Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective, With a New PrefaceHarvard University Press, 30 juni 2009 - 304 sidor Ephraim Kam observes surprise attack through the eyes of its victim in order to understand the causes of the victim's failure to anticipate the coming of war. Emphasing the psychological aspect of warfare, Kam traces the behavior of the victim at various functional levels and from several points of view in order to examine the difficulties and mistakes that permit a nation to be taken by surprise. He argues that anticipation and prediction of a coming war are more complicated than any other issue of strategic estimation, involving such interdependent factors as analytical contradictions, judgemental biases, organizational obstacles, and political as well as military constraints. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective offers implications based on the intelligence perspective, providing both historical background and scientific analysis that draws from the author's vast experience. The book is of utmost value to all those engaged in intelligence work, and to those whose operational or political responsibility brings them in touch with intelligence assessments and the need to authenticate and then adopt them or discount them. Similarly, the book will interest any reader intrigued by decision-making processes that influence individuals and nations at war, and sometimes even shape national destiny. --Ehud Barak, Former Prime Minister of Israel |
Innehåll
| 1 | |
The Components of Surprise Attack | 5 |
Judgmental Biases and Intelligence Analysis | 83 |
The Environment | 157 |
Is Surprise Attack Inevitable? | 213 |
Notes | 236 |
Bibliography | 241 |
Index | 259 |
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Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, With a New Preface Ephraim Kam Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2004 |
Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, With a New Preface Ephraim Kam Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2004 |
Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, With a New Preface Ephraim Kam Begränsad förhandsgranskning - 2004 |
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Al Qaeda alert ambiguous American Amos Tversky analysts and decision analytical process Arab Army assumptions availability heuristic behavior beliefs Betts biases Chinese conceptions countermeasures Cuban missile crisis deception decision makers Defense difficult early warning indicators Egyptian enemy enemy's capabilities enemy's intentions evaluation evidence example expectations explained factors forces German invasion groupthink Hawaii Heuer Hitler hypotheses imminent incoming information influence intelligence agencies intelligence analysts intelligence assessments intelligence community intelligence estimates intelligence failure International interpretation Israel Israeli issue Janis Jervis judgment Kahneman Kimmel Knorr Korea Military Intelligence Moreover North Korean offensive operation organizational overconfidence Pearl Harbor perceived perception policy makers political possible predict probability problem regard relevant reliable reports risk Russia signals situation Six-Day War Slovic South Korea Soviet Stalin strategic surprise strategic warning surprise attack tend threat tions Tversky U.S. Congress victim Wohlstetter Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War