An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: And of the Principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in His Writings, Volym 1
Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 1865 - 560 sidor
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Absolute abstract admit affirm argument Aristotle assertion association attri attributes belief biped called cause cognition colour conceive concept conclusion consciousness consequently considered contradiction deny Descartes Dissertations on Reid distinction doctrine Eeid effect evidence existence experience expression extension external fact faculties feeling finite Hamilton human Ibid idea immediate impossible inconceivable inference infinite infinite divisibility intellectual intuitive intuitive knowledge judgment knowledge known Law of Contradiction Law of Identity laws Laws of Thought Lectures Leibnitz Logic Mansel mathematics matter meaning ment merely metaphysical metaphysicians mind mode moral muscular nature Necessitarians never non-ego notion Noumena Noumenon object opinion perceive perception phenomena philosophers possibilities of sensation predicate premises present principle proposition prove psychological reality reason recognise relation relative sciousness sense Sir W SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON space supposed syllogism theory thing thinkers thought tion true truth volitions whole words
Sida 39 - As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of positive thought — thought necessarily supposes conditions. To think is to condition ; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the possibility of thought.
Sida 312 - Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish...
Sida 103 - ... the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving " does not sanction them ; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do : he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good, who is not what...
Sida 475 - If a body moves, it must move either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not: but either of these is impossible: therefore it cannot move.
Sida 91 - By the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation ; that than which a greater is inconceivable ; and which consequently can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity.
Sida 60 - America, but know that we are alive, that two and two make four, and that the sum of any two sides of a triangle is greater than the third side.
Sida 58 - That the sphere of our belief is much more extensive than the sphere of our knowledge ; and, therefore, when I deny that the Infinite can by us be known, I am far from denying that by us it is, must, and ought to be believed.
Sida 190 - It postulates, first, that the human mind is capable of Expectation. In other words, that after having had actual sensations, we are capable of forming the conception of Possible sensations ; sensations which we are not feeling at the present moment, but which we might feel, and should feel if certain conditions were present, the nature of which conditions we have, in many cases, learnt by experience.
Sida 212 - Besides present feelings, and possibilities of present feeling, there is another class of phenomena to be included in an enumeration of the elements making up our conception of Mind. The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life, consists not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and expectations. Now what are these? In themselves, they are present feelings, states of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished from sensations.