congratulatory smile, saying, "there, petti

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foggers, match that if you can." It has been thought, and said, by many persons, that the French aim at the destruction of our constitution, liberties, and religion; and, as the destruction of them would naturally be included in the conquest of England, the Fench do, in my opinion, aim at that destruction. By way of combatting this opinion, you ask : At what period, since the "revolution in France, has the French go"vernment proposed to us, that we should

་་

relinquish, or divest ourselves of, our constitution. liberties and religion?" To whom did you address this, Sir? Certainly you must have supposed, to the most base or the most stupid of mankind. You are a fit person, indeed, to complain of insults to the common sense and common feeling of the nation; you, who have the impudence coolly to desire us to believe, that the French do not wish to destroy us as an independent nation, because they never have made to us a formal proposition to give our consent to such destruction. Verily, if your verbal dis course be like your written, the rabble of Liverpool treated you with unaccountable forbearance. You proceed to tell us, that "neither in the negociations of 1801, 1903, "or 1806, do we find traces of any proposi"tion on the part of France, which could "intringe, in the slightest degree, upon the "independence, the interest, or the prospe

rity, of this country." You may know, though I do not, how to distinguish between national interest" and " prosperity," or you may, from your intimacy with John Doe and Richard Roe, think, that tautology is a beauty in composition; but, as to the substance of what you say, it is this, that, from the beginning to the end, France has not, in any of the three negociations, proposed any one thing, to which we had any solid ground of objection; an assertion, which, from my soul, I believe, Arthur O'Connor himself would not, for his character's sake, venture to make in the face of the world. You appear to be aware of an .exception that even your political friends (if you have any) night wish you to have made with respect to The propositions, made through Andreossy, dative to the press, and the speeches in parliament; Lut, say you, even the com

plaints made by the French ruler against "the dicentiness of the British press were *standoned, and eventually formed no

part of the discussions;" though you had, before, taken infinite pains to inculcate a behief, that the present war arose wholly from the publications in England against Buonaparte; that it was instigated by a few in

that

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"terested and unprincipled individuals;" it is demonstrated, that the disagreement arose from publications in this "country." But, here again, niggardly nature has refused you the two mouths. When you wanted to cause it to be believed, that England began the war without any reasonable cause, and that there existed, in reality, no grounds of hostility, and no grounds of alarm as to the designs of Buonaparté, then it was necessary for you to find out the real cause of the war, and that cause was, the offence which Buonaparté took at the publications in England; but now, when year object is to persuade us, that your great friend (I must call him so, however it may shock your modesty), has not the least desire to do any thing that can, " in the

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slightest degree, infringe upon the independence of England," you find it necessary to speak very lightly of the complaint about our "licentious press," and to tell us, that, before the war broke out, those complaints were abandoned, and, at last, "formed no part of the discussions:" in other words, that the publications from the press were not the cause of the war, and that what you have before asserted, upon that subject, was a wilful falshood.

Barefaced and disgusting as these contradictions are, however, they are quite equalled by some which are yet to be noticed. You tell us, that the cause of war new alledged is, that" if peace were once esta

blished, it would enable France to create a "marine, by which she might overpower "the British navy and subjugate the coun

try." These words you insert as a quotation, but without reference, for a reason best known to yourself. No, Sir; this also is false. It is not thus, that the objectors to peace express themselves; for this would be to declare for " perpetual war," a declaration, which, with your usual attention to truth, you have ascribed to us. We say, or, I do, at least, that, if we were now to make peace with Napoleon, leaving him in posses. sion of all the ports and naval arsenals upon the continent, and without making any stipulation to prevent the creation of a marine, that he would, in a very few years of peace, create a navy sufficient to overpower us; and, that, therefore, we ought to keep on the war, till we can obtain the separating of some of the maritime states from him, or a stipulation such as I have mentioned; because, in the case of a peace, now made, without such stipulation, we could not dismantle a ship or disband a regiment; that the expences of peace would be equal to the expences of war, and the danger inti

