come a maritime power. And is it not worthy the wisdom and forecast of this nation, to look at the possible consequences of the Union of such a force, with his irresistible power upon the land? It is not to be believed that the power of his great enemy upon the ocean will induce this extraordinary man to relinquish his determination or relax his exertions to create a navy. Let gentlemen not misunderstand me-I must consider the ruler of France as an extraordinary man, whether he be viewed as an instrument of vengeance and of wrath, in the hands of an Allwise Providence, to chastise us here below, or as displaying, in the noblest manner, the greatest energies with which humanity has been endowed. I mean not to be his panegyrist or his reviler. For my own part, I am disposed to consider him as a rod of chastisement to the nations of the earth; but, view him as we may, no wise politician can believe that this extraordinary man is governed by a short-sighted policy. It has been said that he is an enemy to commerce, and wishes to destroy it even in his own dominions; but a more idle fancy never entered into the mind of man. Has he possessed himself of the valuable ports of the Baltic, of Holland, and the Mediterranean, by force and by stratagem, for the purpose of destroying their principal value? His immediate object is, indeed, to make war upon commerce, but it is the commerce of his enemy, which he justly considers as the most vulnerable point of attack-on its fall, and the consequent fall of British naval greatness, he means to establish those of France. Will gentlemen, then, say that we are to have but one nation in view in our naval preparations? Assuredly, they cannot; and therefore, in relation to France and other nations, besides Great Britain, if any naval preparation be proper, under any circumstances, we ought at least to commence a system which may enable us to meet the exigencies of future times. We now say, we cannot encounter the strength of the British lion, because we are not prepared-delay your preparations, and you must hereafter, on the same principle, declare you dare not engage the ferocity of the French tiger. But, as we look at the subject, the prospect opens wider to our view. It is inevitably certain that the West India Islands will in time become independent-they must be oaval, and, probably, from the character of their population, piratical-and without a naval force to defend our commerce, it will become the prey of pirates and buccaneers. But look still further, at Mexico, and, beyond the Isthmus of Darien, to South America; all of which must be soon independent; they must, too, become great, and powerful, and wealthy, and will not, probably follow our example; but, consulting their interest and their strength, will establish a naval power. In this view, we ought to be prepared for defence; but, in another view, we will want a naval force to protect that profitable commerce which must grow out of the proximity, and other relations of these countries, and our own, but which Great Britain, who aims at a monopoly of this trade, will not allow us to enjoy, if we cannot H. of R. protect it. There is another objection, to a Naval Establishment, to which an answer must be afforded. It is alleged that, if we build a navy, we cannot man our ships without resorting to the odious and tyrannic practice of impressment. To this objection a very satisfactory refutation may be easily given. It is believed by many that the number of seamen does not exceed fifty or sixty thousand. I know not the cause of this errorperhaps it may proceed from some estimate which embraces only able seamen, and excludes the classes of half seamen and boys; both of which are included in the crews of vessels of war as well as merchant vessels. To prove the number of our seamen, I will refer gentlemen to "Blodget's Economica," where it will be found that, in 1806, including the classes of half seamen and boys, the number was 110,000. The United States had, at that time, 1,250,000 tons of shipping, and having now 1,488,773 tons, they must have, if this writer be accurate, about 125,000 seamen. But, to prove this fact, like others on which I rely, so as to leave no doubt upon it, I will show, by a comparison of our present tonnage with that of Great Britain, in a given year, and the relative number of her seamen in the merchant service in the same year, that we must, from the amount of our tonnage, have nearly the number which results from this writer's estimate. Great Britain, in 1790, had about the same tonnage which we now have, viz: 1,460,823 tons, which were manned by 112,556 seamen. It is not material to my argument which number be taken; but if we recollect, the great portion of our tonnage which is engaged in the coasting trade, the vessels employed in which are smaller, and will, in proportion to their tonnage, require more hands than the large vessels employed in the foreign trade, we may be authorized to take Mr. Blodget's estimate. It will only take one-eighth part of this numberabout fifteen thousand-to man twelve seventyfours and twenty frigates. It is not to be expected that, in the event of a war with a maritime power of strength, half our seamen will continue to be employed in the merchants' service. Those discharged will be happy to find employment in the Navy. The embargo and non-intercourse laws, it is well known, threw into our maritime cities a great number of seamen, who would gladly have entered the Navy could they have found employment there. But it is supposed they would prefer serving on board the privateers, which would issue from our ports in such