« FöregåendeFortsätt »
pion, Langdon Cheves, Martin Chittenden, Thomas B. Cooke, John Davenport, jr., Roger Davis, Samuel Dinsmoor, Elias Earle, William Ely, James Emott, William Findley, James Fisk, Asa Fitch, Thomas R. Gold, Isaiah L. Green, Bolling Hall, John A. Harper, John M. Hyneman, Richard Jackson, jr., Richard M. Johnson, Lyman Law, Robert Le Roy Livingston, William Lowndes, Aaron Lyle, Thomas Moore, Arunah Metcalf, James Milnor, Samuel L. Mitchill, Jonathan, O. Moseley, Thomas Newbold, William Paulding, jr., Timothy Pitkin, jr., Benjamin Pond, Peter B. Porter, Elisha R. Potter, Josiah Quincy, William Reed, Henry M. Ridgely, William Rodman, Ebenezer Sage, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, Adam Seybert, Samuel Shaw, John Smilie, George Smith, Silas Stow, William Strong, Lewis B. Sturges, George Sullivan, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Uri Tracy, George M. Troup, Charles Turner, jr., Pierre Van Cortlandt, jr., Laban Wheaton, Leonard White, David
R. Williams, William Widgery, and Robert Wright.
The question that the House do concur with the Senate in the said amendments, being stated, and debate arising thereon, an adjournment was called for, and carried. * ,
THURSDAY, December 5.
The SPEAKER laid before the House sundry resolutions adopted by a meeting of a number of the inhabitants of the town and district of St. Louis, in the Territory of Louisiana, expressive of wheir wishes that the second grade of Territorial government may be extended to the said Territory; that the Judges of the General Court be required, by law, to have some permanent interest in the welfare of the inhabitants, and to reside in the Territory: that additional and more equitable provisions be made in favor of claimants to lands in the Territory; and that the limits of the Territory may be more clearly defined; which were read, and referred to the Committee of the Whole on the bill providing for the government of the said Territory. The bill from the Senate" for the relief of Thomas O'Bannon,” was read twice, and referred to the Committee on the Public Lands. The bill from the Senate, “making further provision for the Corps of Engineers,” was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Wednesday next. - Mr. Mitchill presented a petition of Charles Whitlow, of the county and State of New York, nurseryman and botanical collector, praying for a special license to import into the United States all such seeds, grains, and growing plants, as he may deem necessary for the improvement of gardening, farming, science, or the arts; on condition of making a disclosure, for the benefit of the United States, of an important discovery of a native vegetable, possessing, in the highest degree, the qualities for the preparation of cordage, thread and linen cloth.-Referred to the Committee o Commerce and Manufactures. Mr. MoRRow, from the Committee on the Public Lands, made a report on the memorial of the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Indiana Territory, referred the 8th
ultimo; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole to-morrow. Mr. Morrow, from the same committee, made a report on the petition of the Mayor and Aldermen of the city of New Orleans, referred the twenty-eighth ultimo; which was read, and referred to a Committee of the Whole on Monday next. * * * * - - Mr. Bacon, from the Committee of Ways and Means, presented a bill to continue in force, for a limited time, the act, entitled “An act continuing; for a limited time, the salaries of the officers of Government therein mentioned;” which was
read twice, and committed to a Committee of
the Whole on Monday next. - Mr. Bacon, from the same committee, presented a bill to continue in force, for a further, time, the first section of the act, entitled “An act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers;” which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Tuesday next. On motion of Mr. ARcher, the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures were instructed to inquire into the expediency of extending the district of Havre-de-Grace, in the State of Maryland, so as to include Spes-Utice Island, the Northern shore of Elk river, the Eastern shore of Bush river, Susquehanna, and Northeast rivers, and all the waters and shores of the Chesapeake Bay above the mouth of Bush river, on the Western shore, and above the mouth of Elk-river on the Eastern shore of said bay.
APPORTIONMENT OF *REPRESENTATIVEs.
The House, resumed the consideration of the amendments of the Senate to the bill “for the apportionment of Representatives among the sev: eral States, according to the third enumeration.”
Mr. Newton moved that the bill be recommitted to a Committee of the Whole House.—Negatived—ayes 57, noes 60.
