SERMON VII. 233 I COR. xiij. .7. Believeth all things, Hopeth all things, Endureth all things. I Go on to the next Property of Cha- As the former Property, fo this alfo must be understood with fome Limitation. Charity doth not abfolutely believe all things without any difference or distinction. For First it doth not believe things that are apparently otherwife. It doth not believe things against clear and undeniable Evidence to the contrary. 2. Neither doth fhe believe where there are but greater and stronger probabilities to the contrary. In thefe Cafes 'tis not the Property of Charity to believe. Because, 1. This were most Irrational. Charity is guided and led by the Light of right Reason Reason in all its actings; but it should be blind if it fhould believe against clear Evidence, or against stronger probabilities for the contrary to what the be lieves. There can be no obligation from Charity to fuch a blind and irrational belief. 2. In these Cafes it were not only irrational but impoffible to believe. For the understanding cannot but follow the Light and Evidence which it hath 'tis not in the power of any Man to offer violence to his own Reafon, and to be of fuch a belief only because he will. Well then, fetting afide thefe cafes, Charity believeth all things, that is, all things for the beft, and as inclining toward the better part ftill. To the end we may the better understand how far this property of Charity extends, I fhall endeavour to give you the whole Latitude and Compass of it in these ensuing particulars. 1. Where things that are Good or Evil concerning any Man, that tend to his Commendation or Difparagement, that concerns his Guilt or Innocency, are barely propounded, and nothing offered by way of Proof or Evidence, one way or t'other, there Charity be lieves the best concerning every Man, till fhe fees reafon for the contrary. Charity feeks not to raise Sufpicions and Jealoufies, nor fets a Mans Wits a-work to invent Reasons and Arguments to incline it to the worfer part: but takes things fairly as they lye before it, and makes the best of them for the advantage of the party concerned. 2. Where things of this Nature are doubtfully propounded, where there are many Reasons and Probabilities for the one fide and the other, and the whole matter is almost equally poised, or where 'tis hard to judge on which fide the probabilities are greater, yet if there seem to be but the least advantage for the better fide, there Charity helps to turn the Scale that way, and inclines a Man to believe the best, till he be overpowered by Arguments for the contrary. 3. Even where there feems to be greater probability for the worse than the better, yet ftill Charity fhews its willingness to believe the best, and fo in fome Sense, I mean, in Affection and Defire believes it. And this its Affection and Defire to believe the best, it discovers feveral ways. 1. By being troubled that she fees not fuch full and clear grounds of fuch a belief, as fhe defires. 2. By fufpending all peremptory and abfolute determination of the business, till further enquiry be made, and things be better cleared. 3. By being Heartily glad to see Reafon to believe, and to find things cleared for the better fide. 4. Hoping things may be cleared up better, which at present have an ill Face and too much appearance of that which Charity Heartily wifheth may be otherwife. This is the Nature of Charity; she believeth all things for the best where there is any tolerable grounds of belief, or any the least credibility in things;and where she cannot believe, fhe is troubled that she cannot, and defires to be rid of her disbelief,upon any juftifiable grounds, or reasonable Terms. To apply this briefly. Ufe. This alfo may further discover to us, how very fmall those measures of Charity are which we have arrived at. How fhould we blush to confider how little of this property of Charity is discoverable in us. 1. We are so far from believing all things that have any credibility in them, for the advantage of our Neighbour, fo far from believing the best concerning him, that we most readily believe the very worst, and that upon the weakest and most uncertain grounds. Any idle Story or flying Report that tends to the Defamation and Reproach of our Neigh bour, how ready are we to entertain it, and give credit to it! Yea though it be against a Person whofe Innocency and Integrity we never had the leaft Reason to question. 2. Where things are too apparently amifs, we are fo far from being troubled that there fhould be any thing against him, the Evidence of the Truth whereof is fuch, that we cannot but believe it, that we seem to be glad that we have fomewhat to charge him with, from which he cannot eafily be cleared. We hug and cherish our belief of the truth of what he is charged with, and are unwilling to forgo it; and therefore we imploy our felves to pick up and scrape together Arguments by which we may be farther confirmed in our ill opinion of him, and by which we may confirm others therein. Are these practices the |