H. OF R.

Naval Establishment.

JANUARY, 1812.

Sir, the expenses which are necessarily connected with a Naval Esiablishment, constitute a very serious objection to it. At this time, the annual expenditures for the British navy amount to nearly £17,000,000, or $80,000,000. Every succeeding year brings with it an increase of expenditures. This has been the result year after year since the commencement of the institution. Our prospects will be the more evident, when we take a view of the expenses which have been already incurred for the infantile establishment of our country; we shall be led to the same conclusions. The American Navy was commenced in the year 1794, and by the end of the year 1811, the expenditures amounted to $27,456,979-a sum

in Europe. At this time these islands are in the possession of Great Britain, and she denies to us the privileges which we formerly enjoyed. This right on her part is founded on the usage of nations. The captured islands will only be again ceded to France, when peace shall take place; and then France will act as Great Britain now does. The experience at the termination of our Revolutionary war proves this beyond all doubt. We shall then only be allowed to carry rum and molasses from these islands, and these are articles which are not objects of re-exportation. So that, now and hereafter, we cannot expect to derive advantages from the carrying trade. Why then build a navy to protect this commerce? If we adopt the advice of my friend from South Caro-much greater than the one-half of the public debt lina, we shall saddle the nation with a permanent expense for a navy, after an important branch of commerce has left us forever. I will even admit, sir, that we shall enjoy this trade-is it reasonable to suppose that we can protect it by a navy, when the navies of France, Spain, and Holland combined could not insure its passage to Europe? Let us view this subject in a more extended sense-I mean as regards our commerce generally-we shall still have cause to entertain the opinion which we first adopted. We cannot protect our commerce on the ocean. Our ships have vexed every sea-we trade to all parts of the world; of course, to protect our commerce, our ships of war must abandon our coasts and encounter all the force of the enemy or those of Europe. The ports we have in view are European. If your frigates, for convenience and safety, are to cruise only on your coasts, what will be the fate of the millions which are embarked beyond the Cape of Good Hope? By this management surely you cannot afford it protection. France, Spain, and Holland, when combined and backed by an armed neutrality in the north of Europe, could not secure their commerce. The fleets of Great Britain now sail triumphant over every wave of the deep. The Russians have a navy far superior to that which it is proposed we shall establish, and they cannot protect their trade in the confined limits of the Baltic. They count fifty or sixty sail-of-the-line, besides many frigates and smaller vessels.

Sir, the expenses which are incurred by a Naval Establishment, far exceeds the profits which arise from the commerce which it is intended to protect. This proposition is warranted by the experience of Great Britain, the most commercial nation of modern times. In the year 1798, the total imports and exports of Great Britain amounted to £94,952,000. For the same year the expenditures for her navy amounted to £13,654,013, or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports, or fourteen per cent. on the total capital employed in commerce. What regular trade can yield such profits on the outward and inward cargoes? To me this is a secret. In the year 1799. Mr. Pitt computed the profits on the commerce of Great Britain at £12,000,000, or one and a half millions less than the expense for her navy the preceding year!

on the 1st of January, 1812. This would have been much better applied, had it been placed with the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. I will ask the gentleman from South Carolina, what has the nation benefited for this enormous expenditure? What would have been the amount expended, had this engine been Herculean, with Admirals of the Red White and Blue squadrons, with numerous dock and navy yards, placemen, &c.? For we shall gradually advance to all this, if we do not stop short at this time. For the benefits of such appendages, I will refer you to a statement made to this House, the last session, concerning the navy yards belonging to the United States; especially to the details of the expenditures of that connected with this city. The document I refer to, was laid before this House on the 25th February, 1811. It will inform you, sir, that the value of the work done from the 1st of January to the 31st of December; 1810, was $73,947 52. The commandant confesses, in his returns made to the Secretary, that this work, in many instances, is rated twenty per cent. above the prices paid in other places. The salaries in this same yard, for the same year, (1810.) amounted to $95,637 644. So that the pay for the salaries and the wages at this navy yard, exceeded the value of the articles manufactured, even when rated far above the fair prices, in amount $21,790 12! This establishment is under the immediate eye of the Government; we might suppose every attention was paid to economy; if so, who will desire further proofs of the advantages of a navy!