Mr. Calhoun said: Before the bill had gone to the Senate, it excited but very little interest with me. All that I had heard from gentlemen on every side, convinced me that it was a squabble among the several States which should bear the loss of large fractions, rather than a serious division on principle, of one-ratio in preference to another. Were I governed alone by fractions I should not rise this day, nor oppose a concurrence with the Senate, from the pride of opinion; for the ratio which the Senate have fixed, is in accordance with my vote on the original bill, although thirty-seven thousand would leave my State with a less fraction unrepresented than thirty-five thousand: but fractions are not my object. I am not here to represent my own State alone. I renounce the idea. And I will show, by my vote, that I contend for the interests of the whole people of this community. The present question, on concurring in the amendment of the Senate, seemed to be totally different, and much more important than the original one. As it now stands it is a case of disagreement between the two Houses, and the contest is, which shall recede. A contest
of this kind (on the census bill) was one of the most serious consequences to the House. The Senate, by persistance, must force this body either to adopt their ratio, or, if that cannot be effected, even annihilate this branch of the Legislature. I consider this a case of omission in our excellent Constitution—one of that kind which must take place, perhaps, in all free constitutions, however formed; but particularly in one like ours, formed by the foresight of wisdom, and not by slow and successive experience. That it is a case of omission and not foreseen, may be inferred from several parts of the Constitution itself. The Constitution makes this House the sole judge of the qualifications and returns of its own members." This is supposed to vest the power so exclusively in us, that a few days since, in a debate on the contested election from Virginia, it was contended with much force of argument, that any law on this subject, as the Senate must participate in it, would be unconstitutional. What is the reason 7 A spirit of jealousy; a manifestintention to preserve this House from the influence of the other; and to prevent the latter from having any control in the interior management of this. If such caution was necessary in this particular, where the cases must, almost necessarily, be few, and often not important, how much more so. in a question of ratio, in which that body may add to or subtract hundreds from this—may force such a ratio on this, as is favorable to the federative principle, and assimilate it to the other in its formation, it may entirely annihilate this House. Again, it is the theory of our Government, and was the favorite idea of all our politicians, at the time of its formation, that liberty can only exist in a divisign of the sovereign power; and that such division could only be permanent where each of the parts had within itself the means of protection. On this principle, the Executive and Judiciary were detached from the Legislature, and this last divided into two branches. Each of these Departments has the means of self-preservation. The first has its qualified veto and its patronage; the Judiciary its independence—and each House a veto on the proceedings of the other. In the ordinary course of legislation, this furnished ample security. Far different on the census bill. Here the whole is, inverted. The vote of the Senate is no longer the means of protection to itself, but becomes a fatal means of assailing this House; it is no more a shield of defence, but a weapon of attack; and when they use it, by withholding their assent, we are anihilated. This great anomaly could not have been foreseen; it must be considered as an omission. What remedy do I propose ? Prevent the Senate from participating in a census bill? By no means; it would be unconstitutional; because there is no clause to that effect. I propose a means in strict unison with the Constitution, and furnished by itself. It has in this instance withheld from us the shield, but has pointed to its spirit. Let us act with a fixed determination; and not accede to the amendment of the Senate. That body, unaided by precedent, and opposed by the spirit
of the Constitution, must recede. Let us follow the example of the House of Commons in England in relation to money bills, and the same effect will follow—but by no means reverse that example. The Senate, strengthened by precedent, will hereafter control us completely. On this ground they have naturally a greater capacity for struggling than we. Unless we insist in the first instance, we must ever hereafter be overpowered. What inducement can gentlemen have, to make the surrender at this time? None can be weaker, than because some of the States have, by the ratio inserted in the Senate, small fractions, and one section of the Union has by it comparatively gained. Will gentlemen for this inconsiderable ain make so great a sacrifice? Particularly those rom large States, who are the greatest gainers by fractions. For this paltry gain, more apparent than real, which can last but for ten years, they surrender a principle of the most vital importance to them. They will enable the Senate in time to reduce them almost to the same terms of equality on this floor with the small States, as they are in the other House. Let it not be said, the Senate will always exercise this power with discretion. It is the part of political wisdom not to trust when it can make secure, and in a case of such vital importance, it will not confide in the strongest probabilities. Faith is an article of religion, but not of politics. But, sir, if any section or State of this Union gained ever so much, I know not how it could justify this abandonment of principle. Who