as Marcellus afterwards judiciously observed Capua was to the Carthaginians and their general, what Cannæ had been to the Romans.* There their martial genius, their love of discipline, were lost: there their former fame, and their almost certain hopes of future glory, vanished at once. And, indeed, from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal rapidly advanced to their decline; fortune declared in favour of prudence, and victory seemed now reconciled to the Romans. I know not whether Livy has reason to impute all these fatal consequences to the delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all the circumstances of this history, we shall be hardly able to persuade ourselves, that the little progress which was afterwards made by the arms of Hannibal ought to be ascribed to Capua. It might, indeed, have been one cause, but this would be a very inconsiderable one: and the bravery with which the forces of Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies of consuls and prætors; the towns they took even in sight of the Romans; their maintaining their conquests so vigorously, and staying fourteen years after this in Italy, in spite of the Romans; all these circumstances may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too great a stress on the delights of Capua. The real cause of the decay of Hannibal's affairs was owing to his want of necessary recruits and succours from Carthage. After Mago's speech, the Carthaginian senate had judged it necessary, in order to carry on the conquests in Italy, to send thither a considerable reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty elephants, and a thousand talents; and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, to reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy.† Mago however, could obtain an order but for twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse and even when he was just going to march to Italy with an army so much inferior to that which had been promised him, he was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal, after these mighty promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money sent him, but was left to his own resources. His army was now reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How could it be possible for him, with so inconsiderable an army, to seize, in an enemy's country, on all the advantageous posts; to awe his new allies, to preserve his old conquests, and form new ones; and to keep the field with advantage against two armies of the Romans, which were recruited every year? This was the true cause of the declension of Hannibal's affairs, and of the ruin of those of Carthage. Were the part where Polybius treats of this subject extant, we doubtless should find, that he lays a greater stress on this cause, than on the luxurious delights of Capua. THE TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO SPAIN AND SARDINIA. THE two Scipios continued in the command of Spain. and their arms were making a considerable progress there, when Asdrubal, who alone seemed able to cope with them, received orders from Carthage to march into Italy to the relief of his brother. Before he left Spain, he wrote to the senate to convince them of the absolute necessity of their sending a general in his stead, who possessed abilities adequate to oppose the Romans. Imilcon was therefore sent thither with an army; and Asdrubal commenced his march in order to join his brother. The news of his departure was no sooner known than the greatest part of Spain was subdued by the Scipios. These two generals animated by such signal success, resolved to prevent him, if possible, from leav ing Spain. They considered the danger to which the Romans would be exposed, if, being scarce able to resist Hannibal only, they should be attacked by the two brothers at the head of two powerful armies. They therefore pursued Asdrubal, and coming up with him forced him to fight against his inclination. Asdrubal was overcome; and so far from being able to continue * Capuam Annibali Cannas fuisse: ibi virtutem bellicam, ibi militarem disciplinam, ibi præteriti tempo mia famam, ibi spem futuri extinctam.-Liv. 1. xxüi. n. 45. Ibid. n. 32. † Liv. 1. xxiii. n. 13. A. M. 3790, A.Rome. 534. Liv. xxiii. n. 26-80, 32, 40, 41. his march for Italy, he found that it would be impossible for him to continue with any safety in Spain. The Carthaginians had no better success in Sardinia. Designing to take advantage of some rebellions they had fomented in that country, they lost twelve thousand men in a battle fought with the Romans, who took a still greater number of prisoners, among whom were Asdrubal, surnamed Calvus, Hanno, and Mago, who were distinguished by their birth as well as military exploits. * THE ILL SUCCESS OF HANNIBAL. THE SIEGES OF CAPUA AND ROME. FROM Hannibal's abode in Capua, the Carthaginian affairs in Italy no longer supported their reputation. M. Marcellus, first as prætor, and afterwards as consul, had contributed very much to this revolution. He harassed Hannibal's army on every occasion, seized upon his quarters, forced him to raise sieges, and even defeated him in several engagements; so that he was called the sword of Rome, as Fabius had before been called its buckler. But what most affected the Carthaginian general, was to see Capua besieged by the Romans. In order, therefore, to preserve his reputation among his allies, by a vigorous support of those who held the chief rank as such, he flew to the relief of that city, brought forward his forces, attacked the Romans, and fought several battles to oblige them to raise the siege. At last, seeing all his measures defeated, he marched hastily towards Rome, in order to make a powerful diversion. He had some hopes, in case he could have an opportunity, in the first consternation, to storm some part of the city, of drawing the Roman generals, with all their forces, from the siege of Capua, to the relief of their capital; he flattered himself, at least, that if for the sake of continuing the siege, they should divide their forces, their weakness might then offer an occasion, either to the Capuans or himself, of engaging and defeating them. Rome was struck, but not confounded. A proposal being made by one of the senators, to recall all the armies to succour Rome; Fabius declared that it would be a disgrace for them to be terrified, and forced to change their measures, upon every motion of Hannibal. They therefore contented themselves with