short of a speedy and honorable accommodation of existing differences, securing your rights, or open war, in which you may avenge your wrongs, will meet public expectation. To produce one or the other of these results, and be fully prepared for either alternative, was his object; and he would vote for such a force as appeared to him best calculated for that purpose. If all are serious, said Mr. C., as I trust they are, in the professions made on this subject, the only difference of opinion appears to be in regard to the number and kind of troops necessary to effect the objects in view. Our decision on this point must be governed by the information we possess. The amount, as well as the description of the forces to be raised, ought, in a great degree, to be proportioned to and regulated by the impression intended to be made on your expected enemy, and the probable force to be resisted or subdued. The purpose for which these troops are raised, and the immediate use to be made of them, appear now to be made no secret. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) told you this force of twenty-five thousand troops, proposed to be raised by this bill, ought to be considered the Army of the North, and are intended to take and occupy Canada, &c. If it be intended, said Mr. C., to occupy this country, of which, at present, there appears no ground to doubt, it ought to be done with the least possible delay, and in a time much shorter than would be required to raise so large a regular force. This number, with the present establishment of ten thousand men, make an aggregate amount of thirty-five thousand. Of these you have in service little more than five thousand. Of course, near thirty thousand are yet to be enlisted. To raise and discipline this number, or the half of it, would consume more time than ought to elapse before you act, if you are determined to act with effect. The motion is, to strike out the word "ten," the number of regiments of infantry, for the purpose of inserting "six." This would make the number of troops to be raised by this bill somewhat less than seventeen thousand men, and increase the whole regular force to nearly twentyseven thousand men. Mr. C. said, from the best view which he had been able to take of the subject, upon the information we now possess, this force, aided by a proper proportion of volunteers, would be fully competent to effect any object the Government can have in view; to resist and subdue any force; and to occupy, if necessary, any territory in your neighborhood. On any sudden emergency, the number of volunteers or militia actually employed, might, and, perhaps, generally ought to equal, and, on many occasions, much exceed that of the regular troops, as they could be organized and marched to the scene of action in much shorter time than would be consumed in raising regular troops, would consist of better materials, and could be more relied upon to make a first impression than newly enlisted troops without the advantages of discipline. They would, also, when the service was completed, lay down the military character, return to their homes, DECEMBER, 1811. and again amalgamate with their fellow-citizens, without a murmur. Hence, the expense would be inconsiderable, the time of service being probably short. It is, therefore, fair to calculate, if your regular force amounts to twenty-seven thousand men, that you ought to, and will have in actual service, and, of course, in pay, forty thousand men. And will it be contended that this force is not sufficient to accomplish all the purposes which the most sanguine have in view? But, it seems, volunteers are not now to be relied on You must depend entirely on regular troops-on a standing army. This doctrine is of modern date among Republicans, and may, if it should gain currency, sap the vital principles of your Government. The language of the President on this subject, in his Message, breathes a very different spirit. He recommends "that adequate provision be made for filling the ranks ' and prolonging the enlistments of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force, to be engaged for a more limited term; for the acceptance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services; for detachments, as they may be wanted, of other portions of the militia," &c. Here, we perceive, he considers the new force recommended to be raised as only auxiliary to the present regular force. Hence, it would seem fair to conclude he did not mean the number of the former should exceed that of the latter. But, he seems to place considerable confidence in "volunteer corps," on the ground that their "patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services;" those very kind of services for which the force is now to be provided. He did, therefore, contemplate that such volunteers should constitute an efficient part of the force to be employed in effecting the more important objects now in view; and that, the militia, also, should be engaged, and contribute their share in supporting any contest that might ensue, But, it seems, your volunteers and militia are considered totally incompetent to perform any important military services. From them you are required to withdraw your confidence, and place it in regular troops only, of whom, you must raise an army sufficiently large to effect all your purposes. Let this doctrine be once established, and the people may tremble for their liberties when it is too late-when their chains are riveted upon them by a military power. But the attempt to raise so large a regular force at this moment, would retard instead of accelerate the completion of the objects intended; for, it will be found impracticable to enlist and organize such force in time to act before the proper season is gone; before the ice breaks up in the Spring. You might, indeed, collect that portion which consists of officers, but you cannot fill up the ranks. If ten or fifteen thousand effectives could be brought into service in time, it would equal his most sanguine expectations. You would, therefore, have, it is believed, a force equally efficient, if the proposed amendment prevailed, as if the bill passed in its present shape, while