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Additional Military Force.

December, 1811.

said, he felt entirely confident never would appear. The uniform tenbr of the President’s moral and political rectitude, were ample vouchers for the correctness of his motives, and the purity of his intentions. Mr. A. said, so far as we have had an opportunity of judging of the disposition of the present Chief Magistrate, in relation to the protection of Orleans, we had not the 'smallest reason to doubt the purity of his intentions; and he had entire confidence, should an occasion present, that the President would faithfully, ably, and, impartially discharge the duties he owed to every part of the Union. . . Mr. A. said the observations of the honorable. member, respecting the Secretary of the Treasury, the financial department, and the Administration as connected with it, required and should receive an answer. Mr. A. said he considered himself peculiarly bound to support the Secretary, as he had been the innocent cause, by introducing him into the debate, in the course of the observations he had made, in support of his motion, and thereby bringing upon him the animadversions, which the honorable member had taken occasion to make. His attack upon the Secretary is of a o kind; he does not impeach a single official act of that officer, but throws out vague -insinuations, in so untangible a shape as almost to defy an inquiry into their truth. The official acts of a public officer are always free subjects of investigation and discussion; but, does it comport with the dignity of a member of this body, to asperse without proof, not his acts, but his supposed opinions? The honorable member presumes the Secretary gave his assent to the repeal of the salt tax-upon what authority does he found his opinion of the Secrétary 7. No proof can be given of it. Mr. A. said, he had always understood that the Secretary was opposed to the repeal of that tax. . His numerous reports prove the fact; in all of which, if they are examined, it will be found that he considered that duty as one of the branches of revenue upon which he relied. But there would be no criminality, if we were to suppose that the Secretary had joined in the general opinion and given his assent to the repeal, as well as the honorable member has done; the fact, however, Mr. A. averred to be otherwise. That officer must be supposed more alive to everything connected with the Treasury, than other members of the Government. So far had the Secretary carried this feeling toward the Treasury, that he was not only opposed to the repeal of the salt tax, but Mr. A. had always understood that he was opposed to the repeal of the internal taxes at the time they took place; with a view no doubt not only to be able to meet all the demands that could be legally made upon the Treasury, but to procure a surplus to meet any contingency that the peculiar state of our foreign relations might demand. How then the honorable member can charge the Secretary with the deficiency which the salt tax would have prevented, according to the gentleman's calculation, Mr. A. said he was at a loss to know. The honorable member ought more properly to charge his own complaisance

been authorized, and not before, the

with the great deficit which he seems so anxious to charge to the Secretary. The Secretary was opposed to the repeal of the salt tax, from his opinion of the correctness of it. The honorable member was also opposed to it, for the same reason; but from complaisance, he himself tells us, he voted for the repeal. He then, and not the Secretary, is answerable to the Treasury for the great loss sustained by the repeal of that tax; for he has told us, that its repeal depended upon his single vote; and that that vote he gave from complaisance, not from a conviction of its correctness. The honorable member charges the Treasury Department with a recession from the difficulties of the nation.during the last three years, and with the unwillingness of the Secretary to afford the usefulness of his talents to Government. Mr. A. said he could not well understand the meaning of this charge, as the honorable member, acknowledges that Government had not called on the Secretary for greater exertions. Mr. A. said he would ask the honorable member—in what do that recession and unwillingness consist 2 Have not all the duties of the office been performed ! Has the Secretary ever shrunk from responsibility upon any occasion, or declined answering to the fullest extent any of the calls made upon him by Congress, either for information or opinion ? H. he not carried the financial bark safely to this moment notwithstanding the difficulties of the times Have not all the public engagements been fulfilled; all the increased expenses been defrayed; notwithstanding the decrease of revenue, occasioned by the state of our foreign relations? What is then meant by recession ? Does the honorable member mean to say, that it was the duty of the Secretary to point out new branches of revenue; while those already existing were sufficient to defray the expense authorized by law 7 At this moment, while we are acting on the subject of the Army, which will (greatly) more than double the public expeases, the honorable member does not deign to inquire into the ways and means. He scouts the very idea, and finds great fault with him (Mr. A.) because he presumed to make some inquiry into the present state of the National Treasury. Whether we now vote six or ten regiments of infantry, with the addition of those of artiller and horse, the expense will be great; but we thin it necessary some additional troops shall be raised, and will vote accordingly. After they shall have reasury Department may be called upon, to point out the resources and present them to our consideration. The honorable member, not satisfied with his vague charge of what he calls a recession of the Treasury Department, extends the charge, in a most extraordinary manner, to the late and present Administrations. To their indisposition to press on the Treasury, and to disturb the repose and popularity of the Secretary of the Treasury, the honorable member ascribes the measures, which, in his opinion, had dishonored the nation the last three years. Can this be correct, Mr. President 7 Can this House believe that the late and present Administrations would be capable of December, 1811.

