Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J. and is not a claim or demand against said estate. Section 1880 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California is the same as section 5957 of the Revised Statutes, above cited, and under the provisions of said section the supreme court of California has held in Meyers v. Reinstein, 67 Cal. 89, 7 Pac. 192, that an action to establish and enforce a trust against the estate of a deceased person is not a "claim or demand" against such estate. Tyler v. Mayre, 95 Cal. 160, 27 Pac. 160, sustains Myers v. Reinstein. But on rehearing (95 Cal. 163, 30 Pac. 197), the opinion consists of but eight lines, and states that the court is satisfied with the conclusion reached in 95 Cal. 160, 27 Pac. 160, but in the syllabus it is stated that Tyler v. Mayre, 95 Cal. 160, 27 Pac. 160, is overruled. In Moore v. Schofield, 95 Cal. 486, 31 Pac. 532; which was an action to enforce a trust, the supreme court apparently discredited the rule laid down in Myers v. Reinstein, supra. The court said, "It would, indeed, seem to be a claim or demand against. the estate." However, in Poulson v. Stanley, 122 Cal. 655, 68 Am. St. Rep. 73, 55 Pac. 605, the case of Myers v. Reinstein is cited with approval. In that case the court says: "In Myers v. Reinstein, 67 Cal. 89, 7 Pac. 192, it was held that this provison of the statute did not render the plaintiff incompetent in an action to establish a resulting trust in certain property held by an estate. The court therefore did not err in permitting the witness to give testimony." In that case Moore v. Schofield, supra, is not referred to. If the supreme court of California intended in Moore v. Schofield to discredit Myers v. Reinstein, it evidently removes that discredit in Poulson v. Stanley, supra. The supreme court of Utah, in Wood v. For and Whitney v. Fox, 8 Utah, 380, 32 Pac. 49 under a statute the same as the above cited, held that an action to establish a resulting trust against the estate of a deceased person was a "claim or demand" against such estate-which case was carried to the supreme court of the United States, and is reported in 166 U. S. 637, 17 Sup. Rep. 713, 41 L. ed. 1145. In that case the plaintiff sought a decree declaring him to be the equitable owner of one-eighth of the Mansion House, situated in Detroit, Michigan, and entitled to rents, issues, and Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J. profits thereof, as well as a part of three thousand shares of mining stock and dividends thereon. The supreme court of the United States said, speaking through Justice Harlan: "We cannot doubt that the claims as asserted in this suit by Whitney are, within the meaning of the Utah statute, claims or demands against the estate of a deceased person. . . . . The supreme court of Utah properly rejected the suggestion that such claim or demand was not against the estate of Lawrence. To say that the only issue here was whether the real property and stock described in the petition constituted a part of Lawrence's estate, and that no claim or demand was asserted against the estate, would be to defeat what, it seems to us, was the manifest object of the statute. While, as said by this court in Coulam v. Doull, 133 U. S. 216, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 253, 33 L. ed. 596, it is the ordinary rule to accept the interpretation. given to a statute by the courts of the country by which it was originally adopted, the rule is not an absolute one, to be followed under all circumstances. We concur in the interpretation placed upon the Utah statute by the supreme court of Utah as one required by the obvious meaning of its provisions, and we do not feel obliged by the above rule to reject that interpretation because apparently the highest court of the state from which the statute was taken has in a single decision taken a different view." In that decision the supreme court of the United States declares that the interpretation placed upon said statute by the supreme court of Utah is the one required by the obvious meaning of its provisions, and refuses to follow the narrow, restricted, and technical construction placed upon said section by the supreme court of California. In Myers v. Reinstein the decision proceeds upon the theory that the letter of the statute must control, and leaves out of sight that beneficent rule laid down in the statutes of Californiathe rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed-which it is held has no application to the statutes of that state, and that their provisions and all proceedings under them, are to be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and promote justice. And to hold, under the provisions of said section 5957 of the Re Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J. vised Statutes, that this action is not a claim or demand against the estate of said Robbins, deceased, and permit respondents to testify as to a contract alleged to have been made with de ccased during his lifetime, would defeat the manifest object and purpose of said statute. Under the law the legal title to an undivided interest in said mining claims was in the deceased at the time of his death, and was a part of his estate; and the respondents now claim to be the equitable owners of an interest therein by reason of said alleged oral contract. Robbins, being dead, cannot testify as to the alleged contract, and said statute is intended to and does disqualify the respondents Rice and Mallory as witnesses to said contract. In the case of Nasholds v. McDonell, 6 Idaho, 377, 55 Pac. 894, this court held that the provisions of said section 5957 did not