are we? The representatives of the nation; of individual rights; the trustees for the time being of that mass of power which is invested in the hands of the Legislature for the protection of those rights. How then can we make a surrender consistent with the principle, with honor or with conscience, of those important rights so sacredly trusted to our keeping? Mr. Speaker, I wish the task of defending this important point had fallen to abler hands. I feel all that embarrassment which a young man, not much accustomed to speaking, must necessarily experience the first time, before such an audience, and in a place so trying to the voice as this hall. I shall be happy, if in the midst of my embarrassments, I have been intelligible, and have expressed myself with sufficient caution, on so delicate a Olnt. p Mr. RhEA said that, being induced to believe that the great principle of compromise on which he had heretofore voted (which was, that the present representation of the people of any State might not be ...) was abandoned, and that, in place thereof, local, partial, and State interests were substituted, he now, also, would turn his attention to objects of the same nature. He was the more influenced to do this, because the principle of compromise was not only abandoned, but abandoned in a manner highly injurious to the people of Tennessee, one of whose representatives he had the honor to be. If the ratio of thirtyseven thousand had been adhered to, he might have been silent; but, as that ratio is proposed, by
the amendment offered by the Senate, to be no more, and, as the ratio proposed is only one thousand more than the fraction which on that ratio will remain to Tennessee, his duty called on him to protest against this procedure. I will vote, said Mr. R., against concurring with the amendment made by the Senate, which proposes a ratio of thirty-five thousand. And, if that vote was to be spoken with my last breath, it should be io tendered, not only because the amendment, if agreed to, will operate injuriously and unjustly in relation to Tennessee, but, also, by reason that, if agreed to, it will, in my humble opinion, go to fix a principle which, at no very distant period, may shake the foundation of sovereignties. Far be it from me to derogate from the constituted powers of the Senate of the United States, but it may, with all due respect, be observed, that a ratio of apportionment made by the House of Representatives of the sovereign people, and % the commanding majority of 102 to 18 in that House, merits a considerable degree of confidence from the Senate, and, if touched by that honorable House, ought not to be touched nor broken down unless for reasons of an imperious nature. The ratio fixed in the bill was a ratio of compromise, that, thereby, the present representation of the people in any State might not be diminished. When that ratio was fixed in the bill, fractions were little attended to; but it now appears that the avoiding of fractions has taken the place of that magnanimous principle, and crept in to disturb that social and friendly union, which is the basis of the sovereignty of these United states. The offered amendment, then, reduces the ratio to thirty-five thousand. The operation of that ratio on all the other States, except by way of comparison, will be omitted, and its operation by fraction on the State of Tennessee, only, examined. By a ratio of thirty-five thousand, there will remain to Tennessee a fraction of thirtythree thousand nine hundred and jo, one thousand and eighty-seven less than the proposed ratio of this amendment for a representative. It appears that, at a ratio of thirty-five thousand, the four great States of the Union—that is: New York will have a fraction of 8.043; Virginia 12,616; Pennsylvania 4,773; and Massachusetts 740. The aggregate of all , these fractions is about 26,172. The fractions remaining to the States of New Hampshire and Delaware amount
to about 5,464, which, being added to the amount
of the fractions of the four great States, makes an aggregate of about 31,636. Hence, it is manifest that on a ratio of 35,000, a fraction will remain to Tennessee, which is greater than the aggregate of the fractions of the States alluded to. No imperious reason appears, producing this effect, and commanding a descending ratio, to a point within the number 1,160, giving to the people of Tennessee another representative. If the ratio in the proposed amendment be agreed to, the people of the States already named, will have more than one hundred representatives, with an aggregate of remaining fractions of about
31,336; and the people of the State of Tennessee will have six representatives, with a remaining fraction of nearly thirty-four thousand. If the object of the amendment be to reduce great fractions, a ratio of 34,800, would have done away the great fraction of Tennessee, and the people of that State would then have had seven representatives. If then, the ratio must be reduced from 37,000, it is hoped it will be reduced to a number which will remove this great fraction, so that the people of Tennessee shall have seven representatives. . . Mr. Fisk.