Williamson; Richards v.

Willmott v. Barber, 15 C. D. 96; 17 C. D. 772
Wills' Tms., (1892) 3 Ch. 201; 9 R. P. C. 346; 61
546; 67 L. T. 453
Wills' Tm., Re, (1893) 2 Ch. 262; 10 R. P. C. 269;
Ch. 545; 68 L. T. 793

PAGE

- 331, 518

L. J. Ch. 242, 374, 376 62 L. J. 203, 214, 259, 345

Witt v. Concoran, 2 C. D. 69 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 603; 34 L. T. (N. S.)

550; 24 W. R. 501

Wittingham; Cooper v.

389, 419, 426

Wolmershausen v. G. S. Wolmershausen & Co., Ltd., W. N. (1892) 87

Wolmershausen v. O'Connor, 36 L. T. (N. S.) 921-
Wood's Tm. See Wood v. Butler.

399

- 474, 507

Wood v. Burgess, 24 Q. B. D. 162; 59 L. J. M. C. 11; 61
L. T. 593; 38 W. R. 311
Wood v. Butler 32 C. D. 247; 3 R. P. C. 81; 55 L. J. Ch.
Wood v. Lambert ) 377; 54 L. T. 314; 1 Times L. R. 435; 2
Times L. R. 232
Wood; Metzler v.
Woodroffe; Harrison v.

- 119, 155, 201, 259, 285, 338, 339, 346, 406

Woollam v. Radcliff, 1 H. & M. 259 Woolley v. Broad, (1892) 1 Q. B. 806; 9 R. P. C. 208, 429; 40 W. R. 511; 8 Times L. R. 213 Worthington's Tm., 14 C. D. 8; 49 L. J. Ch. 646; 42 L. T. 563; 28 W. R. 747 Wotherspoon v. Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; 42 L. J. Ch. 130; 22 L. T. (N. S.) 443; 27 L. T. (N. S.) 393; 18 W. R. 942 46, 148, 187, 204, 316, 321, 404, 405 Wragg's Tms., 29 C. D. 551; 54 L. J. Ch. 391; 52 L. T. 467; 1 Times L. R. 268

172, 177, 259, 260

Wren v. Weild, L. R. 4 Q. B. 213, 730; 38 L. J. Q. B. 88; 20
L. T. (N. S.) 277

Wriggleworth v. Dallison, Doug. 201; 1 Sm. L. C. 8th ed.,
P. 569

Wright; Martin v.

Yates; Dicks v.

Youatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394
Young; Callow v.

Young v. Macrae, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 322
Younge; Blyth v.

Page 288, note (e), the reference for Welcome's Tm. should be 32 C. D. 213;

3 R. P. C. 76.

1. Trade-Marks before the Registration Acts.

THE foundation upon which the law relating to trademarks and trade-names rests is that the deception of the public by the offer for sale of goods as possessing some connection with a particular trader, which they do not in fact possess, is a wrong in respect of which the trader has a cause of action against any person who is the author of, or is responsible for the deception.

"No man," said James, L. J. (a), "is entitled to represent his goods as being the goods of another man; and no man is permitted to use any mark, sign or symbol, device or means, whereby, without making a direct false representation himself to a purchaser who purchases from him, he enables such purchaser to tell a lie or to make a false representation to somebody else who is the ultimate

К.

(a) Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Loog, 18 C. D. p. 412 (1880).

R

The leading principle as stated by James, Ĺ.J.

Early trademark cases at law and in equity.

"customer. That being, as it appears to me, a compre-
hensive statement of what the law is upon the question of
trade-mark or trade-designation, I am of opinion that there
is no such thing as a monopoly or a property in the nature
of a copyright, or in the nature of a patent, in the use of
any name.
Whatever name is used to designate goods,
anybody may use that name to designate goods; always
subject to this, that he must not, as I said, make directly,
or through the medium of another person, a false repre-
sentation that his goods are the goods of another person."

The law on this subject cannot be traced back further than the present century. It is, indeed, sometimes alleged, upon the authority of Southern v. How (b), that an action lay for the infringement of a trade-mark as early as the reign of James I. In that case the defendant, a clothier, had applied the mark of another clothier to his own inferior cloth, and it was held that for this an action for deceit could be brought. According to one report (c), the action was brought by the owner of the mark, and if this is correct the case does undoubtedly establish the proposition suggested. According to another report (d), however, the plaintiff was the defrauded purchaser, and the action, therefore, an ordinary action of deceit. In the case of Blanchard v. Hill (e), Lord Hardwicke refused to grant an injunction to restrain a trader from imitating the mark of another; but the language of his judgment suggests that if the defendant had used the mark with a fraudulent design to pass off inferior goods by that means, or to draw away customers from the owner of the mark, he might have granted the injunction.

Lord Eldon, who so greatly extended the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in regard to injunction (ƒ), in several instances granted injunctions to restrain a defendant from pretending that his goods were those of, or were

(b) Popham, 144; Cro. Jac. 471;

2 Rolle, 28.

(c) Popham, p. 144.

(d) Cro. Jac. 471.

(e) 2 Atk. 484 (1742), Great Mogul Stamp on playing cards.

(f) See 2 Law Review, p. 282; Kerly's History of Equity, p. 258.