Additional Military Force.


acting upon such principles 2 The honorable member has roundly asserted that the late President, that Mr. Jefferson, whenever he was opposed to what he deemed unnecessary expense, instead of being actuated by his known aversion to saddle such an expense on the people, instead of being, as he had expressed it, averse to taking from the mouth of labor its hard earnings, had no other motive, but a fear to disturb the repose and pularity of the Secretary of the Treasury ! But, §: President, what is the Treasury, abstractedly speaking? and what does the honorable member mean, by a fear to press on the Treasury The officers of the Treasury are mere agents to receive and to P". the money which is collected from the ople. There is never any real pressure on the ory. If there be at any time a pressure for the purpose of defraying any expense, it is a pressure on the people, who must pay the money. Whether the Treasury has ten or twenty millions to collect from the people, and to pay to the other agents of Government, the repose of the Secretary is not in the least disturbed. When, during the Revolutionary war, Congress was obliged to eall on the people for heavy taxes, or unable to redeem our paper money, the pressure fell on the people, who had the taxes to pay and in whose hands the paper money died away. When, notwithstanding these inadequate resources, we were unable to defray the most necessary expenses, the Fo on whom?. On our empty Treasury? o sir—it fell on the Army—on the defenders of your country-on those war-worn veterans, who were scantily fed, hardly clothed, and not paid at all, and whose earnings, at last, fell into the hands of speculating harpies. But, sir, what effect had this state of things upon the personal repose of your then Commissioners of the Treasury? Not the least, except so far as they felt for the distresses of their country, and identified themselves with its fate; and it is only in this point of view, said Mr. A., that the repose of a Secretary of your Treasury can be disturbed on similar occasions. That substitution of the Treasury—of the chest into which the taxes are paid—to the people themselves who pay them, is one of those equivoques of which the honorable member is so fond. It is, however, an artifice too thinly veiled, to deceive the Senate, or mislead our constituents. Mr. A. said, the course taken by the honorable member had been so devious, that it had been hard to fol. low him, and indeed sometimes to understand his meaning correctly. Mr. A. said, he could not, nor did he intend, when he rose, to answer all the observations of the honorable member—he had selected the most prominent, and should answer only one or two more. The honorable member had said, that to the unwillingness of the late and present Administration to incur expense, he attributes the present situation of our country. Although he has made this charge against the Administration, he has not specified any case in which the present Administration had refused to incur expense. Mr. A. supposed it would have been rather too bold a charge, after the measures adopted by the Presi12th Cox. 1st SEss.-3

dent, and with their result now before us; he had, however, specified two cases, under the former Administration—a refusal to incur the expense necessary to carry the embargo into effect, and a rejection by the House of Representatives of a proposition to authorize contingent letters of marque

