Opinion of the Court-Huston, C. J.

[state] not exempt under the laws of the United States, except as enumerated in the next section, is subject to taxation as in this title provided; but nothing in this title shall be construed to require or permit double taxation." The seventh subdivision of section 1401 is as follows (after defining exemptions): "Seventh. Mining claims, but machinery, property and improvements upon or appurtenant to mining claims shall not be so exempt." Is not the intention of the legislature clearly apparent in the language of this section? All property which the legislature was authorized to tax they would tax, in obedience to the recognized principle that taxation should, so far as practicable, be equal. The mining industry was the dominant industry of the territory, and yet it is contended that it was the intention of the legislature to exempt it from taxation. If this is a correct theory of taxation, it would be entirely proper for our next legislature to cxempt sheep from taxation, because the sheep industry has become dominant in this state. We are not in accord with the position taken by counsel for respondent that, in construing statutes in pari materia, we must follow the word, and not the purpose, of the law. All statutes pertaining to revenue are to be construed most strictly in favor of the object of the statute; that is, in favor of the purpose of the statute. Statutes of exemption are to be strictly construed against exemption and in favor of revenue. Statutes providing for liens are to be construed in favor of the purpose of the statute; that is, to secure to the lienholder or claimant the right intended by the statute to be secured to him. If it was the intention of the legislature to exempt from taxation the most valuable property in the state, such intention should have been clearly and unequivocally expressed in the statute, and, not being so expressed, we cannot think that the courts would be justified in reaching so inequitable a conclusion by construction.

The constitution of Nevada (article 10) prescribes the taxation of "all property, real, personal, and possessory, excepting mines and mining claims, the proceeds of which alone shall be taxed." It is evident that the makers of the consti

Opinion of the Court-Huston, C. J.

tution of Nevada, as well as the people who adopted it, recognized a distinction between mining claims and mines. In State v. Kruttschnitt, 4 Nev. 178, the court says: "Whenever the interpretation of a statute or a constitution in a certain way will result in manifest injustice, courts will always scrutinize the statute or constitution closely, to see if it will not admit of some other interpretation." The formulators of the constitution of Idaho, with an experience of more than a quarter of a century before them, declined to follow Nevada, and provide by a provision in the fundamental law of the state for the exemption from taxation of what was known and recognized as among the most, if not the most, valuable property in the state, when the same had become a legitimate subject of taxation. Of course, so long as the title remains in the government, "mines and mining claims," like any other claim to land, are not the subject of local taxation; but when they cease to be property of the United States-when the fee has passed from the United States to the citizen-then they are, as all other property of the citizen is, subject to taxation, unless exempted by positive and unequivocal law. It is true that many of the richest producing mines in the country are held as "mining claims," the owners thereof electing, presumably for the very purpose of evading local taxation, to so hold them, rather than perfect title in themselves by securing patents thereto. But this is an option resulting from the policy of the federal law- —a matter which we are not permitted to consider. Uniformity of taxation is an elementary principle, recognized by the constitution. "The legislature may allow such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem necessary and just, and all existing exemptions provided by the laws of the territory shall continue until changed by the legislature of the state." (Idaho Constitution, article 7, section 5.)

It will not do, in the consideration of this case, to place too much reliance upon the decisions in California and Nevada. The conditions are so very different. We have no law in this state subjecting the product of mines to taxation, and, if the

Opinion of the Court-Quarles, J. Concurring.

contention of respondent is to obtain, the result is that all mining property in the state escapes taxation, except the "machinery and improvements thereon," and this in the face of the fact, well known to all, that the heaviest burden of the expense of the state government comes from the mining counties, not only in the protection of property, but in the punishment of crime.

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It is objected that many patented mines are nonproductive. So, also, is much other property in the state. But the law provides (Laws 1899, sec. 1, p. 215): "All taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value." If A owns hundred and sixty acres of land, all of which is under improvement, and from which he is receiving a large yearly revenue, it is not presumable that B, who owns one hundred and sixty acres of sagebrush land adjoining him, none or but a very small part of which is under improvement, and from which B is receiving no revenue whatever, will be assessed at the same value as that of A. And it is presumable that the like rule will obtain in regard to mines, certainly if regard is had to the law. That the legislature has the absolute authority to exempt all mines and mining property from taxation is unquestioned, but such intention should be expressed in direct and unequivocal terms. Questions of such importance, involving such vital consequences to the state and to the people, ought not to be left to the fallibility of construction. The judgment of the district court is reversed, and cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing the action, with costs of appeal to appellant.