numbers and offer such advantages, as to require and attract all the seamen who should be discharged from the merchants' service. This is very improbable. There would be upwards of sixty thousand thrown out of service, which would be a number sufficient to man the force proposed, and probably five hundred privateers besides. But it is perfectly in the power of the Government to institute such regulations as would insure a sufficient number of seamen for the national service, without any direct restraint upon their will, by limiting the number of privateers, should it be necessary. Taking, however, the worst view of the subject, it would be unnecessary to resort to impressment. I believe the nations of the Continent have never resorted to impressment to man their fleets. I do not speak with certainty as to the fact, but I believe their practice was to cause their seamen to be registered, as our militia are, and, when necessary, a portion of them was draughted for the public service. It will hardly be objected, with respect to seamen, that they cannot be sent out of the United States. I presume even my honorable friends over the way, (the Federal gentlemen,) will waive their objection on this point. I feel confident that they will relax a little in their Constitutional difficulties in favor of our Navy! They will, indeed, have reason for it. The service is, in a great degree, the peculiar duty of our seamen, as the exertion must always be in a great degree, for their peculiar defence. Their home is on the ocean, and their defence of the national rights upon it, may fairly be assimilated to the defence of the soil on which we live, by those who dwell upon the land. But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval Power. They fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and seeking victory on all the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive expenses, and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly not contemplated by the report of the committee; nor can such events possibly happen, as long as we remain a free people. The committee have recommended such a navy as will give to the United States an ascendancy in the American seas, and protect their ports and harbors. The people will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European Power, to station large fleets in our seas, will equally forbid us to cross the Atlantic, or go into distant seas, for the purpose of frequent or habitual wars. But a navy is said to be anti-republican, because it was opposed by the Republicans in 1798. I apprehend, however, that it was then objected to, not because it was anti-republican in itself, but because the Republicans of that time believed it was to be employed for improper objects; because, while it was unnecessary at the time, it was of such a nature as only fitted it for the time, because it was part of a system which embraced unnecessary armies and unnecessary taxes and loans, to continue a war beyond the just objects of war-a war which, to use the language of the day, was to be waged by every man, woman, and child, in the nation, to which we are opposed. We are told, also, that navies have ruined every nation that has employed them; and England, and Holland, and Venice, and other nations, have been mentioned as examples. The vast debt of Great Britain is declared to be among the pernicious fruits of her Naval Establishment. This I deny. Her debt has grown out of her profuse JANUARY, 1812. subsidies, and her absurd wars on the land. Though the ruin, which is supposed to threaten England, is attributed to her navy, it is obvious, that her navy alone has saved, and still saves, her from ruin. Without it she must, long since, have yielded to the power of France her independence and her liberties. We are told that the same wealth which she has expended in support, ing her navies would have been employed more profitably for the nation in the improvement of its agriculture and manufactures, and in the establishment of canals and roads, and other internal improvements. But experience is better than theory. Let us compare England with nations which have no navies, or comparatively inconsiderable navies. The nations of the Continent of Europe are without such overgrown and ruinous Naval Establishments, but do you there find the highest improvements in agriculture, the most flourishing manufactures, or the best roads and canals? No, it is in this nation, that has been ruined by her navy, that you find all these improvements most perfect and most extended. I mean not either to be the panegyrist of England; but these truths may be declared for our instruction, without suppressing the feelings excited by the wrongs she has done us. England has not, then, I conclude, been destroyed or impoverished, but preserved and enriched, by her navy. Was Holland ruined by her navy? No; surrounded by the great Powers of the Continent, with a population not exceeding 2,000,000 of souls, she protected and secured her independence for more than a century, against her powerful neighbors, by means of her commercial riches, which were cherished and defended by her naval power. Did Venice owe her decline, or fall, to her navy? While the neighboring Italian States were subdued, year after year, changing their masters and their tyrants, she long continued to ride triumphantly amidst the storm, independent, and, in a great degree, free. It was her naval and commercial power which made her rich and great, and secured her existence as a State so long. Look even at the little Republic of Genoa, whose inhabitants, but for its commerce and its navy, would scarcely