nitely greater; that he would obtain repose, and that we should receive an augmentation of inquietude; that he, never having any apprehensions of us, would have leisure to mature his maritime projects, while our navy must from the very nature of its constitution become, day after day, in a state less formidable than it now is. This is what I have, over and over again, stated; and, if you had taken this statement, you would have had something to answer. But, now, let us hear what you say in order to convince us of the absurdity of the alarm arising from the notion, that peace, now made, upon the terms proposed by France, will enable Napoleon to create a marine. You tell us, that France is, by nature, not a naval power; that, in the most prosperous days of her navy, she was unable to cope with the fleets of Holland; that those persons are almost insane, who seem to imagine, that, because Buonaparté has been so successful by land he must, if he turn his attention that way, be equally successful by sea; and that, therefore, we may safely make peace, leaving dreams of alarm to the unmanly creatures who entertain them. But, lest your powers of soothing should fail, you, a little further on, try the effect of threats, and tell us, that, if we will not make peace, then Buonaparté may, and, in all likelihood, will, beat us by sea. You say, that, in the commencement of the French revolution, France was not military; that the attacks made upon her made her military; that, if she had been left quiet, she would not have become formidable to her neighbours; that she was compelled, in her defence, to take a government purely military; that, "in like manner," France is not now a naval power (though she has been "attacked" by a navy for many years), and, if left in a state of tranquillity would not be at all likely to attempt it; but, "if compelled to assume "it, if threatened with perpetual war, if "harrassed from year to year by protracted "hostilities; if compelled to become naval "for her own safety; then it is impossible "to say that the same spirit which has been "manifested by land may not be excited by

When it is your

cudgel us with the other? purpose to sooth us into peace, we are told that it is a mark of insanity to suppose that France can ever rival the naval power of England, but, when you take up the cudgel, we are warned to take care how we provoke her to become a naval power. While the former scheme is in your mind, you tell us, that France, even in the best days of her navy, was unable to cope with Holland, quite forgetting to tell us that Holland now makes part of France; but, when you come again to your cudgelling operations, you do not forget this circumstance, but remind us that almost every maritime state in Europe is now under the absolute controul of France, or, as you, with your accustomed candour, choose to express it, "associated with her. "in the same cause." But, sir, as to your argument, there is a little deficiency in point of analogy, to which, in your next edition, it may not be amiss for you to attend. Gire me leave to place it before you in as clear a light as I can. France (you say), at the beginning of her revolution, was not military (false in fact); the attack upon her made her not only military but a military conqueror, and that because "the nations of the continent became her instructors in military tactics." France (you say) is not now naval; but a perseverance in a naval war, on our part, will, or at least may, as in the other case, make her not only naval, but a naval conqueror. No, sir; and if you have deceived yourself by this sort of logic, your brain is of that kind which Swift describes as not capable of bearing many skummings. You quite overlook the want of similarity in the circumstances. It was (taking your fact for granted), at the beginning of her war that she was not military; but it is at the end of fifteen years of war that she is not naval, though the war has, all along, been naval as well as military, as the total destruction of her fleet, old as well as new, is, to her, at least, a convincing proof. For your argument to have been worth any thing, as applied to the purpose which you had in view, there should have been no naval war all this time; or, you should have been able to say, that France was destitute of a navy in 1792, and that now, in consequence of our "attack" upon her, she had drilled herself into a formidable naval power. "The nations of Europe," you tell us, have been her instructors in military affairs," and you express your fear, that, unless we make peace, we shall, in like manner, " become her instructors in naval affairs." Become! Now, really, sir, I must charge you, in your capacity of pleader for France, as being very

sea, an event greatly to be dreaded, and "the more to be apprehended, as she is 66 now associated, in the same cause, with "almost every maritime state in Europe." Poor, injured, "harrassed" France, compelled" to become naval for her own