QUARLES, J.-I concur in the views so ably expressed by Mr. Chief Justice Huston. The theory of the lower court and that urged here by counsel for respondent, in my opinion, overlooks well-established rules of construction in construing our revenue statutes. As suggested in the opinion formulated by Mr. Chief Justice Huston, the only question to be determined here is, What did the legislature intend to be understood by the use of the term "mining claims" in our revenue statutes? Title 10 of the Revised Statutes is entitled "Revenue." The

Opinion of the Court-Quarles, J. Concurring.

first chapter of that title is entitled "Property Liable to Taxation." The first section of the title aforesaid, and of the first chapter thereof, is section 1400, which is as follows: "All property in this territory [state] not exempt under the laws of the United States, except as enumerated in the next section, is subject to taxation as in this title provided; but nothing in this title shall be construed to require or permit double taxation." The following section (1401) is as follows: "The following property is exempt from taxation: 1. All property used exclusively for public schools and such as may belong to the United States, this territory or to any county or municipal corporation or school district within this territory. 2. Churches, chapels, and other buildings, with the lots of ground appurtenant thereto, and used therewith belonging to any church organization or society and used for religious worship, and from which no rent is derived; with their furniture and equipments; also public cemeteries. 3. Buildings or parts of buildings owned and used by the order of Masons or Odd Fellows or by any other benevolent or charitable society exclusively for the purposes of their order, and their furniture and equipment. 4. The property of resident widows and orphan children, not to exceed the amount of $1,000 to any one family, when their total assessment is less than $5,000. 5. Growing crops. 6. Capital stock of corporations where the property of the corporation has been assessed. 7. Mining claims, but machinery, property and improvements upon or appurtenant to mining claims shall not be so exempt. 8. Public and private libraries. 9. Tools of a mechanic, farmer, miner or prospector and household furniture of a family or householder, not exceeding in value two hundred dollars. 10. Possessory rights to public lands." Section 1405, found in said title, and which is the third section thereof, is as follows: "Whenever the terms mentioned in this section are employed in this title, they are employed in the sense hereafter affixed to them: 1. The term 'property' includes moneys, credits, bonds, stocks, dues, franchises and all other matters and things, real, personal and mixed, capable of private ownership. 2.

Opinion of the Court-Quarles, J. Concurring.

The term 'real estate' includes: (1) The possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to, the possession of land; (2) All mines, mineral and quarries in and under the land, and all rights and privileges appertaining thereto; (3) Improvements. 3. The term 'improvements' includes: (1) All buildings, structures, fixtures, fences and improvements erected upon or affixed to the land; (2) All fruit, nut-bearing or ornamental trees and vines not of natural growth. 4. The term 'personal property' includes everything which is the subject of ownership not included within the meaning of the term 'real estate.' 5. The terms 'value' and 'full cash value' mean the amount at which the property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent creditor. 6. The term 'credit' means those solvent debts, owing to the person, firm, corporation or association assessed. The term 'debts' means those liabilities owing by the person, firm, corporation or association assessed to bona fide residents of this territory, or firms, associations or corporations doing business therein."

Without specifying or enumerating the well-known rules of statutory construction which must be followed in deciding the question before us, I will make some general observations relative to the question here. Title 10, supra, is strictly speaking, a revenue statute. Its object and purpose is to raise revenue. Within the meaning of the various sections found in that title, the word "real estate" includes possessory claims to the public lands of the United States, whether those lands are mineral or nonmineral. It is so expressly declared. "All mines, minerals and quarries in and under the land" are real estate, in the language of the statute, and the same is "property," and so declared to be. What property is taxable? The statute says: "All property in this territory [state] not exempt under the laws of the United States, except as enumerated in the next section, is subject to taxation." Careful reading of the whole of title 10, and all amendatory acts relating thereto, shows, to my mind, that it was the intention of the legislature to tax all property in this state, except such as is used for public schools, and public property belonging to the