H. of R. Naval Establishment. JANUARY, 1812. tion, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly, to speak to the House, and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other. It has been said, by a strong and lively figure in which they have exposed it. Not to ask mereof rhetoric, that this country is a great land ani-ly what it would do to assist by naval co-operamal, which should not venture into the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleganies, and its great sides swelling to the East and to the West, where do you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other. The figure explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature did not give That a respectable Naval Establishment afto the United States a coast of two thousand fords the only effectual means of causing our miles in extent, not to be used. No; it was in- commercial rights to be respected, will, as a tended by this bounty to make us a great com- general proposition, be denied by few persons, if mercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject any. But its adoption by us is deemed improper the enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the No, it has not and will not be neglected. A great enormous expense which, it is said, the establishportion of our people exist but upon the ocean ment will necessitate, and the inability of the and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not nation, by any force which it can provide, to reless truly than eloquently, said, that "the ocean sist, with effect, the immense naval power of is their farm," and it must and will be protected. Great Britain. Is it not surprising, that so much But how is this protection to be afforded? I will prejudice should exist against this establishment endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done on account of its expensiveness, when it is ascermost cheaply and effectually by a naval force; tained that, during the whole eighteen years of and if I succeed in this, I shall hope for the con- its existence, from 1794, to 1811, inclusive, it has currence of the Committee. No proposition ap-cost the Government only $27,175,695?' I am pears to me more true or more obvious, than that afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in it is only by a naval force that our commerce which I hope to bring conviction home to the and our neutral rights on the ocean can be pro- minds of the House, is by entering, with minutetected. We are now going to war for the protec- ness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and tion of these rights; but in what way, and under statements; but the necessity of the case must be what circumstances? The mode is altogether my apology for the course which I shall take. If accidental, and not founded on the permanent re- the House shall have full confidence in my statelations or means of the country. It is not my ments, much will be gained to the argument; for intention to condemn the course which has been it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the hearer taken. It has had my hearty concurrence, and to follow me through an examination of these my zealous, though feeble, support. I hope it details, as the argument proceeds. For this conmay be altogether effectual; and I believe it will fidence, therefore, I will venture to hope. I beinflict a wound which will be felt with poig-lieve the statements on which I rely to be accunancy. But it is, notwithstanding, partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers on the ocean. Does it not, then, result, inevitably, as the dictate of common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has been heretofore so much neglected, that it is at present in a state of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whather we will suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "if you had asked for no more than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted your request." But, for myself, I would not thank any gentleman for this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to bring the question fully before the House in the shape rate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them, for their own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident management, has but little exceeded $1,500,000, which is not much more than twice the amount of the usual annual appropriation for our economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed, that it has been much more expensive than the Military Establishment, but I will show that this is not really the case. The expense of the Military Establishment, from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been $37,541,669, giving an annual average of $1,700,000, or $200,000 per annum more than that of the Navy. It thus appears that, in the gross amount, as well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, were victorious wherever it encountered an enemy, and probably laid the foundation of the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean, its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled, in an unexampled manner, the pirati- | cal and barbarous foe, and crowned itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism, which had not been exceeded by the exploits of any nation, and which must go down to a distant posterity. I mean hot, by this comparison, to say anything injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled. Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned an expense not warranted by its force or its services; and I cannot deny but that, from a variety of causes, the expense may have been unnecessarily great; an argument cannot thence, be fairly drawn against its future use-the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest orator, and one of the greatest statesmen, of antiquity, reasoned. The great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen by his impetuous eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he, "were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our State demanded, there were then no hope of recovery." So may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskilful expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of the abuse; to effect this reform, is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee have declared in their report, that a naval force within due limits and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier and that of an adequate naval defence. The experience of modern naval warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier, though they are more numerous and better than they have been at any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two thousand miles to protect, the expense of which H. OF R. could not be borne by the nation. A better defence would be furnished by such a naval force as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less expense. I have taken the trouble, in the discharge of my duty as a member of the select committee, to ascertain the expenditures which have been actually made on account of fortifications, and they amount very nearly to $6,500,000. It is necessary, in fairness, to state, that upwards of $2,000,000 consist of the permanent appropriation annually made "for fortifications, arsenals, and armories." I am not sufficiently acquainted with the application of this appropriation to say how much of it