only recalling part of the army, and one of the generals, Q. Fulvius, the proconsul, from the siege. Hannibal, after making some devastations, drew up his army in order of battle before the city, and the consul did the same. Both sides were preparing to signalize themselves in a battle, of which Rome was to be the recompense, when a violent storm obliged them to separate. They were no sooner returned to their respective camps, than the face of the heavens grew calm and serene. The same happened frequently afterwards, insomuch that Hannibal, believing that there was something supernatural in the event, said, according to. Livy, that sometimes nis own will, and sometimes fortune, would not suffer him to take Rome T But the circumstance which most surprised and intimidated him, was the news that while he lay encamped at one of the gates of Rome, the Romans had sent out recruits for the army in Spain at another gate; and at the same time disposed of the ground whereon he was encamped, notwithstanding which it had been sold for its full value, such open contempt stung Hannibal to the quick he, therefore, on the other hand, exposed to sale the shops of the goldsmiths round the forum. After this bravado he retired, and, in his march, plundered the rich temple of the goddess Feronia.** *Not Hannibal's brother. † A. M. 3791. A. Rome, 535. Liv. 1. xxiii. n. 41-46. 1, xxv. n. 22, 1, xxvi. n. 5-16. Flagitiosum esse terreri ac circumagi ad omnes Annibalis comminationes.-Liv. l.xxvi. n. 8.. T Audita vox Annibalis fertur, potiundæ sibi urbis Romæ, modo mentem nondari, modo fortunam.-Liv.. 1. xxvi, n. 11. **Feronia was the goddess of groves, and there was one with a temple in it dedicated to her, at the foot of the mountain Soracte. Strabo, speaking of the grove where this goddess was worshipped, says, that a sacrifice was offered annually to her in it; and that her votaries, inspired by this goddess, walked hurt over burning coals. There are still extant some medals of Augustus, in which this goddess is repres sented with a crown on her head Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little longer. After such of its senators as had been principals in the revolt, and consequently could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put themselves to a truly tragical death,* the city surrendered at discretion. The success of this siege, which, by the happy consequences attending it, proved decisive, and gave the Romans a visible superiority over the Carthaginians, displayed at the same time, bow formidable the power of the Romans was, when they undertook to punish their perfidious allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could afford his friends, at a time when they most wanted it. THE DEFEAT AND DEATH OF THE TWO SCIPIOS IN SPAIN. THE face of affairs was very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three armies in that country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisco; the second by Asdrubal, son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had joined the first Asdrubal. The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for dividing their forces, and attacking the enemy separately, which was the cause of their ruin: it accordingly was agreed that Cneus, with a small number of Romans, and thirty thousand Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal the son of Hamilcar; while Publius, with the remainder of the forces, composed of Romans and the allies of Italy, should advance against the other two generals. Publius was vanquished first. Masinissa, elated with the victories he had lately obtained over Syphax, had joined the two leaders whom Publius was to oppose; and was to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful Spanish prince. The armies came to an engagement. The Romans, being thus attacked on all sides at once, made a brave resistance as long as they had their general at their head; but the moment he fell, the few troops which had escaped the slaughter, secured themselves by flight. The three victorious armies marched immediately in quest of Cneus, in order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He was already more than half vanquished, by the desertion of his allies, who all forsook him, and left to the Roman generals this important instruction, viz. never to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of foreigners. He had reason to believe that his brother was slain, and his army defeated, on seeing such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a short time, being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally lamented by their citizens and allies; and the Spaniards bewailed their memory on account of the jus tice and moderation of their conduct. These extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of L. Marcius, a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them to the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither, who fully avenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored the affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flourishing condition. THE DEFEAT AND DEATH OF ASDRUBAL. One unforeseen defeat ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the * Villius Virius, the chief of this conspiracy, after having represented to the Capuan senate, the severe treatment which his country might expect from the Romans, prevailed upon twenty-seven senators to go with him to his own house, where, after eating a plentiful ner, and heating themselves with wine, they all drank poison. Then, taking their last farewell, some withdrew to their own houses, others staid with Virius; and all expired before the gates were opened to the Romans.- 1. xxvi. n. i3, 14. t Confessio expressa hosti, quanta vis in Romanis ad expetendas pœnas ab delibus sociis, et quam mihil in Annibale auxilii ad receptos in fidem tuendos esset.-Liv. 1. xxvi. n. 16. A. M. 3793. A. Rome, 537. Liv. l. xxv. n. 32-39. Id quidem cavendum semper Romanis ducibus erit, exemplaque hæc vere pro documentis habenda. No ita externis credant auxilliis,ut non plus sui roboris suarumque proprie virium in castris habeant.-Liv. n. 33. He attacked the Carthaginians, who had divided themselves into two camps, and were secure, as they thought, from any immediate attempt of the Romans; killed thirty-seven thousand of them; took one thousand eight hundred prisoners, and brought off immense plunder.-Liv. 1. xxv. n. 39. TA. M. 3798. A. Rome, 542. Polyb. 