SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE MURDER OF FOUR AMERICAN CHURCHWOMEN IN EL SALVADOR

SEC. 595. (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings

(1) the December 2, 1980 brutal assault and murder of four American churchwomen by members of the Salvadoran National Guard was covered up and never fully investigated;

(2) on July 22 and July 23, 1998, Salvadoran authorities granted three of the National Guardsmen convicted of the crimes early release from prison;

(3) the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador determined in 1993 that there was sufficient evidence that the Guardsmen were acting on orders from their superiors;

(4) in March 1998, four of the convicted Guardsmen confessed that they acted after receiving orders from their superiors;

(5) recently declassified documents from the State Department show that United States Government officials were aware of information suggesting the involvement of superior officers in the murders;

(6) United States officials granted permanent residence to a former Salvadoran military official involved in the cover-up of the murders, enabling him to remain in Florida; and

(7) despite the fact that the murders occurred over 17 years ago, the families of the four victims continue to seek the disclosure of information relevant to the murders.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that

(1) information relevant to the murders should be made public to the fullest extent possible;

(2) the Secretary of State and the Department of State are to be commended for fully releasing information regarding the murders to the victims' families and to the American public, in prompt response to congressional requests;

(3) the President should order all other Federal agencies and departments that possess relevant information to make every effort to declassify and release to the victims' families relevant information as expeditiously as possible;

(4) in making determinations concerning the declassification and release of relevant information, the Federal agencies and departments should presume in favor of releasing, rather than of withholding, such information; and

(5) the President should direct the Attorney General to review the circumstances under which individuals involved in either the murders or the cover-up of the murders obtained residence in the United States, and the Attorney General should submit a report to the Congress on the results of such review not later than January 1, 1999.

SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE TRIAL IN THE NETHERLANDS OF THE SUSPECTS INDICTED IN THE BOMBING OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103 SEC. 596. (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On December 21, 1988, 270 people, including 189 United States citizens, were killed in a terrorist bombing on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

(2) Britain and the United States indicted 2 Libyan intelligence agents-Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah-in 1991 and sought their extradition from Libya to the United States or the United Kingdom to stand trial for this heinous terrorist act.

(3) The United Nations Security Council called for the extradition of the suspects in Security Council Resolution 731 and imposed sanctions on Libya in Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 because Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, refused to transfer the suspects to either the United States or the United Kingdom to stand trial.

(4) The sanctions in Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 include a worldwide ban on Libya's national airline, a ban on flights into and out of Libya by other nations' airlines, a prohibition on supplying arms, airplane parts, and certain oil equipment to Libya, and a freeze on Libyan government funds in other countries.

(5) Colonel Qadhafi has continually refused to extradite the suspects to either the United States or the United Kingdom and has insisted that he will only transfer the suspects to a third and neutral country to stand trial.

(6) On August 24, 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom proposed that Colonel Qadhafi transfer the suspects to the Netherlands, where they would stand trial before a Scottish court, under Scottish law, and with a panel of Scottish judges.

(7) The United States-United Kingdom proposal is consistent with those previously endorsed by the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference.

(8) The United Nations Security Council endorsed the United States-United Kingdom proposal on August 27, 1998, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1192.

(9) The United States Government has stated that this proposal is nonnegotiable and has called on Colonel Qadhafi to respond promptly, positively, and unequivocally to this proposal by ensuring the timely appearance of the two accused individuals in the Netherlands for trial before the Scottish court.

(10) The United States Government has called on Libya to ensure the production of evidence, including the presence of witnesses before the court, and to comply fully with all the requirements of the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

(11) Secretary of State Albright has said that the United States will urge a multilateral oil embargo against Libya in the United Nations Security Council if Colonel Muammar Qadhafi does not transfer the suspects to The Netherlands to stand trial.

(12) The United Nations Security Council will convene on October 30, 1998, to review sanctions imposed on Libya. (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that

(1) Colonel Qadhafi should promptly transfer the indicted suspects Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah to The Netherlands to stand trial before the Scottish court;

(2) the United States Government should remain firm in its commitment not to negotiate with Colonel Qadhafi on any of the details of the proposal approved by the United Nations in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1192; and

(3) if Colonel Qadhafi does not transfer the indicted suspects Abdel Basset Al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah to The Netherlands by October 29, 1998, the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations should

(A) introduce a resolution in the United Nations Security Council to impose a multilateral oil embargo against Libya;

(B) actively promote adoption of the resolution by the United Nations Security Council; and

(C) assure that a vote will occur in the United Nations Security Council on such a resolution.

SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN RECOVERING CHILDREN ABDUCTED IN THE UNITED STATES AND TAKEN TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

SEC. 597. (a) FINDINGS.-Congress finds that

(1) many children in the United States have been abducted by family members who are foreign nationals and living in foreign countries;

(2) children who have been abducted by an estranged father are very rarely returned, through legal remedies, from countries that only recognize the custody rights of the father;

(3) there are at least 140 cases that need to be resolved in which children have been abducted by family members and taken to foreign countries;

(4) although the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, done at The Hague on October 25, 1980, has made progress in aiding the return of abducted children, the Convention does not address the criminal aspects of child abduction, and there is a need to reach agreements regarding child abduction with countries that are not parties to the Convention; and

(5) decisions on awarding custody of children should be made in the children's best interest, and persons who violate laws of the United States by abducting their children should not be rewarded by being granted custody of those children.

(b) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should promote international cooperation in working to resolve those cases in which children in the United States are abducted by family members who are foreign nationals and taken to foreign countries, and in seeing that justice is served by holding accountable the abductors for violations of criminal law.

TITLE VI—INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PROGRAMS AND

REFORM

FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY PROGRAMS

UNITED STATES QUOTA IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND For an increase in the United States quota in the International Monetary Fund, the dollar equivalent of 10,622,500,000 Special Drawing Rights, to remain available until expended.

LOANS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND-NEW

ARRANGEMENTS TO BORROW

For loans to the International Monetary Fund under section 17 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act pursuant to the New Arrangements to Borrow, the dollar equivalent of 2,462,000,000 Special Drawing Rights, to remain available until expended. In addition, the amounts appropriated by title III of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1963 (Public Law 87-872) and section 1101(b) of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1984 (Public Law 98-181) may also be used under section 17 of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act pursuant to the New Arrangements to Borrow.

GENERAL PROVISIONS-THIS TITLE

CONDITIONS FOR THE USE OF APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR THE

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

SEC. 601. None of the funds appropriated in this title may be obligated or made available to the International Monetary Fund until 15 days after the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System jointly provide written notification to the appropriate committees that the major shareholders of the Fund have publicly agreed to, and will act to implement in the Fund the following policies:

(1) Policies providing that conditions in standby or other arrangements regarding the use of Fund resources include, in addition to appropriate monetary policy conditions, requirements that the recipient country, in accordance with a schedule for action

(A) liberalize restrictions on trade in goods and services, consistent with the terms of all international trade agreements of which the borrowing country is a signatory;

(B) eliminate the systemic practice or policy of government directed lending on non-commercial terms or provision of market distorting subsidies to favored industries, enterprises, parties, or institutions; and

(C) provide a legal basis for nondiscriminatory treatment in insolvency proceedings between domestic and foreign creditors, and for debtors and other concerned persons. (2) Policies providing that within 3 months after any meeting of the Executive Board of the Fund at which a Letter of Intent, a Policy Framework Paper, an Article IV economic review con

54-320 99-23

sultation with a member country, or a change in a general policy of the Fund is discussed, a full written summary of the meeting should be made available for public inspection, with the following information redacted:

(A) Information which, if released, would adversely affect the national security of a country, and which is of the type that would be classified by the United States Govern

ment.

(B) Market-sensitive information.

(C) Proprietary information.

(3) Policies providing that within 3 months after any meeting of the Executive Board of the Fund at which a Letter of Intent, a Memorandum of Understanding, or a Policy Framework Paper is discussed, a copy of the Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Understanding, or Policy Framework Paper should be made available for public inspection with the following information redacted:

(A) Information which, if released, would adversely affect the national security of a country, and which is of the type that would be classified by the United States Govern

ment.

(B) Market-sensitive information.

(C) Proprietary information.

(4) Policies providing that, in circumstances where a country is experiencing balance of payments difficulties due to a large short-term financing need resulting from a sudden and disruptive loss of market confidence and in order to provide an incentive for early repayment and encourage private market financing, loans made from the Fund's general resources after the date of the enactment of this section are

(A) made available at an interest rate that reflects an adjustment for risk that is not less than 300 basis points in excess of the average of the market-based short-term cost of financing of its largest members; and

(B) repaid within 1 to 22 years from each disbursement.

REPORTS ON FINANCIAL STABILIZATION PROGRAMS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

SEC. 602. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund to exert the influence of the United States to oppose further disbursement of funds to the Republic of Korea under the Republic of Korea's standby arrangement of December 4, 1997 (in this section referred to as the "Arrangement"), unless there is in effect certification by the Secretary of the Treasury to the appropriate committees that

(1) no Fund resources made available pursuant to the Arrangement have been used to provide financial assistance to the semiconductor, steel, automobile, shipbuilding, or textile and apparel industries;

(2) the Fund has neither guaranteed nor underwritten the private loans of semiconductor, steel, automobile, shipbuilding, or textile and apparel manufacturers under the Arrangement; and