is dead" fuit Ilium, "Troy has been," to signify Troy is no more. A similar phraseology obtains in have been young" is equivalent to

English, thus, "I

"now I am old."

Preter Imperfect.

Sing. I have been

Thou hast been He has been

writing.

Plur. We have been You have been They have been

This tense, in respect to time, is the same as the last, but implies the imperfection of the action, and denotes

This tense denotes that an action was perfected be

fore another action was done.

This tense, in respect to time, is more than past, and in respect to action is imperfect. It denotes that an action was going on, or in a state of progression, before another action took place, or before it was perfected, as, "I had been writing before you arrived."

These compound tenses denote the futurity of an action indefinitely, without any reference to its completion. The meaning of the several persons has been already explained.

This tense agrees with the former in respect to time, but differs from it in this, that the former has no reference to the completion of the action, while the latter expresses its imperfection and progression.

This tense denotes that a future action will be perfected, before the commencement or completion of another action, or before a certain future time; as, "before you can have an answer, I shall have written a second letter." "By the time he shall have arrived, you will have conquered every difficulty." In short, it denotes, that at some future time an action will be perfected.

As it has been a subject of great controversy among grammarians, what tenses should be called definite and what indefinite, I shall now offer a few observations which may serve to illustrate the point in ques

Duration, like space, is continuous and uninterrupted. It is divisible in idea only. It is past or future, merely in respect to some intermediate point, which the mind fixes as the limit between the one and the other. Present time, in truth, does not exist any more than a mathematical line can have breadth, or a mathematical point be composed of parts. This position has, indeed, been controverted by Dr. Beattie ; but, in my judgment, without the shadow of philosophical argument *. Harris, Reid, and several others,

* Dr. Beattie_observes, "that the fundamental error of those philosophers, who deny the existence of present time is, that they suppose the present instant to have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude. But as nothing is, in respect of our senses, a geometrical point (for whatever we see or touch must of necessity have magnitude), so neither is the present, or any other instant, wholly unextended." His argument amounts to this, that as a mathematical point is not an object of sense, nor has any real existence, so neither has a metaphysical instant. It is granted. They are each ideal. But does this prove the author's position, that philosophers have erred in asserting their similarity? or does it evince that no analogy subsists between them? Quite the reverse. The truth is, a geometrical point is purely ideal; it is necessary to the truth of mathematical demonstration, that it be conceived to have no parts. Finding it convenient to represent it to sense, we therefore give it magnitude. A metaphysical instant, or present time, is in like manner ideal; but we find it convenient to assume as present an extended space. The doctor observes, that sense perceives nothing but what is present. It is true; but it should be remembered that not time, but objects which exist in time, are perceived by the senses. It may enable a person to form a correct idea of this matter, if he will ask himself, what he means by present time. If it be the present hour, is it not obvious that part of it is past, and part of it future? If it be the present minute, it is equally clear, that the whole of it

have incontrovertibly proved it. But though present time, philosophically speaking, has no existence, we find it convenient to assume a certain portion of the past and the future, as intermediate spaces between these extremes, and to consider these spaces as present; for example, the present day, the present week, the present year, the present century, though part of these several periods be past, and part to come. We speak of them, however, as present, as "this month," "this year," "this day." Time being thus in its nature continuous, and past and future being merely relative terms, some portion or point of time being conceived where the one begins and the other ends, it is obvious that all tenses indicative of any of these two general divisions must denote relative time, that is, time past or future, in relation to some conceived or assumed space; thus it may be past or future, in

cannot be present at once. Nay, if it be the present vibration of the pendulum, is it not obvious that part of it is performed, and part of it remains to be performed? Nor is it possible to stop in this investigation, till present time, strictly speaking, be proved to have no existence. Did it exist, it must be extended; and if extended, it cannot be present, for past and future must necessarily be included in it. If it should be answered, that this proves time, like matter, infinitely divisible, and that the most tedious process will still leave something capable of division, I reply, that as whatever may be left in the one case must be figure and not a point, so the remainder, in the other, must be a portion of extended time, how minute soever, and not an instant. The process, therefore, must be continued, till we arrive in idea at a point and an instant, incapable of division, being not made up of parts.

respect to the present hour, the present day, the present week.

Again. The term indefinite is applicable either to time or to action. It may, therefore, be the predicate of a tense, denoting either that the precise time is left undetermined, or that the action specified is not signified, as either complete or imperfect. Hence the controversy has been partly verbal. Hence also the contending parties have seemed to differ, while, in fact, they were agreed; and, on the contrary, have seemed to accord, while their opinions were, in truth, mutually repugnant.

Dr. Browne confines the term to action only, and pleads the authority of Mr. Harris in his favour. It is true, indeed, that Mr. Harris calls those tenses definite, which denote the beginning, the middle, or the perfection of an action; but it is obvious, from the most superficial examination of his theory, that he denominates the tenses definite or indefinite, not in respect to action, but to time. When, in the passage from Milton,

"Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth,

Unseen, both when we wake and when we sleep,"

he considers "walk" as indefinite, is it in regard to action? No. "It is," says he, "because they were walking, not at that instant only, but indefinitely, at any instant whatever." And when he terms Thou shalt not kill an indefinite tense, is it because it has no reference to the completion or the imperfection of