your expenditures would be thereby greatly DECEMBER, 1811. Additional Military Force. SENATE. diminished, and no obstacle whatever presented to there be, at this time, to increase your regular the most decisive and vigorous course of proceed-force to thirty-five thousand men? Have you no ing. If immediate operations be intended, as he trusted they were, they must be principally carried on, in the first instance, by volunteers, who could, and ought to be embodied and prepared to act on the shortest notice. For this purpose, authorize the Executive immediately to officer, organize for a limited time, and put into motion, such number of volunteers who may tender their services, as shall be deemed competent to the occasion; bring to the scene of action as many of your present regular troops as may be spared from other services, and can, with the least delay, be concentrated; and let these, united with your volunteers and such of the new troops as can be raised in time, make the first impression, seize and occupy the country contemplated, and maintain the contest until the additional regular force, about to be raised, can be organized and brought into actual service. These may, then, support, and, in due time, relieve your volunteers. Hold the advantages you may have gained; repel any force that may be brought to oppose them, and extend, if required, your acquisitions; while, in the mean time, sufficient corps of the militia may be called into service and employed within the limits of the Union, with such of the regular troops as may be retained for the purpose, to protect your frontiers from incursions by the savages, and your coasts against attacks from a foreign enemy. confidence in the knowledge possessed, and the opinion formed on this subject by your Government? Have they not as ample means, at least, as we have, to obtain correct information? This, no one, it is presumed, will deny; and the honorable gentlemen told you they are of opinion ten thousand additional troops, making the whole regular force twenty thousand, would be sufficient for the present occasion. To those, the Government, no doubt, intended to add as many corps of volunteers, properly officered and organized for the purpose, as circumstances should require; and such united force would, certainly, be competent, according to the present state of things, to subdue any opposition to be expected, and to occupy any territory in your neighborhood, that comes within the avowed object of your present preparations. But, Mr. C. said, he was willing to go further; to increase the regular force to nearly twenty-seven thousand men, and make ample provision for bringing into actual service such corps of volunteers, officered by the Executive, and such number of the militia as shall be considered necessary. Should his motion not prevail, he would, notwithstanding, vote for the bill, and for any other measures proposed that could, in any degree, contribute to maintain the rights and character of the nation. He should, also, at any future day, vote for such additional troops as the crisis might then require; and this appeared to him the most effiThis mode of proceeding would enable you to cient as well as correct course. Raise, at present, act, before the season shall pass away in which the number proposed by the amendment, which your operations could be carried on, with the most, if not all who are in favor of actual resistleast probable resistance, and the greatest pros-ance, allow to be necessary, and before they are pect of success. The most distinguishing fea- organized, you will be better able to determine ture that could characterize your proceedings, at what additional force, if any, will be necessary. this moment, would be, the expedition with which This would produce more unanimity, occasion you progress, both in Legislative and Executive less delay, and could not, in any possible degree, operations. But, if you wait, as seems to be con- weaken your operative measures, or embarrass templated by the gentleman from Virginia, until your Government. twenty-five or thirty thousand men are, by enlist- Mr. C. said, believing, as he did, the force proments, raised, disciplined, and put in readiness for posed by the amendment fully competent to acactual service, the time to act will have passed complish the objects all profess to have in view, away; the ice will be broken up, and the ap- he was unwilling to vote for a greater number. proaches by water to the country intended as the He was opposed, on principle, to swelling the scene of action, will be thereby opened; and, regular military force beyond the bounds really you may have to effect your object, should it then demanded by the crisis, as it would be setting a be practicable, at more than double the expense dangerous precedent, that might, hereafter, be reof blood and treasure that would have been re- sorted to as a pretext for augmenting, from time quired had you taken advantage of the proper to time, without sufficient cause, or beyond the time. What evidence have we, said Mr. C., to nature of the exigency, your standing army; unshow that so large a regular force as that pro- til the people might, perhaps, be awakened from posed by the bill is necessary? The object, as their security, as has been the case on many ocavowed by the gentleman, is to occupy Canada. casions in other countries, by feeling the pressure From the best information he had been able to ob- of the chains of military despotism. He was, tain, there are not more than six thousand regu- also, unwilling to charge the nation with expenlar troops, if there be that number, in the prov-ditures which its finances were not prepared to ince. The gentleman states the number at about seven thousand. Suppose the latter to be correct, would not double the number of regular troops, (allowing for accidents of every description,) be sufficient to oppose to those? And, would not your volunteers be able to cope with Canadian militia? Upon these data what occasion can meet, and which, in his opinion, the occasion did not require. He trusted it was not the intention of any one, by raising so large a regular force, and thereby incurring so great an expenditure, beyond