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ries, which are the acknowledged dangers of our political condition, subsiding or sacrificing? What sight more exhilarating than to see this great nation once more walking forth among the nations of the earth, under the protection of no foreign shield? Peaceful because powerful-powerful because united in interests, and amalgamated by concentration of those interests in the national affections.

a proportionate change in that of the British. suited her power, and adequate to her purposes? And if tameness and systematic abandonment of What object more consolatory to the friendsour commercial rights have had the effect to bring what more paralyzing to the enemies of our Union upon us so many miseries, a contrary course of-than to behold the natural jealousies and rivalconduct, having for its basis a wise spirit and sys tematic naval support, it may well be hoped will have the opposite effect of renewing our prosperity. But if it be true, as is so frequently and so confidently asserted, that Great Britain is jealous of our commercial greatness; if it be true that she would depress us as rivals; if she begins to regard us as a Power which may soon curb, if not in aftertimes spurn her proud control on her favorite element, then indeed she may be disposed But, let the opposite policy prevail; let the esto quench the ardor of our naval enterprise; then sential interests of the great component parts of indeed, it may be her care so to shape the course this Union find no protection under the national of her policy as to deprive our commerce of all arm-instead of safety let them realize oppreshope of its natural protection; and to co-operate sion, and the seeds of discord and dissolution are with and cherish such an Administration in this inevitably sown in a soil the best fitted for their country, as hates a naval force and loves com-root, and affording the richest nourishment for mercial restriction. In this view of her policy; their expansion. It may be a long time before and I am far from asserting it is not correct, they ripen. But, sooner or later, they will assuis it not obvious, that she may be content with redly burst forth in all their destructive energies. the present condition of our commerce? Except In the intermediate period, what aspect does a acknowledged colonial vassalage, what state of Union, thus destitute of cement, present? Is it things would be more desirable to her? The that of a nation keen to discern, and strong to rewhole sea is her own. Her American rival tamely sist, violations of its sovereignty? It has rather makes cession of it to her possession. Our com- the appearance of a casual collection of semi-barmercial capital is already seeking employment barous clans, with the forms of civilization, and in her cities; and our seamen in her ships. What with the rude and rending passions of the savage then results? Is it not on this view of her state. In truth, powerful-yet, as to any foreign policy, undeniable that an Administration in this effect, imbecile-rich, in the goods of fortune, yet country, for the purposes of Great Britain, is wanting that inherent spirit without which a nasuch as thinks commerce not worth having, or tion is poor indeed; their strength exhausted by not worth defending; such as in every scheme of struggles for local power; their moral sense denominal protection, meditates to it nothing, but based by low intrigues for personal popularity, or additional embarassment and eventual abandon- temporary pre-eminence; all their thoughts turnment? Must not such an Administration be con-ed not to the safety of the State, but to the elevavenient to a British Ministry, if such be British tion of a chieftain. A people presenting such an policy? And if British Ministers should ever find aspect, what have they to expect abroad? What such an Administration in this country, made to but pillage, insult, and scorn? their hands, may we not anticipate that they will The choice is before us. Persist in refusing take care to manage with a view to its continu-efficient maritime protection; persist in the sysance in power? Of all policy the most ominous tem of commercial restrictions; what now is, perto British ascendancy is that of a systematic mari-haps, anticipation, will hereafter be history. time defence of our maritime rights.

Mr. FISK said that, when this subject was first The general effect of the policy I advocate, is presented to the House, he felt inclined to vote to produce confidence at home and respect abroad. for a small increase of the Naval Establishment; These are twin shoots from the same stock, and but it now appears that, what is asked for is connever fail to flourish or fade together. Confidence sidered only as laying a foundation for a great is a plant of no mushroom growth and of no ar-system-a system which, he feared, if carried into tificial texture. It springs only from sage coun-execution, might change the Government. sels and generous endeavors. The protection you Mr. F. contended that the Navy never had, and extend must be efficient and suited to the nature never could protect our commerce. Like standof the object you profess to maintain. If it being armies, he considered navies as dangerous to neither adequate nor appropriate, your wisdom liberty. As to the Constitutional provision, with may be doubted, your motives may be distrusted, respect to a navy, it is nothing more than a mere but in vain you expect confidence. The inhabi-grant of power, which Congress is at liberty to use tants of the seaboard will inquire of their own senses and not of your logic, concerning the reality of their protection.

As to respect abroad, what course can be more certain to insure it? What object more honorable, what more dignified than to behold a great nation pursuing wise ends by appropriate means; rising to adopt a series of systematic exertions,

or not, as they may deem it necessary or expedient. Though he had listened with candor to all the arguments which had been used in favor of an increase of this Establishment at the present time, he was far from being convinced that such an increase, at present, is either necessary or expedient. It appeared to him that every nation which has embarked, to any extent, in Navy Es

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Naval Establishment.

