Opinion of the Court-Quarles, C. J.

of that court upon what those provisions of the constitution meant were adopted with those provisions. This rule, that "by adopting a statute from a sister state the construction of the statute by the courts of the latter state is also adopted, is a general rule that is universally recognized." (Flood v. McClure, 3 Idaho, 587, 32 Pac. 255; Brown v. Bryan, 5 Idaho, 145, 51 Pac. 1001; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 256, 337.) And this, of course, applies to the constitution, which is but the law by the people, as the statutes are laws enacted by the legislature, and this is particularly true of election laws. (See 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., subd. 2, p. 588, tit. "Elections.")

QUARLES, C. J.-This action was commenced by the appellant, who is an elector of Ada county, to contest the election of the respondent, Hester M. Spackman, to the office of county superintendent of public instruction of said county, and who received a certificate of election to said office; whereas it is claimed by appellant that Miss Helen Coston was elected to said office, and should have received certificate of election thereto. A stipulation of facts was filed, and the case decided upon the same by the lower court. It is agreed in the stipulation that forty inmates of the soldiers' home, situated in soldiers' home precinct, in said county, voted for Miss Spackman, including which forty votes the votes of Miss Spackman was two thousand two hundred and ninety-nine and that of Miss Coston two thousand two hundred and ninety. It is also stipulated that these forty inmates never resided in said county except in said soldiers' home, the eighth paragraph of the stipulation being in words and figures as follows: "That at least forty of the said persons above referred to, and whose names are set forth in plaintiff's complaint, will testify that they abandoned their former residences and places of abode with no intention of returning thereto, and took up their residence in said soldiers' home in said soldiers' home precinct, Ada county, Idaho, and thereafter resided and continued to reside therein with the intention of permanently remaining and residing there; and that each of said persons were, at the time of said election, and for six months prior thereto had been, residing at

Opinion of the Court--Quarles, C. J.

and as inmates of the soldiers' home in said Ada county, state of Idaho; and that at all times during their residence there the said soldiers' home was established under the laws of the state of Idaho, and maintained at the public expense. That all of said persons above referred to were duly and regularly admitted to said soldiers' home under the terms and provisions of the act entitled 'An act to establish a soldiers' home,' passed at the second and fifth sessions of the legislature of the state of Idaho, and approved March 2, 1893 [Sess. Laws 1893, p. 91], and February 9, 1899 [Sess. Laws 1899, p. 190], respectively, and hereinbefore referred to; and during all the time of their residence in said Ada county they were maintained in the said soldiers' home at the public expense." Judgment was given in favor of Miss Spackman, the respondent, from which judgment this appeal was taken.

This cause is to be determined upon a construction of article 6 of our constitution, especially section 5 of said article, which is as follows: "For the purpose of voting no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the state, or of the United States, nor while engaged in the navigation of the waters of this state or of the United States, nor while a student of any institution of learning, nor while kept at any almshouse or other asylum at public expense." Section 2 of said article of the constitution, as amended; provides that: "Except as in this article otherwise provided, every male and female citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state or territory for six months, and in the county where he offers to vote thirty days next preceding the election, if registered as provided by law; is a qualified voter." Section 3 of said article provides that parties who are insane, under guardianship, idiotic, convicted of any of certain crimes, and not restored to citizenship, or who, at the time of the election, is confined in any public prison, etc., shall not vote. Section 4 of said article is as follows: "The legislature may prescribe qualifications, limitations and conditions for the right of suffrage additional to those prescribed in this article, but shall never annul any of the provisions in this

Opinion of the Court-Quarles, C. J.

article contained." The election statutes of this state cannot affect the question presented here, as none of the constitutional provisions can be repealed by legislative enactment. It will thus be seen that the qualifications of an elector are prescribed by the constitution; that the legislature is restricted from annulling any of the qualifications prescribed, but expressly authorized to prescribe additional "qualifications, limitations, and conditions for the right of suffrage." One of the indispensable elements of the right to vote in this state is residence -"six months in the state, and thirty days in the county, next preceding the election"-and so says the constitution. Can this residence be acquired by a person who is an inmate of an almshouse or of an asylum kept at public expense, while residing in such almshouse or asylum? The answer to this must be found in a construction of the language used in section 5, article 6, of the constitution, quoted above. This section must be considered in connection with the other provisions of the constitution, and the whole must be construed so as to give force and effect to all of the provisions of that instrument, without destroying or nullifying any of them. The meaning and intent of the provision in question, taking the instrument as a whole, must be determined. In doing this we must give to the language used that effect which was most probably intended. We must consider the words used in their ordinary and usual signification.

