tions of the country, he asked if the most sanguine among us would not tremble for the integrity of the Union? If, along with Cuba, Great Britain should acquire East Florida, she will have the absolute command of the Gulf of Mexico. Can gentlemen, particularly gentlemen from the Western country, contemplate such possible, nay, probable events, without desiring to see, at least the commencement of such a naval establishment as would effectually protect the Mississippi? He entreated them to turn their attention to the defenceless situation of the Orleans Territory, and to the nature of its population. It is known that, while under the Spanish Government, they experienced the benefit of naval security. Satisfy them that, under the Government of the United States, they will enjoy less protection, and you disclose the most fatal secret.

The General Government receives annually for the public lands about $600,000. One of the sources whence the Western people raise this sum, is the exportation of the surplus productions of that country. Shut up the Mississippi and this source is, in a great measure, dried up. But, suppose this Government to look upon the occlusion of the Mississippi, without making an effort on that element, where alone it could be made successfully, to remove the blockading force, and, at the same time, to be vigorously pressing payment for the public lands; he shuddered at the consequences. Deep-rooted as he knew the affections of the Western people to be to the Union, (and he would not admit their patriotism to be surpassed by any other quarter of the country,) if such a state of things were to last any considerable time, he should seriously apprehend a withdrawal of their confidence. Nor, sir could we derive any apology for the failure to afford them protection from the want of the material for naval architecture. On the contrary, all the articles entering into the construction of a navy-iron, hemp, timber, pitch, abound in the greatest quantities on the waters of the Mississippi. Kentucky alone, he had no doubt, raised hemp enough the last year for the whole consumption of the United States.

H. of R.

not prepare to protect there your own commerce and to assail his, will he not sweep from the ocean every vessel bearing your flag, and destroy even the coasting trade? But, from the arguments of gentlemen. it would seem to be questioned if foreign commerce is worth the kind of protection insisted upon. What is this foreign commerce that has suddenly become so inconsiderable? It has, with very trifling aid from other sources, defrayed the expenses of Government ever since the adoption of the present Constitution-maintained an expensive and successful war with the Indians-a war with the Barbary Powers-a quasi war with France-sustained the charges of suppressing two insurrections, and extinguished upward of forty-six millions of the public debt! In revenue it has, since the year 1789, yielded one hundred and ninety-one millions of dollars. During the first four years after the commencement of the present Government, the revenue averaged only about two millions annually-during a subsequent period of four years it rose to an average of fifteen millions annually, or became equivalent to a capital of two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, at an interest of six per cent. per annum. And, if our commerce is re-established, it will, in the course of time, net a sum for which we are scarcely furnished with figures in arithmetic.Taking the average of the last nine years (comprehending, of course, the season of the embargo) our exports averaged upward of thirty-seven millions of dollars, which is equivalent to a capital of upward of six hundred millions of dollars at six per cent. interest, all of which must be lost in a destruction of foreign commerce. In the abandonment of that commerce is also involved the sacrifice of our brave tars, who have engaged in the pursuit, from which they derive subsistence, under confidence that the Government will afford them that just protection which is due to all. They will be driven into foreign employment, for it is in vain to expect that they will renounce the habits of their life.

The spirit of commercial enterprise so strongly depicted by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. MITCHILL,) is diffused throughout the country. It If, as he conceived, gentlemen had been unsuc- is a passion as unconquerable as any with which cessful in showing that the downfall of maritime nature has endowed us. You may attempt to nations was ascribable to their navies, they had regulate-you cannot destroy it. It exhibits itself been more fortunate in showing, by the instances as well on the waters of the Western country, as to which they had referred, that, without a ma- on the waters and shores of the Atlantic. Mr. C. rine, no foreign commerce could exist to any ex- had heard of a vessel built at Pittsburg, having tent. It is the appropriate, the natural (if the crossed the Atlantic, and entered a European port term be allowable) protection of foreign com- (he believed that of Leghorn.) The master of merce. The shepherd and his faithful dog are the vessel laid his papers before the proper cusnot more necessary to guard the flocks that tom-house, which, of course, stated the place of browse and gambol on the neighboring mountain. her departure. The officer boldly denied the exHe considered the prosperity of foreign com- istence of any such American port as Pittsburg, merce indissolubly allied to marine power. Ne- and threatened a seizure of the vessel, as being glect to provide the one, and you must abandon furnished with forged papers. The affrighted the other. Suppose the expected war with Eng- master procured a map of the United States, and, land is commenced, you enter and subjugate Can-pointing out the Gulf of Mexico, took the officer ada, and she still refuses to do you justice, what other possible mode will remain to operate on the enemy but upon that element where you can then alone come in contact with him? And if you do

to the mouth of the Mississippi-traced the course of the Mississippi, more than a thousand miles, to the mouth of the Ohio; and, conducting him still a thousand miles higher, to the junction of the

Alleghany and Monongahela-there, he exclaimed, stands Pittsburg, the port from which I sailed! The custom-house officer, prior to the production of this evidence, would as soon have believed that the vessel had performed a voyage from the

moon.