ever have possessed "a local habitation," or "a name!" But I must have exhausted the patience of the House, I will therefore conclude the observations which I propose to make on the general merits of the question. I must, however, yet be pardoned for making a few remarks on the particular provisions of the bill. The committee considered it their duty not to limit the objects of the report to such preparations as it might be proper or expedient to make to meet the present national exigency, but also to bring distinctly and explicitly before the House the more important question, whether the Navy of the United States should be cherished and supported with a fostering hand, or be at once abandoned? Both these objects are embraced by the bill. The first section provides for the repair of the frigates, which are now in ordinary. The question presented by this section the House have already decided by the adoption of one of the res JANUARY, 1812. Naval Establishment. H OF R. the frigates, when repaired, will more than supply the place of the gunboats, while their expense will not be so great; the appropriation, therefore, for the gunboats may be applied to them or the frigates in the alternative. The appropriation for the repair of the frigates in ordinary must follution, which I have before mentioned; therefore, the additional appropriations contained by the bill, amount only to $1,300,000, which must be considered as very small, when we contemplate the large expenditures authorized for other purposes, and the greatness and vital importance of the objects to which these appropriations relate. NOTE. olutions of the Committee of Foreign Relations, tion, no further appropriation will be required for which embraced the subject. The second sec. the service of the year, in consequence of the tion provides for the building of a limited num-frigates now in ordinary being put in service; as ber of frigates, averaging thirty-eight guns. It is my intention, according to the report of the committee, to move, when the section shall occur, to fill the blank with the number ten-the appropriation proposed is one million of dollars. The sum necessary to complete these frigates would be, including the sum proposed to be appropri-low, of course, the vote of the House on the resoated, $1,700,000; but the present appropriation is limited to one million, because it will probably be sufficient to meet the expenditures of the present year. The United States have not, unfortunately, from the little attention heretofore paid to this subject, the materials, particularly properly seasoned timber, necessary to build these vessels immediately. Nor is the article of timber of the best quality speedily to be proeured; and it is therefore intended, unless the exigencies of the country for naval defence shall render it imperiously necessary to proceed with more expedition, only to put it in the power of Government to provide the materials, and make such progress as may be coniistent with the durability and substantial value of the vessels, for which an appropriation of one million of dollars is deemed sufficient. The committee would have recommended seventy-fours in preference; but, as the United States possessed the materials only for four vessels of this description, and as ten or twelve would be necessary to meet the objects for which they are supposed to be principally qualified, it was thought best, by a majority of the committee, to rely at present on the services of smaller vessels, as they will probably form a more active and more efficient cruising force. The next section proposes the erection of a dock for the repair of the vessels of the Navy. It will be useful and economical, though we should not increase the size or the number of our ships, but it is considered indispensable, if we shall add large ships to our naval force. The appropriation required for this object is only one hundred thousand dollars. The next section proposes an appropriation for the purpose of procuring ship timber. It is intended to fill the blank with the sum of two hundred thousand dollars per annum, for three years, and it is hoped and believed this appropriation will be sufficient to provide the timber which may be necessary for the construction of any navy which the United States ought at present to contemplate. It is intended by another section of the bill, to separate the gunboats from the Naval Establishment; they appear to have no proper connexion with it, and swell very much the expenditure of the Naval Department. It is a fact that the estimates for the present year for the annual expense of sixty-two gunboats, are $750,000, nearly onethird of the whole estimates of the department for the year. An expense altogether disproportioned to their utility, and which depresses the general character of the establishment. In consequence of the provision contained in this sec L Statements referred to in the argument.