-Mr. Speaker, I have the honor to represent, in part, a small State, which feels deeply interested in the present question; it is, therefore, with pleasure, I hear the rights and interests of the small States advocated. I am decidedly in favor of concurring with the amendment of the Senate, and, in support of it, shall endeavor to prove that the ratio proposed by the Senate will do less injustice and give a more equal representation to the States than that, fixed on by this House. By the ratio of 37,000, agreed on by the House, Delaware and Vermont, having a population of only 288.899, will have a fraction of 66,899, almost equal to the one-fourth of their whole number, and will deprive Delaware of the one-half of her representation, and Vermont of the one-sixth. By the ratio of 35,000, proposed by the Senate, Vermont and Delaware each gain one representative, while Kentucky, Tennessee, New Jersey, and Ohio, with a population of 1,090,084, will be left with a fraction of 100,084, only equal to about the one-eleventh of their whole number. With these facts before us, I cannot understand by what rule of justice the gentlemen last up from Kentucky, Tennessee, and New Jersey, could advocate the interests of the small States, vote for the ratio agreed to by the House, leaving such monstrous fractions to the States of Delaware and Vermont, and now call on us to join them in rejecting the amendment of the Senate, because of the fractions it leaves in their States, when these fractions are, to their whole numbers, comparatively nothing with those left to Delaware and Vermont by the ratio they voted for. No number can be fixed on as the ratio but what will leave fractions in some of the
Against the doctrines advanced yesterday, by the gentleman from South Carolina, I beg leave to enter my most solemn protest. In these moments of danger from abroad, I am not for declaring war against the Senate—a foreign enemy may soon render a declaration of war both necessary and honorable. The best way of supporting the Constitution, is by acknowledging its principles, and moving within the orbit it has prescribed for us. The framers of the Constitution, for good reasons, no doubt, in the distribution of power to the several branches of our Government, saw fit to give the Senate a participation in the power of fixing theratio for the representation in this House; and it is not competent for us, as legislators, to question the wisdom of this provision. Very little light can be thrown on this subject by precedents drawn from the proceedings of the English Parliament; they are the supreme power; their acts make both the constitution and the law of the country. Not so here. The Constitution is the supreme law and rule to direct our legislative actions. This supreme law, this Constitution, has vested the Senate with the same power, and imposed on them the same obligation'of exercising a sound discretion in legislating on the subject before us that it has to this House. The have the same interests in common with us all, they have solemnly sworn faithfully and impartially to discharge the trust reposed in them, and they would be unworthy their station if they did not do it independently.
Mr. WRight—Mr. Speaker, I hope the House will proceed to decide on the merits of the amendment proposed by the Senate. I, for my part, am prepared to vote for it, although it comes
in the inauspicious shape of an amendment from
that body, so exceptionable in the opinion of the honorable gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun.) I feel no fears of the Senate's subverting the Government while they have a common interest in it. I certainly, when a member of that body, was not less attached to the best interest of my country than I now am, although now directly elected by the sovereign people. J .
The Constitution has wisely provided an equal representation in the Senate to prevent the small States from being injured by the overwhelming majority of the large States, and this appears to me to be one of the cases in which the Senate correctly have interfered, for that purpose, and while they revolve on their own axis, and within
their own Constitutional orbit, I shall always re- |
spect them as a valuable organ of the legislative will of the nation. Sir, let us examine the case. The Constitution declares that “Representatives and direct taxes, shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers.” We find that Delaware, for twenty years, has had a fraction of 30,000 unrepresented, and we know she was directly taxed in the same manner that all the States were, without respect to that fraction, although nearly equal to one-half her whole number; and now, again, by fixing on 37,000 in
stead of the 35,000 proposed by the Senate, she is to be taxed for ten years more on 34,004 unrepresented. We know that, in this body, her feeble voice could not be heard, however just her claims, or honest her pretensions; but, in the Senate, they have been heard and respected; and I trust will now prevail. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. McKee) seems to feel very much for New Jersey, which has a fraction of 31,222, at 35,000; but his sensations do not extend themselves to Delaware, which, for twenty years has had a fraction of 30,000, and at 37,000, will, for ten i. more, have a fraction of 34,004. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. RhEA), seems also to be much alive to the interest of Tennessee; she has a fraction of 33,913; he has said that, if any State had such a fraction imposed on her, he should deem it unjust to impose it, and would oppose it. If he will examine, he will see that Delaware has a fraction of 34,004, and therefore he stands committed to oppose it. Georgia and Massachusetts both have larger fractions than Tennessee. Sir, this question ought to be decided so that the Constitution might be as nearly gratified as possible, by adopting the number that will leave the smallest fraction upon the whole. If gentlemen will examine the document upon the subject, they will find, at 35,000, the unrepresented fractions amount to 249,460; that, at 37,000, the unrepresented fractions amount to 302,262, making a difference of 52,802 in favor of 35,000; so that, on taking into view the interest of all, without respect to particular sections of the Union, there are 52,802 in favor of the proposition of the Senate, which, on principle, ought to be preferred. But we are told that, by fixing on 35,000, the Southern and Western sections of the Union suffer greatly. I have examined that subject, and find that the Southern and Western States, including Maryland, have fractions of 85,764 more than the States to the eastward of Maryland; but I also find, that on examining the fractions of the same-sections at the ratio of 37,000, that the Eastern division of the Union have fractions of 121,448 more than the Southern and Western sections, leaving a balance of 35,784 more against the Eastern section at 37,000 than is against the Southern and Western sections at 35,000; so that the sectional fraction is less at 35,000, as well as the aggregate fraction; therefore, in justice, the number 35,000 ought to prevail. Mr. Gholson.—When this subject was first before the House, a ratio of representation was adopted, which seemed to be the result of prin