may have been expended on the fortifications of the maritime frontier, but gentlemen may make any deduction they may think proper on this account, it will not vary materially the general result. When the present fortifications shall be completed, and the additions made which will be authorized by the appropriations of the present year, it will require fifteen thousand artillerists to garrison them, exclusive of such other force as will be necessary in case of attack. The report of the Secretary of War on this subject, which is among the printed documents on your table, requires, for the present fortifications, 12,600 artillerists; and I think it fair to add the difference between this number and 15,000, the number which I have assumed, for additional fortifications which are deemed necessary, and will be provided for by the appropriations of the year, These men are to be enlisted, and to receive land and pecuniary bounties. If the lands thus given be estimated at two dollars per acre, which is the lowest price at which the officers of the Government are authorized to sell the public lands, and rather below the actual sales, they will amount, for 15,000 men, to $4,800,000. It will be proper here to show that these land bounties are to be considered as an actual expenditure to this amount, as it may be supposed by some that the public lands are in quantity almost without limits, and that any number of acres may be disposed of in this way without perceptibly diminishing the public wealth. This, however, is not the case; the lands given in bounties will be thrown into the market in spite of any legal regulations that can be devised, and will, to their extent, supersede in the market those of the Government; they will, of course, be sold lower than the public lands, as the holders will sell at the price at which they may be able to force a sale. The weight of this argument, however, may be denied, but should it be diminished in any degree by the objections which may be made to it, the diminution will be more than compensated by a consideration of the disadvantages which the present States will suffer in having their population, already too much scattered, spread out to their extremes, a disadvantage more real to them than the expenditure of a considerable sum of money, nor am I to be understood in this as expressing any hostility to our territorial settlements, which ought to be treated with the justice to which they are entitled under our laws, and the kindness which they claim as our breth ren; but we are not therefore to disguise the fact, that, in a political view, the diffusion of a population, at present too little condensed, must be injurious to those whom we now represent. So much has been said of the land bounties, not merely for the support of the present calculation, but because it will be material in other views of this subject. It probably has been proved that it would be equally advantageous to the nation to pay the estimated amount out of the Treasury, were the money there, and not subject to more pressing requisitions. Then, the land bounties may be estimat ed at The pecuniary bounties will be $240,000, which, for even numbers, call Add to this sum the expenditures for the erection of fortifications $4,800,000 6,500,000 $11,500,000 And they will make the sum of The annual estimates for the support of $4,500,000 1,500,000 JANUARY, 1812. 200,000 It is necessary, said Mr. C., that I should fortify every fact which I advance, as I proceed, for eve5,000,000 rything is denied. It is accordingly denied that the estimates of the Secretary are to be relied upon, for it is said that the estimates of that department have been frequently incorrect. This may have been the case in some instances; but it is denied that any of these errors are calculated to prove the present estimates to be incorrect, which are stated by the Secretary to be full, and which are founded on the whole of our past experience. The materiality of accuracy, however, in this particular, requires that every doubt should be removed; and it shall be done, if satisfactory proof can produce that effect. In the first place, the fulness of the estimates, which is the fact we have to prove, is confirmed by the fact expenditures on this object have been wastefully alleged by the opponents of the Navy, that the and unskilfully made, and therefore the introducThe addition for extraordinaries is much below tion of better economy into the system will probthe probable fact; and, for the correctness of this ably diminish the expenditures, and bring them opinion, I beg leave to appeal to my honorable below the estimates; it will, at least, give an ascolleague, the Chairman of the Military Commit-surance of their competency. But I will confirm tee, (Mr. WILLIAMS,) who has lately and fully turned his attention to the subject, and request him to correct me if I am wrong. Now, let us inquire, what will be the expense of such a Naval Establishment as the committee have proposed as a force competent to the defence of your coasting trade, and your ports and harbors. I must here take for granted, what shall be proved in the progress of the argument, that this force is competent for the object proposed. Making, for annual expense, the sum of $6,000,000 the adequacy of these estimates by a comparison of them with the expenditures of the British Government on their Naval Establishment. The British Government has never been distinguished, at least not in modern times, for great economy. In relation to a navy, too, we have many advantages which that Government does not enjoythe materials of a naval establishment are cheaper with us. The British nation imports nearly all of them from abroad-much of them from us. We have nearly all of them within ourselves. We know that ship-building is actually and practically cheaper with us than with them; we have, therefore, the advantages in these particulars. There is but one in which they incur, or can ineur, a less expense than us, and that is in the seamen who man their navy; but this, as will be seen by reference to their estimates, is not among the largest objects of their expenditure. Our es The annual expense, according to the same tablishment, if properly organized and managed― estimate, will be For twelve seventy-fours $211,784 each, and these are objects entirely, within our own power must be cheaper, in proportion to its ex$2,500,000 tent, than that of Great Britain. Let us, then, 2,000,000 compare the estimates of the Secretary with the experience of that country. My honorable friend, $4,500,000 (Mr. BASSETT,) who was formerly the Chairman of the Committee on the Naval Establishment, JANUARY, 1812. Naval Establishment. H. of R. which I have just made of the expenses author- Twenty-five seventy-fours, at $333,000 Forty frigates, averaging thirty-eight Annual expense. Twenty-five seventy-fours, at two hun- and who, I regret, has been succeeded by one so Bounty in money to thirty-five thousand men Bounty in land to thirty-five thousand men Estimate of the Secretary of War for support Appropriations for volunteers Appropriations for munitions of war Extraordinaries 2,240,000 $8,325,000 6,800,000 $15,125,000 The superior cheapness of naval defence seems to me to be satisfactorily established, and I am next to prove that the force proposed-I mean $560,000 twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates-are sufficient to