and reprisal. Mr. A. said, he had always un

derstood, that the Executive had used with great assiduity every means which had been placed in his hands by Congress, to carry into effect the several embargo laws; that the laws were as well executed as any restrictive laws, of so pressing a character, could have been upon so extensive a coast, and more so than the restrictive laws of Great Britain and France had ever been, with all their navies and their numerous armies; and that it was not because this law was not well executed that it was repealed, but in consequence of another consideration, well known to the honorable member himself, who can give as accurate a history of the repeal of that law as any honorable member of either House. Mr. A. said, with respect to the failure, on the part of the House of

epresentatives, to adopt contingent letters of marque and reprisal, he could not see how that could with any propriety be attributed to the late President. He did not indeed, by an official message, recommend such a measure; and the correctness of such acourse might well be doubted, upon Constitutional grounds. But, Mr. A. said he well-knew that the President was anxious for a provision of that kind, as a substitute for the embargo; whether in the precise phraseology of the provision the House rejected, Mr. A. could not say; but knowing, as he did, that the President

was desirous of a strong substitute, he was sorry

that the honorable member had attempted to attribute to him the failure of so important a mea

sure, for which he was in no way responsible.

- Wednesday, December 18. The bill extending the time of certain patents granted to Robert Fulton, was read the second time. - ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCE. : The Senate resumed the second reading of the bill to raise, for a limited time, an additional mil

'itary force; and the motion made by Mr. ANDER

son, to strike out the word “ten,” section one, line three. Mr. CAMPBell, of Tennessee rose, and, in substance, made the following observations. He said he would submit to the Senate some of the reasons which would govern his vote on this question, and then he would notice such of the remarks made by the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) as appeared to him to relate to the grounds on which he acted. It would seem, said Mr. C., from what has passed on this subject, that little or no difference of opinion exists, especially among gentlemen on the Republican side, with regard to the objects to be effected by the troops proposed to be raised. All appear to admit the time has arrived in which you ought to, and must act; the crisis requires it; and nothing

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Additional Military Force.


short of a speedy and honorable accommodation of existing differences, securing your rights, or open war, in which you may avenge your wrongs, will meet public expectation. To produce one or the other of these results, and be fully prepared for either alternative, was his object; and he would vote for such a force as appeared to him best calculated for that purpose. If all are serious, said Mr. C., as I trust they are, in the professions made on this subject, the only difference of opinion appears to be in regard to the number and kind of troops necessary to effect the objects in view. Our decision on this point must be governed by the information we possess. The amount, as well as the description of the forces to be raised, ought, in a great degree, to be proportioned to and regulated by the impression intended to be made on your expected enemy, and the probable force to be resisted or subdued. The purpose for which these troops are raised, and the immediate use to be made of them, appear now to be made no secret. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) told you this force of twenty-five thousand troops, proposed to be raised by this bill, ought to be considered the Army of the North, and are intended to take and occupy Canada, &c. If it be intended, said Mr. C., to occupy this country, of which, at present, there appears no ground, to doubt, it * to be done with the least possible delay, and in a time much shorter than would be required to raise so large - a regular force. This number, with the present establishment of ten thousand men, make an aggregate amount of thirty-five thousand. Of these you have in service little more than five thousand. Of course, near thirty thousand are yet to be enlisted. To raise and discipline this number, or the half of it, would consume more time than ought to elapse before you act, if you are determined to act with effect. The motion is, to strike out the word “ten,” the number of regiments of infantry, for the purpose of inserting “six” This would make the number of troops to be raised by this bill somewhat less than seventeen thousand men, and increase the whole regular force to nearly twentyseven thousand men. Mr. C. said, from the best view which he had been able to take of the sub}. upon the information we now possess, this orce, aided by a proper proportion of volunteers, would be fully competent to effect any object the Government can have in view; to resist and subdue any force; and to occupy, if necessary, any territory in your neighborhood. On any sudden emergency, the number of volunteers or militia actually employed, might, and, perhaps, generally , ought to equal, and, on many occasions, much exceed that of the regular troops, as they could be organized and marched to the scene of action in much shorter time than would be consumed in raising regular troops, would consist of better materials, and could be more relied upon to make a first impression than newly enlisted troops without the advantages of discipline. They would, also, when the service was completed, lay down