It will be seen that the specific inquiry here is whether a resident of some county other than Ada county can take up his abode in the soldiers' home, in soldiers' home precinct, in Ada county, intending to make that his home permanently, and with the intention of abandoning his former residence, and by continuous presence in said soldiers' home for thirty days (he having been in the state six months prior thereto), acquire the right to vote in said precinct. The stipulation of facts in this case shows that the votes in question were cast by inmates of the soldiers' home, who, "during all the time of their residence in Ada county,. . . were maintained in the said soldiers' home at the public expense." With all due deference to the inmates of said soldier's home, there can be no question but what it is an

Opinion of the Court-Quarles, C. J.

"asylum," maintained "at the public expense." Now, in the purview of the constitutional provision under consideration, what does the language used mean: "For the purpose of voting, no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence. . . . while kept at any almshouse or other asylum at the public expense"? In interpreting this language we should have no serious trouble, as all the words used are simple, and have a well-defined signification as used in common parlance. If any one word in this section is liable to raise any doubt whatever of the meaning of the provision, or the effect that it was intended that the provision should have, it is the word "deemed," in the phrase "no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence," etc. The word "deemed” is the past participle of the transitive verb "deem," which is defined by Webster as follows: "To account; to esteem; to think; to judge; to hold in opinion; to regard." And it is defined by the same lexicographer, when used as an intransitive verb, as follows: "To be of opinion; to think; to estimate." Giving this word its ordinary signification as generally used, it would read in the provision in question thus: "No person shall be accounted, or no person shall be esteemed, or no person shall be thought to be, or no person shall be judged to be, or no person shall be held in opinion to be, or no person shall be regarded to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence at an asylum kept at the public expense, for the purpose of voting." The right of the forty inmates of the soldiers' home mentioned in the pleadings and stipulation of facts depends, so far as the qualification of residence is concerned, to vote in said Ada county, upon their presence in said soldiers' home. They did reside in other counties. All of their residence in Ada county has consisted of the time spent by them in the soldiers' home; and, if they have resided in Ada county the requisite thirty days required by the constitution in order to entitle them to vote in the latter county, it must be "by reason of their presence" in the soldiers' home. Now, if the court is prohibited from "accounting" them residents of the county of Ada, for voting purposes, "by reason of their pres

Opinion of the Court-Quarles, C. J.

ence" at said home, how can we account them residents of said county? How can we "esteem" them residents of said county? How can we "think" them residents of said county? How can we "judge" them to be residents of said county? How can we "hold in opinion" that they are residents of said county? How can we "regard" them as residents of said county? To do so it must be "by reason of their presence" at the soldiers' home, and while kept at public expense, in plain violation of the constitution. This cannot be done without violating the constitution itself. The language used cannot be regarded in any other light than that the framers of the constitution intended that the inmates of such an institution, whose residence in a county depended upon their "presence" in or at such institution, should not vote in such county; and, further, that by reason of their absence from the county of their residence they should not lose their right to vote in the latter county.

In the case of Silvey v. Lindsay, 107 N. Y. 55, 13 N. E. 444, the court of appeals of New York construed a similar provision. The plaintiff in that case had been an inmate of the soldiers' home at Bath six years, and made oath as follows: "I reside in the town of Bath for the reason that I was admitted as an inmate of the New York Soldiers' and Sailors' Home, in this town, by the authorities thereof, in the year 1880, and have remained such inmate from that time to the present, with the intention at all times of making my residence in said institution, so long as I shall be permitted to remain such inmate. . . . . In becoming an inmate of said institution, I intended to change my residence from the city of New York to the fifth election district of said town of Bath." The plaintiff there, so far as intent is concerned, abandoned his residence in the city of New York, and changed it to the town of Bath. Yet the New York court held that his narrative of this intention was only a conclusion from the facts stated. The court said, inter alia: "His relations were not with the village, but with the institution, which was situated within its borders. . . . . It follows that he has not lost the right to vote in the place of his legal residence, New York, for the provision of the constitution in question also declares that he shall not lose his resi