safely!" Never was there any thing uttered so devoid of principle as this. I defy the Old Bailey to produce such an advocate. And so, sir, you wish to tame us as they do elephants; stroke us with one hand and

ungrateful; for, have we not been endeavouring to instruct her these fifteen long years, in all sorts of naval affairs, in battles of all sizes, and in all parts of the world, not forgetting to give, as it were purely for her sake, here and there a lesson to her allies, even unto those nations, who are "now associated with her in the same

cause" (say good cause in your next edř tion, to make the thing complete); and, if they have, not one of them, profited from our instructions, in all that time, what reason is there to suppose, that they will begin now to profit from them? This is your main argument; upon this argument you ring all the changes; and in this argument, which is one of experience, you are completely beaten, fifteen years of experience having proved, that, in war, France, though having for her principal object, the destruction of England constantly in view, and though having at her command almost all the naval force of the continent of Europe, has been daily sinking as a maritime state; and, yet you would fain make us believe, that the only way to prevent her from becoming formidable at sea is to make peace with her, and that, too, upon terms, which shall leave her in quiet possession of all the means which the continent affords for the creation of a navy. Your proposition, stripped of all its useless words, and connected with undeniable fact, is this: the only dauger which we have to apprehend from the hostility of France, is, that she may create a naval force; she has now, and has had for some years, almost the whole of the naval means of the continent at her disposal; we have been at war with her for ifteen years, and she has been daily sinking in naval power; therefore, in order to prevent her from rising in naval power, let us make peace with her as soon as possible, and insist upor no stipulation that shall prevent her from making use of the absence of our naval force for the creating of a naval force of her own: This is, disguise it how you will, the advice which you give to your country; advice which no man would give, who was not the enemy of his country, or, at least, who, from want of real patriotism, had not suffered his spite against his party opponents to get the better of every higher consideration.

You admit, sir, for argument's sake, that France would, in case of peace, increase her Pay so as to threaten the independence of England; and, under this admission, you

"What is our remedy against it? The answer," you continue, "is ready from the whole tribe of alarmists: PER

parté, they cannot sleep in peace, unless "the blood of their fellow subject ɔe daily "and hourly flowing in their defence, in

every part of the world.". For malignant aspersions there is nothing like a philanthropist by trade; but, sir, while you were drawing such a hateful picture of the cowardice of others, you certainly forgot those symptoms of unfeigned fear, which you exhibited at Liverpool, where you retreated at the very sound of the voice of your opponents, crying, if we are to believe the published reports, like a stout Italian, when a little blackguard of a dozen years old has given a hoist to his board of brittle images; you must have forgotten this, or you would have shown some compassion for the cowardice of us, who are, at least, your countrymen. But, sir, where is it that you have to refer to what you have here given as the answer of those whom you (brave man!) term the alarmnists? Who has ever said, that "perpetual war is the object of his exer

tions, and the sole preservative" against the dangers which he apprehends? I believe, that no one has ever said it, in print or out of print. But, I will tell you what we say we say, that a war to last until our grand children are fathers of families; that a war for a hundred years to come, would be preferable to the subjugation of our country by France; and, preferable, too, to a peace, which, in our opinion, would speedily lead to such subjugation. Whether the sort of peace which you recommend would ̧ have this effect, is a question which has before been discussed by me,* and which I shall not discuss again here; but, that you feel conscious of the badness of your cause is pretty evident from your having recourse to such flagrant misrepresentations as that which I have just noticed. Perhaps,

however, it is in the way of induction that you have made this statement of our sentiments. We insist, that perpetual war is preferable to subjugation by France; we insist that perpetual war is preferable to such a peace as would speedily lead to subjugation; we say what sort of peace we should think preferable to war; you are, I suppose, of opinion, that we shall get no such peace as

See Register, present volume, page 65, and subsequent articles upon the subject of Peace, where I have used arguments, which, as far as my knowledge reaches, no one has yet attempted to answer.