Sir, if we follow the British in the principle, we must look for the same results. The expenses of a navy are not only enormous, but, sir, they increase in a ratio far beyond the increase of force. From the year 1701 to 1801, the vessels in the British navy increased fourfold in number, at the same time the expenses increased in a twelvefold ratio-they are 270 greater now than they were in the time of James I. In 1701, the British navy consisted of 256 vessels; its annual expenditure amounted to £1,046,397, or $4,650,653. In the year 1798, the vessels increased to 946; and the annual expenditure to £13,654,013, or $60,684,502 !

Sir, we will now compare the force with the rate of expense. This will be done by dividing the sum of the annual expenditures by the number of guns employed. The House will indulge me

can seas will mount a total force of 2,350 guns; that on the Halifax and Newfoundland station alone will mount 680 guns; a force in itself very superior to that of all the vessels belonging to the American Navy, independent of gunboats. The American vessels now in actual service are-5 frigates, 3 ships, and 7 brigs, besides gunboats. We have in ordinary-5 frigates, (two of which are probably so rotten as to be unworthy of repairs,) besides gunboats. Our whole force amounts to but 20 vessels, independent of gunboats, and mounts a total of 524 guns!

Sir, I fear the British force in the American seas is too competent for our interest-they may despatch many more. The statement of the gentleman from South Carolina, (I allude to his reference to the navy list for 1801,) was very favorable to his purpose. I do not attribute his using it to any sinister views; I know he was not in possession of that for the last year.

The British stations at Halifax and Bermuda afford every facility to fit and repair. They from thence can at all times watch our vessels'; and, sir, they will not neglect to oppose them by a double force. From the view we have just taken, I ask you, sir, what must be the probable result of hostilities on the ocean?

JANUARY, 1812.

will read an official document to satisfy him on this subject; it is a letter from Mr. Russell, our Chargé d'Affaires at Paris to Mr. Monroe, dated July 14, 1811:

"Sir, I have the honor to hand you, herein, a copy of my note of the 18th inst., to the Duke of Bassano, claiming the release of twenty-three American seamen, stated to have been pressed into the French service at Dantzic and its vicinity. When I called on the Duke on the 9th, he acknowledged the receipt of this note, and said that he should immediately write to the Minister of Marine on the subject. In the conversation which I had with him yesterday, he informed me that ister of the Marine had replied that no American citi he had performed this engagement, and that the Minzens had been pressed by his orders; that the city of ber of seamen, and was alone responsible for the manDantzic had been required to furnish a certain numner in which it had complied with this requisition. The Duke of Bassano also added, that my note had been laid before the Emperor, and that His Majesty had ordered that on the arrival of the seamen from Dantzic at Antwerp, where they were expected yesterday, all that were American citizens should be discharged, and the city of Dantzic should be required to furnish others in their stead."