what it is believed was necessary, to drain your Treasury, embarrass your fiscal concerns, and paralyze the best concerted measures of your Government. If, however, such were the objects intended, a more effectual mode to accomplish them could not be adopted. If war becomes indispensable, you ought not to calculate that it will be of short duration. You can make war, but it does not rest with you alone to make peace. Every effort ought to be made to bring it to a speedy termination, and all the means that could be usefully employed afforded for that purpose. But you ought not, in the beginning, to waste unnecessarily your treasures, which are the sinews of war; your exertions should be proportioned to the resistance to be overcome; and no more of your energies and resources exhausted than the occasion requires; always reserving the residue to meet a more urgent emergency. War once commenced, you ought to calculate on supporting it, on at least the same, if not on a more extended scale, not only for one, but for many years, as it cannot be known how long it may be continued. DECEMBER, 1811. force to be resisted or subdued was not known or believed to be considerable, nor such as to require the number of troops ordered to be raised; but that a majority of Congress took upon themselves, without sufficient cause, to raise this large army, incur this immense expense, and consequently require those new burdens to be imposed. For all this, therefore, and the consequences that may flow therefrom, such majority, and not the Executive, must and will be responsible to the people. Mr. C. said, he would now notice more particularly some of the arguments adduced by the honorable member from Virginia, (Mr. GILES.) He did not propose following him through the various course of his reasoning, much of which, however ingenious, did not appear to him relevant to this subject, and although on that account would not now be answered, he did not subscribe to. The honorable gentleman said, in case of war, your present military force of 10,000 men The American people, said Mr. C., will, with- would be required to protect your Western frontout a murmur, support any expenditures they be- iers, and prevent New Orleans and Florida being lieve necessary to maintain the rights and avenge taken by the British, &c.; and, therefore, that the wrongs of their country. But they will ex- 25,000 additional regulars would be necessary, and pect you to restrict those expenditures to such little enough, to effect your purposes in the North, only as the emergency shall require; and that be- &c. Mr. C. said no object could be more interfore you call on them for new contributions, youesting to the Western country than the security will be prepared to show you have disposed of of New Orleans; no one could feel more sensibly the means already in your hands to the best ad- than he did the importance of affording effectual vantage. Your Government has, no doubt, esti-protection to that place, as well as to Florida and mated the probable amount of force that would the Western frontiers; and he believed no one be required to accomplish the objects in view; was more anxious than himself, or would go furthey have probably made arrangements, so far as ther to provide the most ample means, and such rested with them, to meet the expenses of such as could be most usefully employed for those purforce; they would also, he conceived, be in a poses. He trusted the gentleman's professed regreat degree responsible that it was competent gard for the protection of that quarter of the for the purposes for which it was raised, should be Union, was sincere and would long continue. He employed to effect those purposes, and that your would not, however, suffer himself to be induced finances could be rendered adequate to its sup- by his anxiety for even those favorite and highly port. But what are you about to do by this bill? important objects, to abandon his solemn duty, Derange all those plans and change the respon- by raising a force so much larger than, in his sibility. Instead of twenty or twenty-five thou-opinion, the occasion required. He was inclined sand, the number deemed sufficient, you force to believe 5,000 regular troops, with the aid of upon the Government thirty-five thousand regu- volunteers and militia, would be competent to lar troops. You thereby take upon yourselves protect New Orleans and its neighborhood. The the responsibility of raising a force much larger number of forces necessary to protect the Westthan was required, or can be usefully employed; ern frontiers would depend upon circumstances, of occasioning a great unnecessary expenditure, and the disposition of the neighboring Indian which will drain your Treasury, embarrass your tribes. But a considerable proportion of the finances, and probably compel you to impose new force requisite for that purpose might consist of burdens on the people. Will they not inquire volunteers, or corps raised for a limited time, into the causes of those extraordinary measures, whose services would be equally useful, and and ask wherefore were those new taxes im- would enable the Government to dispense with posed, those expenditures incurred? What occa- the employment of any large portion of your regsion was there for so large a regular army? Onular troops in that quarter. We have as yet, said what great emergency were they to be employed, and what numerous force was to be resisted or subdued? Those will be natural inquiries, and the answers will, no doubt, suggest themselves, that a great portion of these expenditures was incurred contrary to the views of the Executive, and for which he would in no respect be responsible; that little more than half the regular force raised was deemed competent to effect all the practicable objects within your reach; that the Mr. C., taken possession of that part only of West Florida, to which our territorial claim extends, and there appears no ground, at present, to be alarmed for its safety. The employment, therefore, of so large a regular force as 10,000 men in that quarter, does not appear necessary, and can furnish no good ground for raising so large an additional army as that contemplated by