1. xi. p. 622-625. Liv. 1. xxvii. p. 35-39, 52. eleventh of the second Punic war, (for I pass over several events for brevity's sake,) were C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius. The latter hau for his province Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the Brutians and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and was there making head against Hannibal. The passage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to receive him. Some time after this he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so delicate and important a nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself at liberty to dispense with the established rules of his duty, for the welfare of his country.* In consequence of this, it was his opinion, that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be capable of terrifying the enemy, by marching to the relief of his colleague, in order to charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with their united forces. This design, if the several circumstances of it be thoroughly examined, will appear exceedingly remote from imprudence. To prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state. Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which indeed were the flower of his troops, but at the same time, a very inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now, could it be supposed that Hannibal would attack, and force a camp, defended by thirty-five thousand men? Nero set out, without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design. When he advanced so far, that it might be communicated without any danger. he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory; that in war all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that the whole honour of this battle would fall to them. They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in the night, but did not encamp separately the better to impose upon the enemy. The troops on their arrival joined those of Livius. The army of Portius the prætor was encamped near that of the consul, and in the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it might be proper to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves, but Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy, absent as well as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly the signal for battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost ranks, discovered by several circumstances, that fresh troops were arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul. This made him conjecture that his brother had sustained a considerable loss, and, at the same time, fear that he was come too late to his assistance. After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded and his army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his guides deserting, he was uncertain which way to go. He marched at random along the banks of the river Metaurus, and was preparing to cross it, when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of posting his left wing, the weakest part of his army, in such a manner, that it could neither be attacked * No general was allowed to leave his own province, to go into that of another. t Now called Metaro. in front, nor charged in flank; and of giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and first marched to attack the enemy's left wing; well knowing that all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed on both sides. Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new glory to that he had already acquired by a series of brilliant actions. He led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces, endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of so many thousand men, who had quit their country to follow his fortune, he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal. This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had fought during this war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a retaliation for the battle of Cannæ. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,* and six thousand prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand, and were so weary of slaughter, that some person telling Livius, that he might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: It is fit, says he, that some should survive, that they may carry the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians. Nero set out upon his march on the very night which followed the engage. ment. Through all places where he passed, in his return, he was welcomed by shouts of joy and loud acclamations, instead of those fears and uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the sixth day. Asdrubal's head being thrown into that of the Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother's unhappy fate. Hannibal perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: It is finished, says he; I will no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune. He afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians, where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage. SCIPIO CONQUERS ALL SPAIN; IS APPOINTED CONSUL, AND SAILS INTO AFRICA. HANNIBAL IS RECALLED. THE affairs of the Carthaginians were equally unfortunate in Spain.‡ The prudent activity of young Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former flourishing state, as the courageous delay of Fabius had before done in Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco, Hanno, and Mago, having been defeated with their numerous armies by the Romans, in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain, and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans; and Sy phax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians. Scipio, on his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then thirty years of age. He had P. Licinius Crassus for his colleague. Sicily was allotted to Scipio, with permission to cross into Africa, if he found it convenient. He According to Polybius, the loss amounted to but ten thousand men, and that of the Romans to two thousand.-L. xi. p. 870. Edit. Gronov. Horace makes him speak thus, in the beautiful ode where this defeat is described: Carthagini jam non ego nuntios Mittam superbos. Occidit, occidit Spes omnis, et fortuna nostri Nominis, Asdrubale interempto.-Lib, vi. Od. 4. A. M. 3799. A. Rome, 543. Polyb. 1. xi. p. 650. et l. xiv. p. 677-687. et 1. xv. p. 689-694. Lis ). xxviii. n. 1-1, 16, 38, 40-46, 1. xxix. n. 24-36. l. xxx. n. 20-28. A. M. 3800. A. Rome, 544. |