Sir, I further object to a navy, because it will be the means of exciting many wars, which, withSir, we shall find it very difficult to man a con- out the establishment, may be honorably avoided. siderable fleet in the United States; seamen will It is said, nations are involved in war, in propornot abandon the merchants to enter on board tion to the extent of their navies, and some assert ships of war at half the rate of wages; numerous (Brougham) that a perpetual war is one of the privateers will be fitted out in all our ports, they two modes which are necessary to support a pow will pay higher wages than the Government, anderful naval establishment. Sir, a naval establishthe best men will be diverted from the national ment will create a new and a dangerous interest service. Sir, we need the best seamen to combat in our country. Nothing is more common than those of Great Britain; they have the advantage to be told, that such are the wishes of the naval of long experience in the best regulated service. interest of Great Britain, and that this or that war I entreat you, at no time despise your enemy, you must be entered into to gratify them. For my will thus be the better prepared to encounter him. part, sir, I shall be very sorry indeed, if ever the I cordially assent with my friend from South Ca- period arrives in the United States, when any rolina in the declaration, that the American tars particular interest or community shall direct the are as brave as those of any other nation; but, Government, whether it be naval, agricultural, sir, at the same time we must do justice to those manufacturing, or commercial-the general welof Great Britain, they are not to be treated with fare should be the sole great ruling principle in contempt. Men are of more consequence than the National Councils. ships; the naval combats of Europe prove, that a Sir, I am deterred, when I consider the fate of small number of the ships well manned, will de-all those nations who at different periods have feat a greater number when they are indifferently been famous for their navies. The naval strength manned. The contest between Great Britain on of the Hanseatic League was such, two centuries the one part, and France and Spain on the other past, as to excite terror on the part of England. part, are decisive on this head. Sir, to man our These, sir, distant free cities, are now the appenships we should have to resort to the odious prac- dages of mighty France, and have no political tices of Great Britain and France;, impressment existence. Who has not heard of the once forand naval conscription would be the order of the midable fleets of Venice and Genoa? At one day. Men of observation and experience declare time England was indebted to the latter for offithese as the inevitable consequences of a naval es- cers to command her ships of war-Alas! these tablishment-press-gangs would disturb the peace Republics are now consigned to oblivion. Denof your cities-your seaports would become the mark was at one time the mistress of the ocean ; constant theatres of riot and debauchery. Sir, by means of her fleets she often invaded England, the citizens would not yield to this state of things; and held her in a state of subjection. The Danes personal liberty in our country is too highly heretofore burned London, Paris, and other great prized to suffer such violation. cities-they are now controlled by France, and they have had their Copenhagen defeat. Holland, with her Van Tromps and De Ruyters, occupied the British Channel at pleasure; this Power defeated the navies of England and France.

The gentleman from South Carolina thinks that impressments are not absolutely necessary to man a navy; he doubts whether this method is adopted in any other country besides Great Britain. I

Where is Holland now? Incorporated as a part of the French Empire. Spain boasted her invincible armadas; Elizabeth of England, by nature haughty, proud, and ambitious, trembled at the very mention of them, until they were dispersed and destroyed by storms at sea; Spain is now the vassal of France. Not very long since the navy of France sailed triumphant along the British coast, looked into Portsmouth harbor, and taunted British spirit. I ask you, sir, where is the strength of which these nations formerly boasted? All are inoperative, and dread the gigantic power of the British navy-they are in part sick in dry docks, or are blockaded in their ports.

H. OF R.

ject before the Committee, though he confessed himself very inadequate to do justice to it. He deemed the question of great magnitude; as he feared, if we were to proceed to build up a large Naval Establishment, it would affect the destinies of this nation to the latest posterity.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. CHEVES) has said, that it is time to go into the establishment of a permanent Navy, because the vessels already on hand would be liable to decay. If it should be the will of Congress, said Mr. McK., to go into the business of building a Navy, it will be necessary to enter upon it with all possible energy. Therefore, if any attempt should be made to lessen our present force, he should be opposed to it. But he was decidedly opposed, and forever should be opposed, to the application of a cent to repair those old hulks of vessels which are fit only for fuel.

Mr. Chairman; Great Britain, though at this time triumphant in every sea, if she persists in her expensive naval establishment, with her present debt of £800,000,000, which was chiefly created for her navy-Great Britain, sir, I say, with all The gentleman from South Carolina has said, this, must sink under the heavy pressure. She that he has great prejudices to encounter. Mr. will hereafter derive very little satisfaction from McK. would have thought that the deliberate opinher brilliant victories on the 1st of June off Cape ion of a majority of Congress, expressed upon more St. Vincent, Camperdown, Aboukir, and Tra- than one occasion, was entitled to a more respectfalgar. ful term than prejudices. Those decisions proShall I be pardoned, sir, when I fear our ves-ceeded from the honest convictions of some of the sels will only tend to swell the present catalogue of the British navy? Of the 1,042 vessels which she possessed in July, 1811, one hundred and nine were captured from the French, forty-six from the Danes, twenty-five from the Spaniards, twenty-national security which is formed by a naval four from the Dutch, and three from the Italians; making a total of two hundred and seven captured ships, or one-fifth of her whole navy.

best friends of the country. Mr. McK. would refrain from noticing the reasoning of the committee in their report on this subject. They say, The important engine of national strength and

inefficiency."

