had, by its proceedings, destroyed itself, and therefore that the meeting assembled by its direction, in 1828, was not the regular successor of the ancient yearly meeting of the society. As they failed in this attempt, judgment was given against them.

In like manner, on the supposition that our new-school brethren should organize themselves as the General Assembly, to substantiate their claim they must prove that the body from which they withdrew has forfeited its legal existence. The burden must lie on them. The presumption of course will be in favour of the body which shall assemble agreeably to the requisition of the General Assembly of 1837, and be constituted in the ordinary manner. This presumption will be greatly strengthened by the fact, that these brethren must recognise its character, by claiming their seats in it as the General Assembly. They will be driven therefore to prove that its refusal to admit them destroys its nature, so that it ceases to be what it was before that refusal, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States. It matters not where the controversy about property may begin; whether it be a suit between two sets of trustees of an individual congregation, or between two men, each claiming to be the treasurer of the General Assembly; to this point it must come, and upon this hinge the case must turn. Is the General Assembly destroyed by its refusal to acknowledge the rights of the delegates from mixed presbyteries to take their seats as members? Must it continue to allow Congregationalists to take part in the government of our church, or cease to be the General Assembly?

It appears from what has already been said, that the decision of this question cannot depend upon the number of delegates who may choose to withdraw. It matters not whether they are a minority or majority; if they have a quorum behind, it is the General Assembly, unless it can be proved to have destroyed itself. As courts of chancery have the right to protect trusts and to prevent their abuse or perversion, it is certainly possible for the highest authority of a church so to act as to forfeit its claim to the property of the society which it represents. In order to this, however, it must openly renounce either the faith or discipline of the society. Had the yearly meeting of 1827, of which the Hicksites complained, and from which they separated, declared themselves Presbyterians or Episcopalians, they could no longer be regarded as the yearly meeting of the society of Friends. Majorities are not omnipotent. "They have no power," says Mr. Wood, "to break up the original landmarks of the institution. They have no power to divert the property held by them in their social capacity from the special purpose for which it was bestowed. They could not turn a Baptist society into a Presbyterian society, or a Quaker into an Episcopalian society. They could not pervert an institution and its funds formed for trinitarian purposes, to anti-trinitarian purposes." P. 53. Mr. Williamson says, " If the superior churches change their doctrines, the subordinate ones are not bound to

change theirs. If a part of the head changes its doctrines, and a part of the subordinate branches change theirs also, then those who separate and form a new head, will lose their right to the property; but if there is no dispute about doctrine, those who separate from the head will be considered as seceders, and will lose the benefit of the property. If the whole head changes its religious principles, the society which separates from it, and adheres to the religious principles of the society, will not lose its rights." P. 165. A case strongly confirming this last position is cited by Mr. Wood, p. 55. A large part of a congregation left the jurisdiction of one of the Scotch synods. But they claimed to hold the property on the ground that they were the true church, inasmuch as they adhered to the original doctrines of the church, and they alleged that the synod had departed from those doctrines. The court below decided in favour of the party who still adhered to the synod. In the House of Lords where Lord Eldon presided, the court under his advice decided, that if these allegations of the seceders were true, they were entitled to the property, notwithstanding their secession. It being determined, however, that there was no departure from the faith of the church on the part of the synod, judgment was given against the seceders. We admit, therefore, that it is possible for the supreme judicatory of the church to take such a course as to forfeit their character and authority, and to justify a portion of its members in withdrawing from it as no longer the supreme judicatory of the church to which they belong. It is obvious, however, that nothing short of such a dereliction of the doctrines or order of the church as is a real rejection of its faith or form of government, can work such a result. It is not pretended that the Assembly has departed from the doctrines of the Confession of Faith; the only question therefore can be, whether the rejection of the delegates from mixed presbyteries is so inconsistent with our form of government, that the Assembly, which decides on such a measure, ceases to be the General Assembly of the Presbyterian church? Nothing short of this will suffice to establish the claim of the opposite party. "If this new society have separated from us," says Governor Williamson, "if they have withdrawn; if they cannot show that the original meeting was dissolved, they can have no claim to the property." P. 164. It is not enough, therefore, that the court should disapprove of any particular act of the Assembly, thinking it uncalled for or severe; they must pronounce that it is a secession from the Presbyterian church; that it is such a renunciation of its doctrines or discipline as to justify its being deprived of its legal existence and privileges. As the simple question is, Which of the conflicting bodies is the General Assembly? the new one cannot be recognised as such, except on the assumption that the old one is destroyed; destroyed too by the exercise of an undoubted constitutional right, viz. that of judging of the qualifications of its own members. This right is inherent in every representative and legislative body, and is essential to its indepen

