from what we can see of the creation, we may reason concerning things invisible; supposing that God cre ated the first man with the highest capacity, which could belong to his rank of being; yet knowing, that he was made a little lower than the angels; that the lowest of these intelligences was made greater than he ; we cannot place him higher, than upon an ascent next between the animal and more intellectual state. And when we consider how it answers the analogy of things, that all the intellectual powers should rise gradually, one order above another, to complete a fulness in God's creation of the heavens and of the earth; it will not be unreasonable to suppose, that God created man with such powers indeed of reason, as to be above all that can be called animal life; yet not with so masterly a light of reason, as absolutely to want no assistant in formation. Mr. Pope has excellently well expressed what I am aiming at. In the creation of God, he ob serves, that as

– All must full, or not coherent be,
And all that rises, rise in due degree;
Then in the scale of life and sense 'tis plain,
There must be somewhere such a rank as man;
Plac'd on the isthmus of a middle state,

A being darkly wise and rudely great.

• Without this Plato thought the heavens would be imperfect. ερανος ἀτελης εται, τα γαρ απανία ἐν αυτω γενη ζώων και εξει. δει δε οι μελλει τελειΘ ικανώς είναι. Plato in Timeo, d Pope's Essay on Man, ep. 1 and 2.

There must be somewhere, in ascending from sense to the height of reason, a rank of creatures above the confinement and limitation of instinct; but not so perfect in their powers of reason, as to stand in need of none other than their own direction.

Of this rank the poet deemed man, estimating him made,

With too much knowledge for the sceptic side,

With too much weakness for the stoic's pride.

f

To have light enough to see how he may, with a sufficient certainty, from known premises draw many important conclusions, but not light enough absolutely to rest satisfied in the sufficiency of his own wisdom. The poet gives us many rational intimations, that man must originally have been formed in this line of being, that there might be a just gradation in the works of God:

с

that progressive life may go

Around its width, its depth extend below,
Vast chain of being, which from God began,
Nature's ethereal, human, angel man,

Beast, bird, fish, insect! what no eye can see,
No glass can reach! from infinite to thee,
From thee to nothing.8

Pope's Essay on Man, ep. 2. ver. 5.

The stoic's pride here hinted at, is, I think, what is expressed in the latter part of the following sentence: Judicium hoc omnium mortalium est; fortunam a Deo petendam esse, a seipso sumendam esse sapientiam. Vide Cic. de Nat. Deor. 3. C. 36.

tib.

Pope's Essay on Man, ep. 1. ver. 199.

The poet farther expátiates upon the subject, ..

Far as creation's ample range extends
The scale of sensual, mental pow'rs ascends.
Mark how it mounts, to man's imperial race,
From the green' myriads in the peopled grass!
How instinct varies in the groveling swine,
Compar'd, half-reas'ning elephant! with thine:
"Twixt that and reason what a nice barrier,
For ever sep'rate, yet for ever near:

And he further hints, that we ought not to think it 'wrong, that man, made to be of this order, has not a large share of reason to guide him.

say not man's imperfect, heav'n in fault,

Say rather man's as perfect as he ought:

His being measur'd to his state and place.

Presumptuous man! the reason would'st thou find,
Why form'd so weak, so little, and so blind;
First, if thou canst, the harder reason guess,

Why form'd no weaker, blinder, and no less.

What would this man? would he now upward soar?

And, little less than angel, would be more?

on superior powers

Were we to press, inferior must on ours;

Or in the full creation leave a void,.

Where one step broken, the great scale's destroy'd,

The gen'ral order since the whole began,

Is kept in nature, and is kept in man.

h Pope's Essay, ep. 1. ver. 199.

1 Ibid. ver. 35–163. 233.

These sentiments do, I think, most clearly lead us to see, that, in the reason of things, there must be somewhere in the universe a being of such, and no greater 'powers of reason, than are here supposed to belong to And that this is our true standard, has been the opinion of the best writers, and has been confirmed in fact by the experience of all ages.' So that to talk of man having unerring reason, or of our wanting no further instruction than a careful attendance to the result of our own judgment; is a vanity which might be sufficiently exposed in the sentiment mentioned in the book of Job: Vain man would be wise, though man be born

It is the sentiment expressed by Cicero, that we are not creatures made able by nature; Naturam ipsam intueri et perspicere, eâdemque optimâ duce cursum vitæ conficere; but that we want for this purpose, what he calls rationem ac doctrinam, having only igniculos, which, if not properly fed and cherished, will fail and be extinguished. See Cic. Tusc. Quæst. lib. 3. in princip, sup. cit. Quartus autem gradus et altissimus eorum est, qui naturâ boni sapientesque gignuntur: quibus a principio innascitur ratio, recta constansque, quæ supra hominem putanda est, deoque tribuenda. Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 2. c. 13.

Our scriptures rightly tell us, that there is no man who may not sin: 1 Kings viii. 4. There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good and may not sin: Eccles. vii. 20. The philosophers say, Sapientiam nemo assequitur. Vide Cic. de Nat. Deor. lib. 3. c. 32.

m Nam, ut nihil interest, utrum nemo valeat, an nemo possit valere, sic non intelligo, quid intersit, utrum nemo sit sapiens, an nemo esse possit. Vide Cic. ibid.

like a wild ass's colt:" such an independence of understanding is a height for which we were not made. We may think of ourselves as we please; but from the beginning to this time, even from the time when Adam was brought into the world, until now, he that has thus absolutely trusted in his own heart has been a fool. How peculiar then is it to the nature of man, that God, as soon as he was created, made to him, as Moses relates, an especial revelation? If the perfection of man could have arisen merely from his reason, without doubt no such revelation would have been given him; for the all-wise God does nothing superfluous or in vain.P Therefore since a revelation was in fact made to man in the beginning; hence we know, that it was necessary, and that his original reason was not alone sufficient for him. As to those who say that the narration of a revelation made to the first man is a mere allegory and fable; let them not pretend to argue, that if the original reason of man was not alone a sufficient guide, then it must follow, that God did not sufficiently provide for the creature made thus imperfect; for the answer hereto is, that the revelation given to Adam, and intended to have been continued over and above his

n-Job xi. 12.

• Prov. xxviii. 26.

The argument used by the apostle concerning the law, might, I think, be justly accommodated to the topic before us, in words as follow: for if there had been reason given unto Adam, such as, or so sufficient, that it might have given him life, verily his righteousness would have been by his reason. See Gal, iii. 21.