar only with worlds on which sin and sorrow had never cast their shadow, were to urge that a world could not be otherwise constituted under the government of omnipotent wisdom and love, he would be sadly, but irresistibly, refuted by visiting the earth, or receiving authentic accounts of its condition. He could not deny the fact, though it might be (as it undoubtedly is) an inexplicable difficulty that there should be such a world. On the other hand, if a philosopher were to argue (as many a philosopher has done), from the analogies among the members of our planetary system, - the physical resemblances observable amongst them,-that, since the earth is inhabited, those other orbs, which roll round the same centre of light and heat, must be inhabited also, the conclusion would be but probable and precarious; and, in fact, has been eagerly disputed in one of the most ingeniously sustained and instructive controversies of our day. - Nevertheless, in this last case, could it be shown that a second, a third, a fourth planet and so of the rest, in proportion as they became known—were characterised by more and more of the physical conditions which accompany life in our world, then the argument, though still only founded on probabilities, would be strengthened at each step; and, at last, in |