dence and purity. It is a right, moreover, from the exercise of which there is no appeal. To whom can an excluded member of the House of Commons look for redress from its decision that he is not entitled to a seat? To what court can the representatives elect from Mississippi now appeal from what they regard as an unjust decision of the House of Representatives, denying them their right as members? What would our religious liberties be worth, if this privilege were denied to religious bodies? if they were not allowed to say who do, and who do not conform to the standards of their church? or if every decision of an Episcopal convention, or Methodist conference, were liable to be brought under the review of the secular courts? "While the law," says Mr. Wood, "protects individuals, it would be shortsighted indeed if it did not protect religious societies in their social capacity." They are to be protected in the maintenance of their doctrines and discipline, and in the preservation of their property. "How," he asks, "are they to be protected in these important particulars? By guaranteeing to them the power of purgation, of lopping off dead and useless branches, of clearing out those who depart essentially from the fundamental doctrines and discipline of the society." P. 5. That is, by guaranteeing to them the right of judging of the qualifications of their own members. This right has ever been respected. "In determining the great question of secession (and of course of membership) the court," says the same legal authority," always looks to the highest ecclesiastical tribunal, which exercises a superintending control over the inferior judicatories." P. 56. He refers to a case in New York, in which it was decided "that the adjudication of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal upon this matter (the standing and membership of a minister) was conclusive on the subject." He quotes also from Halsted's Reports to prove that the dissatisfied party cannot get clear of such decision "by changing their allegiance." In the case referred to, Chief Justice Ewing says, that civil courts are bound to give respect and effect to the constitutional decisions of ecclesiastical judicatories, " without inquiring into the truth or sufficiency of the alleged grounds of the sentence." 7 Halsted, p. 220. "The decision of the church judicatory would not be final, if we may afterwards examine its merits. If we ask, as

we doubtless may do, by what warrant individuals exercise the powers and duties of ministers, elders and deacons (who were the trustees of the property in controversy), they may answer, by an election, appointment, or call, the validity of which has been decided and sustained by the superior judicatory to which the congregation is subordinate. Such being the fact, ulterior inquiry on our part is closed, and I think with much propriety and wisdom." P. 223. There would be no security for church property if this principle were not admitted. What would be thought of a decision which should strip Trinity Church of its property for an act sanctioned as regular and constitutional by all the authorities of

the Episcopal Church? We have in our own church many men who are avowed anti-sectarians; who think that the barriers which separate the different denominations of Christians should be broken down. It is a possible case, that men of these opinions should have on some occasion, an accidental majority in the General Assembly. Suppose they should avail themselves of the opportunity to enact a Plan of Union, by which, not the favoured Congregationalist only, but the Episcopalian, the Baptist, and even the Papist, should be allowed to sit and vote in all our presbyteries. This would be hailed with delight by many as the commencement of a new era, as the adoption of "a principle that could stand the test of the millennium." Would it then be all over with the Presbyterian Church? Must its General Assembly forfeit its existence and be deprived of all its property, should it repeal this Plan, and refuse to recognise presbyteries thus constituted? We have no fear that any decision so subversive of established principles, so destructive of the rights and liberties of ecclesiastical bodies will ever be made.

We should think the monstrous injustice of any decision which could answer the purpose of our new-school brethren, must alarm the conscience of the most obdurate man in the country. Here, in the event supposed, are two bodies claiming to be the General Assembly. The one, continued by regular succession, is the representative of those by whom almost the whole of the property held by their trustees has been contributed. The other, the representative of some three or four hundred Congregational churches, and of about an equal number of Presbyterian ones, most of which were originally Congregational. It is proposed to apply for a decision which shall declare this mixed body the true Presbyterian Church, and as such entitled to all the property collected and funded by the other party! And for what reason? Because the regular Assembly has resolved not to allow Congregationalists to vote, or to be represented in Presbyterian judicatories. We doubt not that every good man on the opposite side would rather see the property at the bottom of the ocean, than that any such decision should be made.

ESSAY X.

SLAVERY.*

EVERY one must be sensible that a very great change has, within a few years, been produced in the feelings, if not in the opinions of the public in relation to slavery. It is not long since the acknowledgment was frequent at the south, and universal at the north, that it was a great evil. It was spoken of in the slaveholding states, as a sad inheritance fixed upon them by the cupidity of the mother-country in spite of their repeated remonstrances. The known sentiments of Jefferson were reiterated again and again in every part of his native state; and some of the strongest denunciations of this evil, and some of the most ardent aspirations for deliverance from it ever uttered in the country, were pronounced, but a few years since, in the legislature of Virginia. A proposition to call a convention, with the purpose of so amending the constitution of the state as to admit of the general emancipation of the slaves, is said to have failed in the legislature of Kentucky by a single vote.† The sentiments of the northern states had long since been clearly expressed, by the abolition of slavery within their limits. That the same opinions and the same feelings continued to prevail among them, may be inferred, not only from the absence of all evidence to the contrary, but from various decisive indications of a positive character. In the year 1828 a resolution was passed by an almost unanimous vote in the legislature of Pennsylvania, instructing their Senators in Congress to endeavour to procure the passage of a law abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia. In 1829 a similar resolution was adopted by the assembly of New York. In 1828 a petition to this effect was presented to Congress, signed by one thousand inhabitants of the District itself; and the House of Representatives instructed the proper committee, in 1829, to inquire into the expediency of

ning."

Originally published in 1836, in review of "Slavery. By William E. ChanIt is probable that many reasons combined to make a convention desirable to those who voted for it. But to get rid of slavery, was said to be one of the most prominent.