Mr. McK. asked whether the ingenuity of man could find language which could cast a more severe censure upon the late Administration, than is contained in these strictures of the committee. It is well known, that our Treasury was in flourishing circumstances during the late Administration, and yet no recommendation was made by the Executive in favor of increasing our Naval Establishment. The extension of the Navy was not thought of till the year 1812; but now we are told, that, to neglect the commencement of a permanent naval system, "impolitic under any 'circumstances, is the more so, when it is demon'strably clear that this nation is inevitably destined to be a Naval Power."

force has hitherto, in the opinion of the committee, been treated with a neglect highly impolitic, or supported by a spirit so languid, as, while it Small ships are proper for the service of the has preserved the existence of the Establishment, United States-by their agency we shall be able has had the effect of loading it with the imputo annoy the convoys of an enemy. The priva-tations of wasteful expense and comparative teers which were fitted out in every port during our Revolutionary war, destroyed much of the British commerce, even in the British and Irish channels, whilst the frigates which were built by the Government, did little or nothing-but two of them remained at the conclusion of the contest. The enemy will not watch your small vessels; they may enter all your small inlets, where heavy vessels cannot venture to approach them; and, at the conclusion of the war, they may be sold for the merchant service. I shall not follow the gentleman in his remarks on the bill before the Committee; I shall vote against it, though it is my present intention to appropriate the sums requisite for the repairing and equipping our present ships of war. I will go no further. I tell you, sir, naval victories in the end would prove fatal to the United States; the consequences which have uniformly followed in other countries must take place here. If the United States shall determine to augment their navy, so as to rival those of Europe, the public debt will become permanent; direct taxes will be perpetual; the paupers of the country will be increased; the nation will be bankrupt; and, I fear, the tragedy will end in a revolution.

Mr. McKEE rose, with deference, to perform a duty which he owed to his constituents, by delivering his sentiments on the very important sub12th CoN. 1st SESS.-27

Mr. McK. denied this doctrine, that "it is demonstrably clear that this nation is inevitably 'destined to be a Naval Power;" and he believed, that, if the attempt were made to make it such, it would prove the destruction of our happy Constitution. He would proceed to show on what ground he supported the opinion that the maintenance of a permanent Naval Establishment would prove ruinous to this country. For this purpose, he should be under the necessity of submitting some calculations to the House; for, though he had heard a course of this kind condemned, as fit only for the counting-house of the merchant, he

considered it as the most conducive to correct legislation. It is certainly a matter of just calculation, when we are called upon to establish a permanent Navy, to show that such an institution would cost more than any advantages to be derived from it would compensate.

Having said this much in favor of this mode of counting the cost, he hoped, if he should make any incorrect statement, that it would be rectified

JANUARY, 1812.

16,945,045

by gentlemen better acquainted with the subject Allow for taxes and excess of calculation - 2,945,045 than he pretended to be. And though his calculations might in some instances be thought at present too high, he would venture to say, that hereafter they would be found to be under the

truth:

For the year 1812.

The ordinary expenses, including the pres-
ent Army and Navy, agreeably to Sec-
retary of the Treasury's report, will be $9,400,000
Expense of the new Army of 30,000 men,
and 50,000 volunteers-allowing 30,000
only to be called into service-exclusive
of bounties, estimated at one million for
every 3,000 men -

Balance to be supplied by loans

For the year 1814.

$14,000,000

- 10,000,000

Bounty and allowance of $2 a man for recruiting, say 30,000, exclusive of the land bounty

Repairing the old ships, and half years' service, as estimated by the Secretary of the

Navy

714,981