and again amalgamate with their fellow-citizens, without a murmur. Hence, the expense would be inconsiderable, the time of service being probably short. It is, therefore, fair to calculate, if your regular force amounts to twenty-seven thousand men, that you ought to, and will have in actual service, and, of course, in pay, forty thousand men. And will it be contended that this force is not sufficient to accomplish all the purposes which the most sanguine have in view 7 But, it seems, volunteers, are not now to be relied on. You must depend entirely on regular troops—on a standing army. This doctrine is of modern date among Republicans, and may, if it should gain currency, sap the vital principles of your Government. The language of the President on this subject, in his Message, breathes a very different spirit. He recommends “that ad‘equate provision be made for filling the ranks ‘and prolonging the enlistments of the regular ‘troops; for an auriliary force, to be engaged for “a more limited term; for the acceptance of vol* unteer corps, whose patriotic ard or may court a ‘participation in urgent services; for detach‘ments, as they may be wanted, of other por, ‘tions of the militia,” &c. Here, we perceive,

he considers the new force recommended to be raised as only auxiliary to the present regular

force.' Hence, it would seem fair to conclude he did not mean the number of the former should exceed that of the latter. But, he seems to place considerable confidence in “volunteer corps,” on the ground that their “patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services;” those very kind of services for which the force is now to be provided. . He did, therefore, contemplate that such volunteers should constitute an efficient part of the force to be employed in effecting the more important objects now in view; and that, the militia, also, should be engaged, and contribute their share in supporting any contest that might ensue, But, it seems, your volunteers and militia are considered totally incompetent to perform any important military services. From them you are required to withdraw your confidence, and place it in regular troops o of whom, you must raise an army sufficiently large to effect all your purposes. Let this doctrine be once established, and the people may tremble for their liberties when it is too late—when their chains are riveted upon them by a military power. But the attempt to raise so large a o: force at this moment, would retard instead of accelerate the completion of the objects intended; for, it will be found impracticable to enlist and organize such force in time to act before the proper season is gone; before the ice breaks up in the Spring. You might, indeed, collect that portion J. consists of officers, but you cannot fill up the ranks. If ten or fifteen thousand effectives could be brought into service in time, it would equal his most sanguine expectations. You would, therefore, have, it is believed, a force equally efficient, if the proposed amendment prevailed, as if the bill passed in its present shape,

the military character, return to their homes,

while your expenditures would be thereby greatly December, 1811.


Additional Military Force.

diminished, and no obstacle whatever presented to the most decisive and vigorous course of proceeding. If immediate operations be intended, as he trusted they were, they must be principally carried on, in the first instance, by volunteers, who could, and ought to be embodied and prepared to act on the shortest notice. For this purpose, authorize the Executive immediately to officer, organize for a limited time, and put into motion, such number of volunteers who may tender their services, as shall be deemed competent to the occasion; bring to the scene of action as many of your present regular troops as may be spared from other services, and can, with the least delay, be concentrated; and let these, united with your volunteers and such of the new troops as can be raised in time, make the first impression, seize and occupy the country contemplated, and maintain the contest until the additional regular force, about to be raised, can be organized and brought into actual service. These may, then, support, and, in due time, relieve your volunteers. Hold the advantages you may have gained; repel any force that may be brought to oppose them, and extend, if required, your acquisitions; while, in the mean time, sufficient corps of the militia may be called into service and employed within the limits of the Union, with such of the regular troops as may be retained for the purpose, to protect your frontiers from incursions by the savages, and your coasts against attacks from a foreign enemy. - - This mode of proceeding would enable you to act, before the season shall pass away in which our operations could be carried on, with the east probable resistance, and the greatest prospect of success. The most distinguishing feature that could characterize your proceedings, at this moment, would be, the expedition with which you progress, both in Legislative and Executive operations. But, if you wait, as seems to be contemplated by the gentleman from Virginia, until twenty-five or thirty thousand men are, by enlistments, raised, disciplined, and put in readiness for actual service, the time to act will have passed away; the ice will be broken up, and the approaches by water to the country intended as the scene of action, will be ..., opened ; and, o may have to effect your object, should it then practicable, at more than double the expense of blood and treasure that would have been required had you taken advantage of the proper time. What evidence have we, said Mr. C., to show that so large a regular force as that proposed by the .# is necessary? The o, as avowed by the gentleman, is to occupy Canada. From the best information he had been able to obtain, there are not more than six thousand regular troops, if there be that number, in the province. The gentleman states the number at about seven thousand. Suppose the latter to be correct, would not double the number of regular troops, (allowing for accidents of every description,) be sufficient to oppose to those? And, would not your volunteers be able to cope with Canadian militia? Upon these data what occasion can