JANUARY. 1812.

South Carolina had acknowledged that the sum now asked toward building this navy was only intended as the beginning of the business, that more would be called for hereafter. He knew very well this was the intended course. It was a little extraordinary, said Mr. S., to find gentlemen from Kentucky, patronizing this navy scheme, while the large shipping and commercial State of Pennsylvania does not want this alleged pro'tection of commerce but really the machine of

Mr. MITCHILL made some additional observations, chiefly on the great resources of this country for ship-building, which he exhibited in the most comprehensive way, showing that every material used about a ship could be obtained within ourselves in the greatest abundance..

In delivering the sentiments he had expressed, Mr. C. considered himself as conforming to a sacred Constitutional duty. When the power to provide a navy was confided to Congress, it must have been the intention of the Convention to sub-power, mit only to the discretion of that body the period when that power should be exercised. That period had, in his opinion, arrived, at least for making a respectable beginning. And, while he discharged what he conceived to be his duty, he derived great pleasure from the reflection that he was supporting a measure calculated to impart Mr. BoyD had heard a great deal said in favor additional strength to our happy Union. Diver- of going into the establishment of this navy; he sified as are the interests of its various parts, how wished to offer a few remarks against this project. admirably do they blend together and harmonize! He had heard theory on theory, and calculation We have only to make a proper use of the bounties on calculation; but, nothing that he had heard spread before us, to render us prosperous and pow-convinced him of the policy of building a navy erful. Such a navy, as he had contended for, will form a new bond of connexion between the States, concentrating their hopes, their interests, and their affections.

He concluded by inquiring of the chairman of the Naval Committee, if there were seasoned timber on hand, to enable him to judge whether it was best now to vote for immediately building some additional frigates, or to provide the requisite materials?

Mr. CHEVES Could only repeat the information which he had already given to the Committee, that suitable timber could be obtained for these frigates, though it be not on hand, except some of the large pieces required. And, as to the expense of these vessels, it is estimated at one million three hundred thousand dollars.

The subject had been so ably argued by his friends, that he would not intrude longer on the Committee than to notice one circumstance. Gentlemen have been alarmed by a project from the Secretary of the Treasury, proposing ways and means for the present crisis. But if gentlemen be satisfied, as he trusted they were, that a moderate increase of our Navy Establishment is expedient, this letter of the Secretary ought to have no effect upon them; for, while Congress can raise a land force of 85,000 men, they can surely afford to appropriate the comparatively small sum asked for on account of the Navy. But, gentlemen say this is the way schemes are fixed upon the nation, by making one appropriation that another may follow. No deception, said Mr. C., had been used in this business. The case had been fairly stated, and the question is put, Will you cut off the right arm of your nation, by putting down the Navy? If gentlemen please, they can do it; but he wished it might not be done on account of the Secretary of the Treasury's letter. The nation is, doubtless, equal to the crisis; and it is to be hoped members will not shrink from a performance of their duty.

Mr. SMILIE observed, that the gentleman from

larger than we have, especially at the present time; he knew, indeed, that we could never build a navy to cope with Great Britain.

Instead of hearing so much said about throwing money away upon a navy, he should like to hear something about the encouragement and protection of our infant manufactories, which he thought of greater importance to the country than building ships; for, if they are properly encouraged, they will make everything we want, and by drawing over emigrants from other countries, and thus increasing our population, they will consume a great part of our surplus produce, so that foreign trade would be less an object. Too little attention, he thought, was paid to this subject. This would be a peaceful course; manufactures might be carried to any extent, without running the risk of war; not so with foreign commerce, the more it is extended, the more difficulties the country is involved in. He was in favor of the peaceful course, and consequently against a large permanent naval establishment.

Mr. RHEA said, before the question was taken, he would add a few other remarks. He had always been in favor of protecting commerce; but he could not consent to protect it in the manner now proposed. We have, said he, voted millions for the fortifications on our seacoast, and for building gunboats for the protection of our coasts and ports and harbors. But gentlemen now say, these are not sufficient, give us a fleet-not to meet our enemy at sea, nor to protect our commerce in our waters, but to protect our coasts and harbors, he supposed, to be alongside our fortifications.

He was surprised to hear a gentleman from Kentucky (the Speaker) express a desire for ships of war to protect the interests of the Western country. He knew of no use they would be of there, except they meant to use them against the Indians.

And, as to New Orleans, it is defended so well by nature, that no foreign Power can annoy it,

H. of R.

Naval Establishment.