-Comparative expense of the Army and Navy. Year. From Mar. 4, 1789, to Dec. 31, 1791 Military Estab'nt. Naval Estab'nt. $632,804 03 1792 1,103,048 47 1793 1,132,443 91 1794 2,589,097 59 $61,408 97 1795 H. OF R. BRITISH. Naval Establishment. Mr. JENNINGS presented a petition from the officers and soldiers engaged in the late expedition on the Wabash, praying for remuneration. Mr. KENT, from the committee to whom the subject was referred, reported a bill for the relief of Ninian Pinkney, which was twice read and committed. JANUARY, 1812. hand bids me shrink from the task which I am about to undertake; whilst on the other hand, a conscious duty impels me to engage in the consideration of the question now before the honorable Committee. My friend from South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES) says this question is all important to this nation; in this I perfectly coincide with him, and therefore cannot rest satisfied with a mere vote on this occasion. Sir, it is not my intention to follow the gentleman from South Carolina through all the windings of the labyrinth not pretend to chase reason on the wing. This into which he has ventured to penetrate. I will subject is one which may be demonstrated by figures and calculations-its investigation shall be attempted in this way. self do not differ as regards the intimate connexion The gentleman from South Carolina and myof the agricultural and commercial interests. On Mr. CONDIT called up for consideration, a resothis part of the subject, he has left nothing further lution which he had laid upon the table some to be said. But, sir, he mistakes when he redays ago, requesting from the President of the United States information respecting seamen im- marked, that it was the common sentiment, that pressed into the service of Great Britain; and the the commerce of the United States ought not to House having agreed to consider it, Mr. C. pro- considered subject to this accusation, though I be protected at any rate, for one, I will not be posed a modification of the resolution, by insert- shall maintain, that we cannot protect the coming the words, "and which information has not been heretofore communicated." He proposed in support of this opinion will be stated presently. merce of this country on the ocean. also an additional resolution for the appointment In common with my friend, I will lay before this of a committee, to arrange all the information on this subject, of which Congress was, or might be tlemen will indulge me with a portion of their Committee "a dry detail of facts." I hope genin possession, into one view, for the use of such time, though there may not be much pleasure in of the new members as might not have had an hearing such details. I will not particularly folopportunity of being acquainted with these par-low the gentleman in his comparison of the Army and Naval Establishments of the United States. ticulars. The facts The adoption of these resolutions was ob- He has stated to us that the Army has cost this jected to, as unnecessary. It was stated that cart-nation much more than the Navy; he concludes loads of documents had been already had on this subject; that by continual calls upon the Executive, that department was kept fully employed in answering these demands, when, perhaps, more important business required their attention; that no member could want information on this subject, after the volumes which had been published upon it; but if there were any such, they had only to apply to the Clerk's office, or the Library, to be fully satisfied. The first resolution was rejected the last was agreed to by a small majority, and a committee of five members appointed. On motion of Mr. LEWIS, the bill for amending the charter of the City of Washington, was re committed to the select committee who reported it, for amendment. The SPEAKER laid before the House, a communication from the Postmaster General, containing a report on the subject of finishing the public building, commonly called Blodget's Hotel, which was referred to a select committee. NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT. The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the Navy bill; when Mr. CHEVES finished his speech in favor of the bill, as given in full in preceding pages. we ought to be equally liberal in our appropriations for both these purposes. Sir, I perceive no reason in this assertion. Some gentlemen on the other side of the House may say, that we have been lavish in our appropriations for an army; even admitting that in this respect we have been liberal to extravagance, it surely cannot be inferred that we should make ourselves doubly guilty of this charge. I will agree to make appropriaStates. The gentleman from South Carolina has tions for the establishing a navy for the United told us, that when the war which we are about to wage, shall be over, our Army will leave us. Sir, I am happy to hear that on such an event the military will be readily disbanded—a dread of the contrary gave much uneasiness to many a few days since this is just what we wish should take Navy," will remain. It is for this, with many place. On the other hand, said he, "your proud other reasons, why I am opposed to a navy. I wish he could have proved to us, that with the end of the war the Navy would also leave us; perhaps I should then agree with him in favor of its establishment: though the "proud Navy" will remain with us, he has neglected to tell us at what rate of expense. Sir, the gentleman from South Carolina says, Mr. SEYBERT. I rise under a pressure of more many oppose a navy, because they deem it an than ordinary embarrassment-prudence on one I anti-republican institution. On this head, I shall JANUARY, 1812. Naval Establishment. remark but little: I will only ask if it is to remain with us in times of peace with its numerous train of officers, may it not become a powerful engine in the hands of an ambitious Executive? H. of R. ship of war-rotten ship, I may say, sir, for I believe without exception in the frigates, which were built by the United States, the more important parts decayed and were rotten in two, three, or four years. consoling circumstance for these heavy disburse repaired, especially the frigates, have been so much improved in their armament, their other fitments, and their sailing, that the most