apply to an action brought to establish a trust against the estate of a deceased person. On that point the only case cited in briefs of counsel was the case of Myers v. Reinstein, supra, and, as that point was not seriously controverted by the counsel for appellant, this court considered that case decisive on that point under the ordinary rule to accept the interpretation given to a statute by the courts of the state from which it was adopted. But upon a careful examination of that question we find that said statute became a law in this then territory, June 1, 1875-long before the decision of the case of Myers v. Reinstein, and some months prior to the decision in Blood v. Fairbanks, 50 Cal. 420. Hence, the California decisions do not come within the rule above stated, and are only precedents, and have no more binding force upon this court than the decisions of the supreme court of Utah and that of the supreme court of the United States, both of which are in accord with the spirit and intent of the provisions of said statute. In Moore v. Schofield, 95 Cal. 486, 31 Pac. 532, the supreme court of California said that the decisions under said statute were upon the principle that "the letter of the statute must control." Under our system the spirit must control, and the statutes must be liberally construed with a view to effect their objects and promote justice. The object of said statute was to prevent the decimation and Opinion of the Court-Sullivan, J. confiscation of a deceased person's estate upon the testimony of parties or assignors of parties to an action or proceeding, or persons in whose behalf an action or proceeding is prosecuted against an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person as to matters of fact occurring before the death of such person; and to hold that a claim for a resulting trust does not come within the intent of said statute would be to give that term a narrow and restricted meaning, much narrower than was given to it by Lord Coke and other eminent jurists since his time. Lord Coke said that the word "demand" is the largest word known to the law, save only the word "claim," and "a release of all demands discharges all rights of action." (Gray v. Palmer, 9 Cal. 636.) Chief Justice Nelson said in Re Denny and President, etc., of Manhattan Co., 2 Hill, 223: "The term 'demand' is of much broader import than 'debt,' and would embrace rights of action belonging to the debtor, beyond those which could appropriately be called debts." Applying to the words "claim or demand," as used in said section, the definition or meaning of said term as given to them by Lord Coke and Chief Justice Nelson, and the plaintiffs in this case have no right of action if they have no claim or demand against the estate of the deceased, for "claim" embraces rights of action, and, as said by Lord Coke, a release of all demands discharges all rights of action. Therefore, if plaintiffs had no claim or demand against the estate of said deceased, they cannot evade the intent and purpose of said statute by attempting to ingraft a trust thereon whereby they can secure a large share of said mining claims, the legal title to which is in the name of said deceased. The court erred in permitting said Mallory and Rice to testify in regard to conversations that they had with said Robbins, deceased, and that part of the opinion in Nasholds v. McDonell, supra, which holds that the provisions of said subdivision 3, section 5957, does not apply to an action brought to establish a trust is hereby overruled. However, in that case there was competent testimony to establish the trust alleged. As the record shows that no one was present at the time said Points decided. alleged contract was made except appellant Rigley and Rob bins now deceased, and Mallory, and that the plaintiffs have produced all of the evidence that they could produce in support of the allegations of their complaint, we conclude that no benefit can result to the respondents by a retrial of the case, and therefore reverse the judgment and decree of the court below, and remand the case, with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the appellants and against the respondents in accordance with the views expressed herein, dismissing said action. Costs of this appeal are awarded to the appellants. Huston, C. J., concurs. Quarles, J., did not sit at the hearing of this case, and took no part in the decision thereof. (May 19, 1900.) STATE v. TAYLOR. [61 Pac. 288.] CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE-PREJUDICIAL REMARKS BY COURT-REVERSIBLE ERROR.-Where, on the trial of a defendant, upon a charge of murder, a witness testified that after the shooting, and when the defendant was some distance from the house where the shooting took place, "he [the defendant], took a shot at me" (the witness), in overruling an objection to the evidence, the court remarked that "the object of the admission of that testimony is to show the character, disposition and action of the defendant at that time as being evilly disposed toward some one." Held, that both the admission of the testimony and remarks of the court were error. The coroner, being upon the witness stand, was asked by the prosecution if he held an inquest over the deceased, and the question being objected to by defendant, the court remarked in sustaining the objection: "1 sustain that. There was nothing mysterious about it. People knew who shot him. A coroner's inquest is only to find ot how a person came to his death. If the known otherwise, they do not have to hold one." Held, reverstruedle error. The obje (Syllabus by the court.) from District Court, Shoshone County. |