JANUARY, 1812.

tom or be captured. Of the bravery, skill, and enterprise of our seamen, no man can doubt. Give them ships any way equal to their enemy, and my life upon it we never lose one but at a cost to the enemy which shall make him repent the contest. For the seventy-fours we have the timber ready, of the finest quality, and in the best possible state of preparation; it will cost less to build them and less to keep them in service, and when built, I have no hesitation in declaring it as my firm belief, that they will produce a much more powerful effect upon the enemy than the frigates. I shall therefore vote against this section, but shall do it under a hope of having a section substituted, authorizing the build

mitting the frigates to average but thirty-six
guns, it appears from the Secretary's report they
will cost us annually to keep the ten in service
one million twenty thousand dollars, when four
seventy-fours would cost but eight hundred and
forty-seven thousand one hundred and sixteen
dollars, making a difference of near two hundred
thousand dollars a year in our expenses. Let us
build which we may, our object is to employ them
against an enemy vastly our superior upon the
ocean, and who will no doubt do his utmost to
keep them blockaded in our ports, or capture them
if they get to sea. We ought then, I think, un-
questionably to vest our resources in that species
of force most likely to enable us to take advan-
tage of the disasters which must frequently being four seventy-fours.
fall any blockading squadron upon our coast.
Add four seventy-fours at once to the ten frigates
we already have, and independent of the appal it
will produce upon our enemy, evincing a deter-
mination to meet him as early as possible upon
his own element, we shall put him to double the
expense in his blockading squadrons which he
would feel any necessity to be at in keeping
twenty frigates shut up in our ports.

The objects of our preparations for war by land are to garrison our forts, and wrest from the enemy his Canadian possessions, and it is believed by all that they are commensurate to the end, and that in the course of the first year we shall at least be able to get possession of Upper Canada, and all that part of the country furnishing either timber or provisions for exportation. To this purpose I agree that it is proper to direct the energies of the nation at the outset. But these provinces, except for the purpose of some supplies for her West India Islands and her fleets in our seas, it is known are not of much importance to her. Admit, then, that we have taken them, all we have gained worth speaking of is in the additional expense and trouble we shall have thrown upon our enemy in supplying her blockading squadrons. This is surely an important point, but by no means sufficiently so, I fear, to bring her to a sense of justice towards us if we there stop. An increase of our Naval Establishment is also another essential link in our chain of preparations. That increase should be made in the way most likely to endanger the enemy's commerce and squadrons in our seas. These squadrons we know will consist not of frigates alone, but of ships-of-the-line to come in aid of their frigates in the case of need. They know the gallant commanders of our frigates will never surrender them to ships of equal force, and, therefore, as in the case of the dastardly attack of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake, they will take care to have ships-of-the-line to aid their quick sailing frigates. We must do the same, or our frigates when built will be of but little use, for though I do not believe that either a Decatur or a Rodgers would surrender their frigates to any seventy-four in the British navy, as long as they could be kept afloat, yet no man acquainted with the relative force of the two ships can hesitate in declaring that the frigates must ultimately go to the bot

have nothing to hope for from negotiation. It Our experience for years past proves that we proves more, for it shows that a failure to resent by war one invasion of our rights has led to another; that a failure to resent by war an invasion of our rights by one of the belligerents has served as a pretext for a similar or a more flagrant violation by the other. Our love of peace then must either give way to necessity, or chain us in submission at the feet of our insolent oppressors. Great Britain, by her Orders in Council, forbids our carrying the produce of our soil to any mar. ket from whence her products are excludedthus, in fact, assuming and exercising the right to regulate our commerce as before our Revolu tion. By her practice of impressment, she has already forced into service thousands of our citizens, and compelled them to fight her battles. What have we gained, or what has she lost by the blood and treasure expended by our ancestors in the glorious struggle which achieved our independence, if we submit to the pretensions now set up by the very nation from whom they obtained it? Will it be any consolation to our seafaring brethren to tell them that they enjoy the glorious privilege of electing men to represent them and guard their interests in the great councils of the nation, when they see that their Representatives suffer them to be enslaved by any foreign Power, and their families thrown into distress and upon the bounty of their friends or the parish? Will it be any consolation to the agriculturist or merchant to know that he also enjoys the privilege of sending men to represent him here, when they see that these Representatives have surrendered to any nation whatever the right of directing to what ports or places, and under what conditions, the products of our soil shall be carried for a market? It certainly cannot. They will see at once that they had better rid themselves of the expense of their own Government, and rely entirely upon some Government for a protection of their rights. Rather than submit to pretensions so degrading to our national honor, and which, if submitted to, must lead to consequences so destructive both to the agricultural and commercial interests of the nation, I do not hesitate to prefer war; and am happy to find from the vast majority in favor of the measures heretofore under discussion pre