there be, at this time, to increase your regular force to thirty-five thousand men? Have you no confidence in the knowledge possessed, and the opinion formed on this subject by your Government? Have they not as ample means, at least, as we have, to obtain correct information ? This, no one, it is presumed, will deny; and the honorable gentlemen told you they are of opinion ten thousand additional troops, making the whole regular force twenty thousand, would be sufficient for the present occasion. To those, the Government, no doubt, intended to add as many corps of volunteers, properly officered and organized for the purpose, as circumstances should require; and such united force would, certainly, be competent, according to the present state of things, to subdue any opposition to be expected, and to occupy any territory in your neighborhood, that comes within the avowed object of your present preparations. But, Mr. C. said, he was willing to go further; to increase the regular force to nearly twenty-seven thousand men, and make ample provision for !. actual service such corps of volunteers, officered by the Executive, and such number of the militia as shall be considered necessary. Should his motion not prevail, he would, notwithstanding, vote for the bill, and for any other measures proposed that could, in any degree, contribute to maintain the rights and character of the nation. He should, also, at any future day, vote for such additional troops as the crisis might then require; and this appeared to him the most efficient as well as correct course. Raise, at present, the number proposed by the amendment, which most, if not all who are in favor of actual resistance, allow to be necessary, and before they are organized, you will be better able to determine what additional force, if any, will be necessary. This would produce more unanimity, occasion less delay, and could not, in any possible degree, weaken your operative measures, or embarrass your Government. Mr. C. said, believing, as he did, the force proposed by the amendment fully-competent to accomplish the objects all profess to have in view, he was unwilling to vote for a greater number. He was opposed, on principle, to swelling the regular military force beyond the bounds really demanded by the crisis, as it would be setting a dangerous precedent, that might, hereafter, be resorted to as a pretext for augmenting, from time to time, without sufficient cause, or beyond the nature of the exigency, your standing army; until the people might, perhaps, be awakened from their security, as has been the case on many occasions in other countries, by feeling the pressure of the chains of military despotism. He was, also, unwilling to charge the nation with expenditures which its finances were not prepared to meet, and which, in his opinion, the occasion did not require. He trusted it was not the intention of any one, by raising so large a regular force, and thereby incurring so great an expenditure, beyond what it is believed was necessary, to drain your Treasury, embarrass your fiscal concerns,

and paralyze the best concerted measures of your


Government. If, however, such were the objects intended, a more effectual mode to accomplish them could not be adopted. - - If war becomes indispensable, you ought not to calculate that it will be of short duration. You can make war, but it does not rest with you alone to make peace. Every effort ought to be made to bring it to a speedy termination, and all the means that could be usefully employed afforded for that purpose. But you ought not, in the beginning, to waste unnecessarily your treasures, which are the sinews of war; your exertions should be proportioned to the resistance to be overcome ; and no more of your energies and resources exhausted than the occasion requires; always .* residue to meet a more urgent emergency. ar once commenced, you ought to calculate on supporting it, on at least the same, if not on a more extended scale, not only for one, but for many years, as it cannot be known how long it may be continued. - - The American people, said Mr. C., will, without a murmur, support any expenditures they believe necessary to maintain the rights and avenge the wrongs of their country. But they will expect you to restrict those "expenditures to such only as the emergency shall require; and that before you call on them for new contributions, you will be prepared to show you have disposed of the means already in your hands to the best advantage. Your Government has, no doubt, estimated the probable amount of force that would be required to accomplish the objects in view; they have probably made arrangements, so far as