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Gentlemen say, that Great Britain will run great risks in sending vessels on our shore. If so, why build ships to meet them? He thought the destruction of Copenhagen ought to warn us against going into a scheme of this kind.

If he were asked how he would protect commerce, he would answer, by marching to Canada, and taking that country and Nova Scotia ; and, having got possession of Halifax, she would have no means of refitting her vessels in this country, in case of that damage to which they are so liable on our coast.

tablishments, has been eventually crushed by them. Whether you go back to ancient, or look upon modern Europe, you will find navies have not afforded that protection which gentlemen are desirous of persuading the House they are capable of affording. Has the navy of Russia protected her commerce? There are in the Russian dominions from twenty-five to thirty millions of people; but, by every account we have of them, their situation is not very enviable; nor have they any great degree of commerce to protect. Where are the navies of Sweden and Denmark? The latter, it is well known, were swept away But it has been said that, except we take this and destroyed by the British fleet; and the fleet course, we shall be considered by the Governof Sweden serves only to keep the country in pov-ments abroad, as wanting a proper degree of spirit erty to maintain it. A navy looks pretty well in to defend our rights. There has never been wanttheory; but look into the experience of nations, ing à disposition in this House, or in the nation, and it will be found to have been the bane of every to defend our rights to the utmost. country which has had any thing to do with it.] We should want wisdom, therefore, to pursue a system which has proved so ruinous to others.

With respect to Great Britain herself, it had been said that her navy had been the basis of her wealth and prosperity. Mr. F. said he did not envy the situation of that country. The glory and honor which such nations are in the habit of acquiring, prove a curse to them in the end by enslaving them with expense.

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. QUINcy) had spoken of the naval force formerly possessed by Massachusetts. But, what security did those ships afford? They were of no use, as he believed; they were nothing but a heavy expense to the State; and he believed the merchants had found their commerce in a much better state since, than it was when they were in being.

Gentlemen speak of the embarrassments of our commerce, as if they were owing to our not havWhen the House was engaged in the army bill, ing a navy; but, if they will look around, they it was said that the necessary number of men will find that those countries which have navies could not be got; that it was not in this country, have not escaped; our embarrassments have arisen as in Europe, where thousands of men enter into from the wrongs committed against us by other the land and sea service because they are destinations, which we had no power of preventing. tute of employment or of any means of getting bread; here, every man, who will labor, can procure a living without difficulty.

It had been shown that the Navy Establishment proposed could not be supported but by an expense which would prove ruinous to this country. If men cannot be gotten for the Army, how are Rather than incur this expense, he was willing to they to be procured for the Navy? He should dispense with the honor supposed to be attached apprehend impressment, or something like it. to such an Establishment. Mr. F. was opposed Look, said Mr. F., at the debt of Great Britain to this system, too, because it could not be suplook at her taxes-everything pays a duty-even ported without having recourse to a force similar the light of Heaven is not passed by without be- to impressment to obtain a number of seamen sufing made to yield supplies to her revenue. So ficient to man such a fleet. He was anxious to heavy do these taxes bear upon the people, it is protect every part of the Union ; but he could not said that one-seventh part of the whole of the consent to support any scheme so pregnant with inhabitants are paupers. These are some of the mischief to the country, as he considered this fruits of a navy! large Navy Establishment to be.

As to the protection and encouragement of commerce, he believed commerce would always flourish best when left to itself unshackled by regulations. It will then be carried to every part of the globe. In the course of the debate, it had been said that the exports of Great Britain, in 1797, were not greater than ours before our commerce was restricted, though that nation had possessed a navy which had triumphed on the ocean for half a century. How did this happen? It was owing, said Mr. F., to the freedom of our com

merce.

Gentlemen ask, if marching to Canada will protect our commerce? Where do gentlemen wish protection? Not in our ports and harbors; they are already protected. He asked, if any attempt had ever been made to bombard our cities, or to enter our ports and harbors? Or is it probable any such attempt will be made?

Mr. MCKEE said, he with reluctance presented himself before the House a second time on this question: he had given his views of it in the Committee of the Whole, and he only rose to relieve some of his opinions from the misconstruction to which they had been subjected in the progress of the discussion.