protect us in our own seas, and de11,200,000 fend our ports and harbors against the naval power of Great Britain. The first evidence that is 10,500,000 offered in support of this proposition, is the opin3,000,000 ion of naval men; and if the representations of 1,500,000 any man may be relied upon with confidence, so 1,000,000 far, at least, as that they are not founded in deception, I believe those of a sailor may be. By 27,760,000 naval men, I have been assured, that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It is impossible for me to state with accuracy, or in a manner $30,000,000 calculated to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in support of their opinion, but among them are those detailed in the report of the select committee. Indeed, they advance the opinion, and support it with reasons, the error of which, if they be erroneous, I am unable to discover, that it will require the enemy to employ a triple force to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United States. Their reasons are, as nearly as I can state them, these: there must be stationed on our coast, at any given time, an equal force; this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months' Let us now, as further proof of the superior service. An equal force must be put in requisicheapness of naval defence, compare the estimate l'tion and kept in readiness to relieve that on the station. But, as all the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the force destined to relieve the first, must be despatched by the time the first may be supposed to have arrived on our coast, because it will be necessary, at a period as early as the arrival of the second, for the first to return; but the first could not proceed to Europe, be equipped, and return to relieve the second in time; and therefore a third equivalent force is necessary, and thus three times the force of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to, with confidence, to prove that neither Great Britain, nor any other nation, has ever been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas, a force equal to that which, in the opinion of naval men, is sufficient to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee the dominion of the American seas, and the defence of our ports and harbors. There is one fact which, above all others, shows the inability of Great Britain to keep a large fleet on our coast. From the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for naval equipment or repair, except Halifax; and if, as the opponents of the Navy seem to think certain, and I hope their opinions may be realized, we shall, in the event of war, deprive her of that, she will be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas. Under such circumstances, anything but temporary service would be utterly impracticable. JANUARY, 1812. can direct to any given point almost an unlimited number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be found that, notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it must be destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it all in requisition. This I will prove by reference to the distribution of her fleets in 1801. [Here Mr. C. read a statement of the force and distribution of the British fleet at that time.] From which of these stations, said Mr. C., could she have spared, with safety and prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she, from all, have stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been equal, under the disadvantages which have been pointed out, to twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates? How much less would she have been able to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval armament whose expense should equal that of the military preparations of the present year? But, it may be said, that the ships which Great Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which any circumstances would require, This might be true, were her seamen unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible; but both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out vessels which she has in ordinary, would require, within a few thousand, all the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could bear. The true object of inquiry to ascertain her efficient power is, what number of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument, yet confirmatory of it. in the example of 1801, the year which I have selected for illustration, when it is confidently believed her equipment was greater, combining force and numbers, than at any other period of her history. [Here Mr. C. closed his observations, for this day.] But, said Mr. C., on the subject of the British naval force, there is great misconception. The high-sounding number of a thousand ships appals the mind, and an examination of its actual force, and the numerous requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as an idle labor. Let this examination be made, and at least some part of the terror which it excites will vanish. Of the eight hundred and thirty-three ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801, and she never had more, it is believed, there were only three hundred and eighty-three that exceeded the On the 18th, Mr. C. continued.-I, yesterday, size and capacity of the large privateers that will contended that the great commercial and agriculprobably be fitted out by the citizens of the Uni-tural interests of the nation, the natural advanted States, in the event of war. Of this last number, there were one hundred and forty-two of sixty-four guns, and above; twenty-two between fifty and sixty guns; one hundred and fifty-six between thirty-two and forty-four; and sixty-three between twenty and thirty guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission, consisted of one hundred and seventy-four sloops, one hundred and forty-one gun-vessels, and one hundred and thirty hired vessels. These hired vessels are small vessels, of from four to ten guns, which it is believed, are only employed for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration, I have no doubt, proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain, however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression almost universally received, from the high-sounding boast of her thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more misconceived than the application of it. The common impression is, that the Government tages of the country, and the general policy and duty of the Government, concurred in requiring the establishment of a navy. I also answered the two great objections which are most relied upon in opposition to a Naval Establishment. But the subject must be considered in relation to other times and to other Powers with whose naval strength we shall have to struggle. It is unworthy of a nation looking to that greatness which must be our destiny, to limit its views to a single nation whose power, however great, is perishable, and whom many gentlemen think to be now tottering to her fall. We must take the whole extent of our relations into view in considering this question; and in doing so, we cannot keep out of sight the marine which the Emperor of France is so industriously and anxiously preparing and cherishing in the ports and harbors of those under his control. What do these preparations indicate? A settled determination to be |