this bill. But the gentleman inquires, what you would think of New Orleans and New York being taken by the British? and observes, if this should take place, you would not remain in power, or be the men who would end the war, &c. It might not be very important, said Mr. C., to the nation, whether the men now in power should long continue to enjoy it or not; or whether, in case there should be war, they or their successors should terminate it. Measures and not men is the maxim by which we ought to regulate our conduct; and if their successors should be equally or more competent to execute the important trusts reposed in them the nation would have nothing to apprehend from the change. It was, however, a doctrine to which he could not subscribe, that they were to act contrary to what they believed their duty, in order to avoid losing their places. But why this attempt, said Mr. C., to exaggerate the dangers and raise the fears of the citizens of New York and New Orleans? and to excite in the public mind apprehensions for the safety of those places? This could answer no valuable purpose; its only effect would be to produce groundless alarms, and inflame, for a while, the public sensibility. There appeared no substantial grounds to be alarmed for the safety of either of those places. The position of New Orleans is such as renders it difficult of approach to an enemy, and, by the employment of proper means, capable of being successfully defended. The fortifications of New York are stated by those best informed on the subject to be in such a state of completion as would enable that place to resist any attack likely to be made upon it; and there is no rational ground to doubt that Government will employ the best means they possess for the security and protection of those places. The gentleman did indeed make a statement, said Mr. C., which, at the time, very much sur prised me. It was, (as I took his words down,) that he did know it was the intention of the former Administration in case of war, not to protect New Orleans, but let Great Britain take it; and that the Western people would be left to retake it themselves;" "that he did not know the intention of the present Administration on this subject, but believed it to be the same with that of the former." This appears to me, said Mr. C., a charge of the most serious and alarming nature, and, if well-founded, would merit the most severe reprehension. But to establish it, under existing circumstances, would require strong and incontestable proofs. That the Government should, without any known inducement, abandon one of the most important places in the nation, and, without attempting its defence, suffer it to pass into the hands of an enemy, is, in itself, so improbable, and would argue so great a weakness, or what is worse, such political depravity, that if I had no knowledge of the transaction alluded to, or of the persons then composing the Government, I could not, without the most convincing evidence, persuade myself to believe it. I should be forced to conclude that however sincerely the gentleman might believe what he stated, he must have been misinformed on the subject, or have mistaken the views of the Administration. And SENATE. here it might seem natural to inquire, if the gentleman was, at the time, informed of designs entertained by the Administration, so derogatory to the character, as well as dangerous to the dignity of the nation, and so evidently ruinous to the Western portion of the Union, why he did not make them known to the public, or at least to those who were so deeply interested in guarding against their consequences? But, said Mr. C., in 1808-9, the time it is presumed alluded to, when some apprehensions were entertained for the safety of New Orleans, I was a member of the other House, It became my duty to ascertain, so far as circumstances rendered it proper, the measures intended to be adopted, and the means that were to be used for the protection of that place, whose safety was so important to the people I represented; and if confidence could be placed in the declarations of those who then composed the Administration, (and their veracity, it is believed, has hitherto never been justly questioned,) it was their intention and solemn determination to defend it to the last extremity, in case it was attacked, by all the disposable force and means in their power. That this was their real intention appears sufficiently established by their subsequent conduct, in sending a considerable number of troops, as well as gunboats, to that place for the object alone of protecting it; and who were ordered to take such position as should be best calculated for that purpose. The destructive calamity experienced by those troops from the insalubrity of the climate, must be fresh in the recollection of all. But the uniform conduct of the late Executive, during the whole course of his administration, (of which unreserved candor was a distinguishing characteristic.) and in particular, the just regard he paid on all proper occasions to the best interests of the Western people, are of themselves more than sufficient to shield him against the imputation of the views now ascribed to him. I cannot, however, but express my regret that this statement, made at this time, should have the appearance of throwing a censure on the conduct of the late venerable President. He has retired, accompanied by the plaudits of his fellow-citizens, and the high respect of the real friends to civil liberty throughout the world, to the shades of private life. Why not suffer him to repose there undisturbed? I can hardly persuade myself it was intended by this statement to impeach the purity of his motives; but I cannot omit observing, that it appears to me a melancholy proof of the malignity of the human mind, that so many attempts should be made to sully the well-earned reputation of that illustrious statesman, whose fame will survive the lapse of ages, and glide down the tide of time unimpaired, while that of his enemies will vanish like the fleeting smoke, or descend with themselves to the tomb of oblivion. With regard to the present Administration, Mr. C. said, he did not know their particular views on