Gentleman have congratulated the House on account of the conciliatory temper and spirit with which this discussion was conducted; he was concerned that he could not unite in those congratulations, because that portion of the House with whom he was associated on this question had been accused of an adherence to their prejudices and of a total disregard of the admonitions of reason and common sense. These suggestions charged that portion of the House opposed to an increase of the navy with a want of wisdom to perceive, or with a want of honesty to pursue, the

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means of promoting the general welfare, and were therefore rather rude than conciliatory to him.

JANUARY, 1812.

thousand dollars. In the meantime the constant drains of money wrung from the hands of the great body of the people by heavy internal taxes would keep them poor. The wealth of the country would be gradually assembled in the hands of a few; and wealth is the strong basis of power everywhere. Consequently the power of the country would be concentrated in the hands of a few, who would apply your navy to maintain and support the wealthy and well-born in the possession of this power.

But we are told by gentlemen that this is mere assertion; the product of a mind frightened by hobgoblins and bugbears, and laboring under the influence of prejudice. If gentlemen were corapprehensions dissipated by experience. But what does the experience of other nations prove? England, the bright example always quotedwhose political dogmas we affect to despise, but in whose paths we seem now to be treading with undeviating steps as fast as the moments runEngland once had no public navy, and then too she had no public debt. She also had a Parliament the real representatives of the British nation who dared to resist the corruptions of the times and the encroachments of the Crown. But England was then vexed with the Spanish Armada and the Dutch fleets, which rode triumphantly in the English channel with a broom at the masthead.

He had stated it to the committee, as his opinion, that the establishment of a large navy would change, in the progress of time, the present form of this government. The House has been informed that this statement was mere assertion, unsupported by argument or even an effort to prove that we could not create and support a large marine without difficulty or danger. In support of the opinion he then expressed, which he had not seen any reason to change, he had submitted to the House a statement of the probable expenses of the Government in the succeeding years, including the expenses of the proposed navy. If those state-rect, it would be a gratification to him to find his ments were substantially correct (and he had not heard them questioned) they prove the fact, that a war of five years duration with a navy would increase the public debt from forty-five millions of dollars, the present amount, to upwards of an hundred and fifteen millions; and would likewise increase the expenses of the Government on the return of peace to upwards of eighteen millions per annum. From those facts the conclusions were drawn which appeared to him very naturally to follow, that permanent internal taxes in times of peace as well as war would be rendered necessary; and even with the aid of internal taxes to the amount of four millions of dollars per annum, your public debt would be gradually increasing. He had also stated the revenue of the country, under the existing Constitution, with the intention of showing the difficulty of meeting so large an expenditure. This statement, so far as it had been noticed, was met by a statement that the public lands as a source of revenue were worth twelve hundred millions of dollars, and that the revenue arising from commerce might amount to eighteen or twenty millions per annum. He confessed he did not understand the arithmetic by whose magic these results were produced. The first was to him evidently incorrect and the second seemed also incorrect; our revenue for the last ten years (the most prosperous period of our history) had averaged about twelve millions of dollars per annum, and the world was evidently more hostile to commerce now than it had been for the last ten years. No reasonable calculation could therefore be made on a revenue from imposts and tonnage for the succeeding ten years, Create the causes and the consequences will exceeding in amount the receipts of the past ten follow-man is substantially the same everyyears, and admitting the revenue to be equal to where; here a little more civilized and there a that we had received, the taxes would be rendered little more savage; but God and nature for wise permanent to the amount of upwards of six mil-purposes have implanted in every human bosom lions of dollars per annum in order to pay the current expenditure: you will then have a large public debt with permanent and heavy internal taxes, and this is the soil which produces aristocracy in every country; and here, the debt furnishes to moneyed men the facility of increasing their wealth without ingenuity, industry, or care. Ten thousand dollars vested in the public funds, by converting the interest into principal at the respective periods when the interest falls due, in twenty years would amount to more than forty

England commenced ship-building on national⚫ account and borrowing money on the same account. Her navy too, when small, was loaded with the imputations of "wasteful expense and comparative inefficiency." It was increased because it was demonstrably clear that she was destined to be a great naval power;" her debt also increased pari passu (as the diplomatists would say) with her navy.

The British Navy now is the most splendid fabric of human power the world ever witnessed; her debt is equally great and splendid; the wretchedness and misery of the great mass of her people bears a full proportion to the debt and navy; her Parliament also is highly celebrated for its venality and compliance. The man who knows the views and wishes of the English Ministry, without farther inquiry, thereby knows the opinion of a majority of Parliament.

the same original desires; and love of wealth, of fame, and of power, create the means of their gratification on a large scale, and you give them activity-an activity fired with ambition and fraught with ruin to the peace of society.