ciple, and which appeared also to have been in
dicated by the federal numbers of some of the small States. The principle assumed had reference partly to the small States, and partly to the number of this branch of the Legislature, and accordingly, the highest ratio which would not reduce the present representation of any State was selected by a very large majority. , The ratio taken was one member for 37,000, and this ratio grew not out of fractional calculations, but out of a spirit of magnanimity and conciliation. The
Virginia delegation, I believe, would most of us have preferred 40,000 to a member, but we took 37,000, to prevent what Rhode Island and Connecticut alleged would have been injustice to them, namely, a reduction of their numbers in this body. o For this act of conciliation, how, sir, have we been requited by the small States? They have united in rejecting the ratio of 37,000, and in taking a smaller one, which throws almost all the large fractions on the southern part of the Union. I am very far from ascribing any incorrect intention to any one. I would not, in the slightest degree, insinuate that it was the intention of the Senate, or that it is now within the view of this House to do injustice to any section of this Confederacy. Yet, from the enactment of this bill, as amended by the Senate, the most obvious and manisest injustice would accrue to almost the entire southern portion of the Union. This will appear from a superficial view of the results arising from the ratio of 35,000, which has been substituted by the Senate. The nine States to the north and eastward of Maryland contain the federal number of 3,546,848, and then their aggregate fractions or remainders amount to 81,864. The eight Southern States, inclusive of Maryland, comprise the federal number (deducting for the slaves) of 3,037,412. Thus three and a half millions in the North have about eighty thousand unrepresented, while only about 3,000,000 in the South have near one hundred and seventy thousand unrepresented. The disproportion is enormous. If the Northern States have 81,000 of remainders, the Southern States, according to the law of proportion, should have 69,000. But they have in fact 167,000, from which, if you deduct the rightful proportion of 69,000, it will be evident that they have an over proportion of unrepresented remainders, amounting to 98,000. By adopting the Senate's amendment, the Eastern States, moreover, gain nine Representatives, and the Southern States two only. The ratio of 35,000 is therefore peculiarly unequal in its operation, and consequently unjust. If, Mr. Speaker, the principles which at first guided us upon this subject, are now to be deserted, all that I ask is equality. It was a few days ago remarked by a venerable gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) that at last he expected this matter would resolve itself into pen and ink calculation. Although I reposed much in the discernment of that gentleman, I then hoped his prediction would not be fulfilled. I, however, now begin to discover strong indications that it is to be verified... If so, let this affair be referred for an arithmetical estimate. Let the calculations be only made with tolerable accuracy, and I am content. The gentleman from Maryland has declared his object to be the reduction of the aggregate fraction, and he therefore takes the smallest ratio. The entire fraction at 37,000 is 52,000 greater than at 35,000. Waiving all other objections to the gentleman's reasoning, I would ask him if it is not better that the whole nation should have
a moment on the attention of the House while I
answer some observations of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. SMILIE.) If I understood the gentleman, he said the secret was, that the Southern people wanted the preponderance. Is it meant, sir, to convey, by these expressions, an insinuation that there are Southern men on this floor who act in a secret, clandestine way? Who profess one motive and act from another? Whatever may be intended, the observation is unmerited, and I repel it. I will not, for a moment, allow myself to believe that there is any man in this Assembly who would be capable of such conduct. -. I regret, Mr. Speaker that the gentleman has thought it necessary on this occasion to call over the roll of appointments that have been conferred on particular States, and that he has entered into a comparison of the favors received by Virginia and Pennsylvania in this respect. Topics of this sort are extremely painful to me, and invidious in themselves. Without, therefore, entering myself at all on the subject, I will only observe, that if, in fact, from Virginia there have been more high federal officers than from Pennsylvania, I will leave it entirely to the gentleman from that State to calculate the causes of it. . After considerable further debate the question that the House do concur with the Senate in their first amendment, to wit: to strike out the words “thirty-seven,” before the word “thousand,” and
insert “thirty-five,” being taken, it was deter
mined in the negative–yeas 65, nays 64.