rested with them, to meet the expenses of such

force; they would also, he conceived, be in a #. degree . that it was competent or the purposes for which it was raised, should be employed to effect those purposes, and that your finances could be rendered adequate to its supÉ. But what are you about to do by this bill?

erange all those plans and change the responsibility. Instead of twenty or twenty-five thousand, the number deemed sufficient, you force upon the Government thirty-five thousand regular troops. You thereby take upon yourselves the responsibility of raising a force much larger than was required, or can be usefully employed; of occasioning a great unnecessary expenditure, which will drain your Treasury, embarrass your finances, and probably compel you to impose new burdens on the people. Will they not inquire into the causes of those extraordinary measures, and ask wherefore were those new taxes imposed, those expenditures incurred? What occa

sion was there for so large a regular army? On.

what great emergency were they to be employed, and what numerous force was to be resisted or subdued 7 Those will be natural inquiries, and the answers will, no doubt, suggest themselves, that a great portion of these expenditures was incurred contrary to the views of the Executive, and for which he would in no respect be responsible; that little more than half the regular force raised was deemed, competent to effect all the practicable objects within your reach ; that the

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force to be resisted or subdued was not known or believed to be considerable, nor such as to require the number of troops ordered to be raised; but that a majority of Congress took upon themselves, without sufficient cause, to raise this large army, incur this immense expense, and consequently require those new burdens to be imposed. For |. therefore, and the consequences that may flow therefrom, such majority, and not the Executive, must and will be responsible to the people. - -- - Mr. C. said, he would now notice more particularly some of the arguments adduced by the honorable member from Virginia, (Mr. Giles.) He did not propose following him through the various course of his reasoning, much of which, however ingenious, did not appear to him relevant to this subject, and although on that, account would not now be answered, he did not subscribe to. The honorable gentleman said, in case of War. o present military force of 10,000 men would be required to protect your Western frontiers, and prevent New Orleans and Florida being taken by the British, &c.; and, therefore, that 25,000 additional regulars would be necessary, and little enough, to effect your purposes in the North, &c. Mr. § said no object could be more interesting to the Western country than the security of New Orleans; no one could feel more sensibly than he did the importance of affording effectual protection to that place, as well as to Florida and the Western frontiers; and he believed no one was more anxious than himself, or would go fur, ther to provide the most ample means, and such as could be most usefully employed for those purposes. He trusted the gentleman's professed reÉ. for the protection of that quarter of the nion was sincere and would long continue. He would not, however, suffer himself to be induced by his anxiety, for even those favorite and highly important objects, to abandon his solemn duty, by raising a force so much larger than, in his opinion, the occasion required. He was inclined to believe 5,000 regular troops, with the aid of volunteers and militia, would be competent to protect New Orleans and its neighborhood. The number of forces necessary, to protect the Western frontiers would depend upon circumstances, and the disposition of the neighboring Indian tribes. But a considerable proportion of the force requisite for that purpose might consist of volunteers, or corps raised for a limited time whose, services would be equally useful, an would enable the Government to dispense with the employment of any large portion of your regcular troops in that quarter. We have as yet, said Mr. C., taken possession of that part only of West Florida, to which our territorial claim extends, and there appears no ground, at present, to be alarmed for its safety. The employment, therefore, of so large a regular force as 10,000 men in that quarter, does not appear necessary, and can furnish no good ground for raising so large an additional army as that contemplated by this bill. But the gentleman inquires, what you would

think of New Orleans and New York being taken

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