this subject; he had, however, no reason to believe that they were such as the gentleman seemed to consider them. He could not for SENATE. Additional Military Force. DECEMBER, 1811. a moment entertain the idea that they intended to abandon the protection of New Orleans, and he did not believe there was a single act of the Executive that would justify such a conclusion. The honorable member asserted this motion was in opposition to the spirit of the President's Message, and the measures therein recommended, &c.; he observed, the Secretary of War did indeed state, in conversation, to him, that ten thousand additional regular troops might answer the present purpose, but that he differed entirely in opinion with the Secretary on this subject, and gives you to understand that this inofficial statement, (as he chooses to call it,) which he considers as coming from the Executive, was at variance with his official communication in his Mes-provided would be nearly 27,000, which, with the sage, &c. Mr. C. said he could not admit the correctness of the conclusions which the gentleman drew from his premises. It did not appear to him that this motion, or the statement alleged to have been made by the Secretary of War, was in opposition to, or at variance with, either the spirit of the Message, or the specific measures recommended therein. It is true, the honorable gentleman differed in opinion from the Secretary with regard to the number of regular troops necessary to effect the purposes intended; and it would seem the principal question was, whether on this subject the opinion of the former, who professed to have no knowledge on military affairs, or that of the latter, as the organ of the Executive, (as he was alleged to be,) deserved most weight, and ought to be most relied upon. Mr. C. said he had already stated the sense in which he understood the Executive recommendation on this subject, and endeavored to show the force proposed to be raised by this motion, connected with the other measures he wished adopted, was in conformity to the views presented by the Message. He would now, however, again recur to the words of the Message itself, and see if they furnished any just grounds for the gentleman's deductions and satirical strictures. The parts particularly alluded to are in the following words: "With this evidence of hostile inflexibility, in trampling on rights which no independent nation can relinquish, Congress will 'feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations. I recommend, accordingly, 'that adequate provision be made for filling the ranks, and prolonging the enlistments of the regular troops; for an auxiliary force torbe engaged for a more limited term; for the accept ance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services; 'for detachments, as they may be wanted, of other 'portions of the militia," &c. Here we see, said Mr. C., the specific measures officially recommended by the Executive, and may form an opinion of the spirit of his Message, to which allusion has been made. Let us now examine the measures proposed to be adopted by those in favor of the present motion, and which are, with little variation, consistent with the statement, termed inofficial, said to be made by the Secretary of War. They are, to fill up the ranks of the present regular troops, for which a bill has already passed; to raise an additional (or auxiliary) force of nearly 17,000 men; and also, to authorize bringing into service such volunteer corps and portions of the militia as the occasion may require. This will make the auxiliary force much larger than the principal force, in aid of which it is required; and it would seem a fair construction of the words of the Message, as already stated, that the auxiliary force, as said to be suggested by the Secretary of War, should be equal only to the principal force; the whole regular force thus volunteers to be authorized, (who were undoubtedly considered by the Executive as an efficient part of the troops to be employed.) would put in the power of the Government a disposable force, exclusive of the militia, of at least 40,000 effective men. This force, which might be increased as circumstances should require, is certainly competent to accomplish all the attainable objects the most sanguine can have in view. In what respect, then, can these measures be considered in opposition to, or at variance with, either the spirit or language of the official communication? If the forces furnished be fully competent to effect the purposes for which they were required, will you not, then, have put the United States "into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations?" And will not all the objects of. the Executive recommendation be complied with? There does not, therefore, appear any ground whatever, except in the imagination of the gentleman, for the alleged variance between the official and responsible communication of the Executive, and that which has been termed inofficial and irresponsible. Nor was he able to perceive what public good could arise from statements evidently calculated, if not intended, to misrepresent the views of the Administration. He was himself convinced, from sources to him entirely satisfactory, the views of the Executive were really such as had been presented to the public by his Message; such as they ought to be, and such as would, if supported and promptly carried into effect by Congress, maintain the rights and vindicate the honor of the nation. It seems, however, you must raise the number of troops contained in the bill, whether they can be usefully employed or not; for the honorable gentleman says, if you raise less, Great Britain will not believe you are in earnest, or that you mean to use physical force, &c.; and further observed, she had in Canada seven thousand regular troops and fourteen thousand militia, &c. I cannot, said Mr. C., subscribe to the doctrine that we are to raise a force greater than is competent to accomplish the substantial objects we have in view, for the purpose alone of convincing that nation we are in earnest that is, that we mean what we say. This would appear to me beneath the dignity of the Legislature, and derogatory to |