experi Sir, it was thought proper to make the foregoing remarks as preliminary to the subject. The In many instances the expense for repairs was question of a Naval Establishment for the United equal to the original cost. A single frigate, the States more especially concerns those who inhabit Constitution, has cost for repairs, from October, commercial districts. As one of these I am much 1802, to March, 1809, the enormous sum of interested. Many persons maintain, that a naval $302,582 21, or upwards of $43,000 per annum system of defence is indispensably necessary to a for seven years in succession. Sir, we are not nation, whose seaboard extends more than 1,500 without some "consolation" on this item. The miles, with a shipping interest amounting to 1,300,- Secretary of the Navy, in his letter of December 000 tons-in this respect, ranking the second of 1, 1809, has drawn our attention to the subject. modern nations. The argument is as specious as it I beg leave to be permitted to read his remarks to is plausible; it is liable to many, and in my opin- the Committee: "The sum transferred in aid of ion, to insuperable objections. The proposition the appropriation for repairs of vessels may apbefore us will be considered as leading to a per- pear large; but, pursuing the spirit of the act of manent Naval Establishment. This course is war- 31st January, 1809, it was determined that the ranted by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, repairs made should be thorough and complete. as well as by the mode which was pursued by my In doing this, the disbursements have certainly friend from South Carolina. I shall not hesi- 'been heavy. The price of naval stores, greatly tate to declare my decided opposition to such an es- ' and suddenly enhanced, has greatly contributed tablishment, and will proceed to state the objec-to swell them to their present amount. One very tions whereon my opinion is grounded. Sir, I deem it inexpedient to commence a permanentments arises out of the fact, that all the vessels Naval Establishment at this time. We are quite unprepared for it-we are in want of all the necessary materials; though we have been told that our forests abound in all the necessary tim-enced practical men pronounce them to be, at ber, it was said little of this material was to be this time, greatly superior in all respects to what found in our dockyards. The gentleman from they were when first fitted out from the stocks." South Carolina has told us, that a sufficiency of I confess, sir, I am dissatisfied with this mode of seasoned timber, to build four seventy-fours, was improving our ships. It appears to me, it would now on hand, and that the proper authority deem- be much better to follow the mode which is pured it advisable to be used for frigates. Sir, this sued in Europe. They begin by stocking their timber is a portion of that which was purchased navy yards with the necessary raw materials. some years since, for the purpose of building six Instead of a few months, several years are allowed seventy-fours. It now appears, that of this tim-to elapse before they finish a ship-of-the-line. It ber as much as was sufficient for two of these vessels, has been employed to build smaller vessels or gunboats, I presume. This is all a piece with our pretended economy. This mode of proceeding will not answer, sir. We are in the wrong from the commencement of our Navy, I do not wish it to be understood that. I have decided a navy will never be a proper mode of defence for this nation-but whenever it shall be determined on, we should begin right; this can only be done by following those nations who have had most experience on the subject. Our first step should be to store away the proper timber. This should be done in times when we can best afford it-in times when our market is glutted-in times when - labor can be commanded at fair prices-at a period when we enjoy peace, and surely not when we are about to engage in a war. We have heretofore paid the highest price for every article; we have given double wages for labor; and instances might be mentioned, when the workmen were transported in stage coaches, at an enormous expense, from our large seaport towns to the navy yard of this city. Contracts for timber were made in haste and at a very advanced price. As soon as it was obtained, it was put together, and in a few months we saw it floating in the form of a is said they expose their frames for several years, under cover, before they are planked. When I passed through Chatham, I saw the famous Ville de Paris, a first-rate, on the stocks. This ship drew my attention. On inquiry, I was informed she was then upwards of ten years in her cradle, from the laying of her keel. Sir, it is to be hoped, before we should be able to build ships of war in a proper manner, that the contest we are about to engage in will have ceased. If the ships cannot be had ready for service, why commence building them under the present unpromising aspect? Mr. Chairman, the great object of a Naval Establishment is declared to be the protection of our commerce against captures on the ocean. We will first turn our attention to that species of commerce which is generally termed the carrying trade; by this we understand the exportation of such articles as are not the productions of the United States. During the war between France and England, we were permitted to carry the productions of the West India islands, belonging to France, to the European markets. This privilege was granted to us on the part of France, solely because she could not protect and secure these productions in transitu to her ports |