this latter; and, hence you conclude, that we are for perpetual war, which, in this way, you take us to have openly avowed, as the sole preventive for the evil which we dread. But, observe, you take it for granted (for argument's sake) that our apprehensions are well founded, as to the means that it would put into the hands of our enemy; and how do you console us? Why, by telling us, first, that we have not the power, by continuing the war, to prevent the operation of those means; but, next, that the "immense preparations for subduing us are not the vo luntary act of our enemy, who has, probably, other objects in view; but are forced upon him by the persevering hostility of this country, and the declared pur66 pose of waging against him perpetual war; or, in other words, of contending with him, till one of the two countries be destroyed as a nation and subjugated to the "will of the other." It is useless to repeat the accusation of falshood, so often before proved upon you; it is useless to express one's contempt of your misrepresentations; but, it is still less useless to ask you where you have ever seen such a declaration on the part of England against France. You do, indeed, quote a passage from the author of War in Disguise: "He (Buonaparté) says "there is room enough in the world for “him and us. 'Tis false; there is not room "enough in it for his new despotism and "the liberties of England." Whereupon you, like a true pettifogger, ask: "How

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did, then, the liberties of England exist so long in the same world with the ancient government of France? Or, why were "Mr. Pitt and his friends so anxious to es"tablish that government?" What a miserable quibble! Is it not evident, that the author of War in Disguise was not talking about the internal despotism of Buonaparté ? Is it not manifest that he was speaking of his universal despotism, and particularly of the effect of his power over the maritime states of the world, to induce England to set about counteracting the effect of which power was the avowed object of the pimphlet in question? A man who can be guilty of such glaring misconstruction; who can wilfully expose himself to the impatation of ignorance, rather than forego the advantage to be derived from falshood, is well worthy of being the advocate of the cause you have espoused; but, he might, methinks, have spared us his moral reflections and his references to holy writ. There is, in leed, one way, in which we may be said io force Buonaparté to make vast preparations for invading us, namely, in refusing to

put on his yoke quietly. It is the second "blow that makes the battle," say the Quakers; and, as towards the Emperor Napoleon, you, Sir, appear to be a perfect "Friend." The refusal of the Prince of Portugal to make a fraudulent seizure of English property, held under the sanction of the law, you term a persevering, after repeated remonstrances, in the maintaining "of alliances supposed to be injurious to a belligerent and successful power;" and our conduct you describe by the words "persevering hostility;" that is to say, that by our persevering in a refusal to submit to Napoleon's terms, we force him to make vast preparations for invading and conquering us. "Under such circumstances," you proceed, "there can be no doubt that every effort "will be made by him for the invasion of "these islands." And then you go on again with your threats. But, Sir, why do you not address yourself to him? Since you find us so "persevering;" so mulishly obstinate in our reluctance to put our heads into the yoke, why do you not ask him to think of some terms of peace that we shall look upon as safe? This is a way of putting an end to the war, that has not, it would seem, come athwart your 'mind; and yet, there appears to be nothing unnatural in the idea; unless, indeed, you regard it as the height of presumption in us to think of any terms not strictly conformable to the dictates of his promulgated will. In that case your conduct is consistent, whatever people may think of you as a legislator and a patriot.

Suspecting, apparently, that the infallibility of your own judgment may be doubted by some few persons, at least, you appeal for a presumptive proof of the inoffensiveness of the views of France, to the opinions of the several sets of ministers, under whom negociations have been carried on with her for the termination of war. You tell us, that Lord Sidmouth and his colleagues, in 1801; that. the same ministry, in 1803; that Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox, in 1806; perceived no such objections to a pacification as the fears of the alarmists have now discovered; and that even the present ministers, "have acknowledged, in the face of Eu

rope, that there was no substantial cause "for hostility between France and this

country, either from apprehensions of "this, or of any other, nature; but, that "the war was continued on account of "Russia only, and that his majesty was con"tending for interests not his own." This falshood have exposed once before; but in this place, it is stated still more distinctly and, therefore, shall again be pointed out