Gentlemen had exultingly called on those opposed to an increase of the Navy, to show how commerce could be protected without a Navy. He had supposed it to be the duty of those who advocated a system attended with immense expense to show the good to society resulting from the

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their intrinsic merit, without much regard to former opinions; and, therefore, he did not mean to say to the gentleman that he had gone over to the enemy's camp.

the place of destination, its flag will be changed. the opinions and arguments used in support of But admit your two ships-of-the-line and five them in 1798. It was certainly proper to confrigates competent to guard in safety the produc-sider all questions coming before the House on tions of the country, watered by the Mississippi, from New Orleans to the Atlantic ports, where is the benefit resulting therefrom, when every man who knows anything of nature and the character of the commerce of the Mississippi, must be uncandid if he does not acknowledge that in time of war the productions of the Mississippi in general would not pay freight to the Atlantic market. Mr. McK. said he pretended to have some practical knowledge of the commerce of the Mississippi, and he unhesitatingly declared that a war with any maritime nation holding the control of the West India islands would annihilate all legitimate trade from New Orleans during its continuance; an illegal or licensed trade perhaps might be carried on to a small amount, and it would not require protection..

Gentlemen seemed to be enamoured with the superior protection (as it is called) afforded to the persons and property of other nations on the high seas. This superior protection was desirable; it was highly appreciated by the Governments of Europe. But the picture had two sides; and he desired gentlemen to look at both. The persons and property of the subjects of the Governments of Europe are said to ride in safety on the ocean beneath the triumphant banners of their country. And as a compensation for this protection (which was far from being complete) the sighs of the oppressed ascended to Heaven, from every corner of Europe, in secret or open curses against their oppressors. It was due to candor to admit that the griefs of Europe were not altogether owing to navies. And it was also worthy of remark that the people of every nation in Europe had been more or less oppressed with taxes and debt in proportion to the extent of their navy; create the cause, and the consequences will follow.

But suppose your navy of twelve ships-of-theline, and twenty frigates had been built in 1798, and maintained ever since-would it have rendered your commerce more prosperous than it has been since that period? He did not believe any man would assume such a position, inasmuch as our commerce since 1798 had been more prosperous than was or could have been foreseen; and if the navy had been then built, the national debt would now be near one hundred and fortysix millions of dollars, instead of forty-six millions, the present amount; and he entertained no doubt but that the good consequences resulting from a rejection of the navy project at this time, would be seen as clearly and as thoroughly felt fourteen years hence, as the good effects of its rejection in 1798 was now perceived and felt.

With regard to the effects which it is supposed the navy would produce on England in time of war, he thought those effects much overrated. He was, however, willing to see what could be done with the present navy, which amounted to between sixteen and twenty in number, exclusive of gun vessels. If thirty fast sailing frigates would produce the wide-spread ruin on British commerce in time of war, of which gentlemen have spoken, twenty frigates would produce twothirds of these effects. He desired to see what could be done in the first place with our present force; and if the result was proportionate to the expectations which seem to be entertained, the nation would be willing to increase the naval force. But at the present time, when we were incurring immense expenses, it did not seem prudent to him to increase those expenses by a project of this kind-the proposed war would not be a war of great battles, but rather a war of means; England would make the war as expensive to us as possible, and if we sat out with expenses so extravagant, the war might terminate unfavorably. The House adjourned without taking the question.

MONDAY, January 27.

The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WRIGHT) had said that what might be wrong in 1798, might be perfectly prudent and right now. He admitted there was a time for all things; but the principle in politics or theology certainly could not be very stubborn that was wrong in 1798 and perfectly right now; and if any change in this respect had taken place, it must consist in the greater fitness of the means to effect certain desirable ends. In 1798 American commerce was most shamefully plundered by both France and England. At that time Spain, France, and Mr. BACON, from the Committee of Ways and England had large navies-Holland and Den-Means, presented a bill making appropriations for mark had ships of war; a navy of twelve ships of the support of Government, for the year 1812; the line and twenty frigates on the part of the which was read twice, and committed to a ComUnited States by uniting with the fleets of France mittee of the Whole on Wednesday next. and Spain, would have been able to have coped with England on the ocean; and in case of a war with France, a similar result could have been effected against the fleets of France and Spain; but the condition of Europe in this respect was materially changed, and not for the better as it regards us. He had no disposition, however, to censure the opinions of any gentlemen or their arguments, on account of their great similarity to

Mr. SEYBERT said, that when he considered it his duty to take up the subject of the Navy, he had occasion to look into the expenses of that establishment, and especially into the expenses of the navy yard in this city; and from examining the account lately laid before this House by the Secretary of the Navy, of the expenses of 1810, he was induced to offer the following resolution:

Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be di