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The words of the declaration were, that "the negociation was broken off upon "points, immediately affecting, not his majesty's own interests, but those of his imperial ally." Now, was this a declaration, in the face of Europe, that his majesty, in continuing the war, was contending "for interests not his own?" And, that there was no substantial cause for war between England and France, but that the war was continued on account of Russia only?" What an impudent misconstruction! What a scandalous attempt to mislead the uninformed! Besides, what was this famous negociation of 1800? To hear you, Sir, would not any one suppose, that it was a negociation, just upon the point of ending in a treaty of peace, when some demand of ours in favour of Russia came, unfortunately, and broke all off again? To hear you, who would not imagine that this was the case? But, the fact is, as the fact pretty generally is with respect to your representations, completely the reverse; for this promising negociation, instead of being upon the point of ripening into a treaty of peace, had scarcely begun to show blossom, when it was blasted by a dispute about the basis, that is to say, about the foundation upon which the negociators should begin to talk about terms. The negociation, in truth, never really began, it never existed; and we call the silly thing, which was going on in 1806, a negociation, only because we have no word whereby to characterize it. Yet you speak, all along, of the negociation as an affair of great importance; you speak of the parties as being agreed as to terms; and you express your approbation of those terms, as well you may, for they are the dear offspring of your own prolific brain. Such a way of representing transactions, may do very well for the Lives of Lorenzo de' Medici and Pope Leo the Tenth; but with regard to transaetions of yesterday a little more fidelity is required. The several sets of ministers, to whose opinions you have appealed against "the alarmists," all bear witness against you. In 1801, Lord Sidmouth and his colleagues expressly declared, that they had made peace by way of experiment," and accompanied this declaration with another, that a large peace establishment would be necessary, in order to keep us upon our guard against probable dangers; which declaration, as you well know, was complained of by Buonaparté. In 1803, the same ministers declared, that we were at war with Buonaparte, because we could not live in peace with him; and they repeatedly stated their suspicious oilsutsle designs even

during the short interval of peace. After breaking off the negociation of 1806, the late ministry solemnly declared, "that the "restoration of the general tranquillity was "retarded only by the injustice and ambi

tion of the enemy." These are excellent authorities for you to appeal to in corroboration of your opinion, that the views of France are just and moderate; that, the manner in which the last negociation was put an end to is a proof, that there is now no rational object in continuing the war, and a ground whereon for the people to proceed in petitioning the king to hasten negociations for peace.

You

Thus, Sir, have I had the patience to go through the whole of your pamphlet; and, I must say, that so much misrepresentation, misconstruction and falshood, accompanied with so little truth and sound reasoning; so much assurance with so little candour; so much malice with so little wit; so much profession of morality and religion with so little of the practice of either, I never before met with in any one of the hundreds of political publications whereon it has fallen to my lot to remark. You appear to me not only to have laid aside, or set at nought, that conscience, of which you speak so feelingly in your preface, but also to have been so infatuated as to suppose that there was not, in the whole English nation, one single person capable of detecting your miserable attempts at deception. As to your partiality for France, which is too glaring to be denied, I do not impute it to a desire on your part to see that country conquer your own. do not proceed that length in your wishes. That is a state of things, which, indeed, you do not at all contemplate. You have a liking for the rulers of France, partly because they are the enemies, not of your country, but of the politicians you hate in your country; and partly, I am afraid, because they are triumphant. You owe the French rulers a grudge and the French people too, for hav ing, by their actions as well as their solemn declarations, so completely belied your opi nions and predictions; but, you have not the courage to acknowledge your error, and you therefore still have an attachment to them, while you throw the blame upon the powers by whom they were, as you call it, attacked. Your excuse is, that they were compelled to adopt a simple military despoism in their own defence, forgetting, apparently, what is notericus to all the world, namely, that, it was not 'till after they were out of danger, nay, after they had brought their enemies to their feet, and trampled them under their feet, that they adopted a