ed for common ufe; and this evidently implies, that God has revealed his will there with fufficient plainness in all important points, or believe what is more abfurd, that he has given us a revelation that wants another to explain it ; and of confequence it must be every man's right to have the free use of the fcriptures, and a liberty of judging of the true meaning of them, and of receiving the doctrines and principles of Chriftianity from an inward conviction and full perfuafion of their truth, reasonableness, and excellency, and not received as the effect of chance, custom, intereft, implicit faith, or any other motive beneath the dignity of the Chriftian religion *.

From hence we may reasonably draw fome arguments in favour of free and candid debate on matters of inquiry on religion. The great author of nature having given us certain powers and faculties, whereby we are enabled to judge between truth and error, we conceive it is a duty incumbent on us to apply these powers to that generous purpose for which they were defigned, especially as we may reasonably expect that this very inquiry after truth fhould be of fome fervice to us, in order to our advancement in virtue, as it has a moft apparent tendency to promote a spirit of integrity and impartiality, and, above all, a spirit of charity. For it fhould be obferved, that there is not only a natural inquifitiveness in mankind, but also a natural fanguineness to fupport their refpective tenets; and hence, for want of attending to that common right, which every one has of thinking for himself, infinite uncharitablenefs, harfh cenfure, morofe or fhy behaviour, have unhappily prevailed. Now, whatever tends to banish this narrow and unsocial spirit out of the world, must be allowed greatly beneficial to mankind in common. And fince the fame reasons that prove inquiry reasonable, implies that we ought to use all the means within our power for information, I am inclined

* Confult on this fubje&t Dr. Watts's Logic, p. 225. & feq.

to

to think every unbiaffed reader will admit a free frienddebate is one proper expedient for the acquifition of truth; efpecially as oftentimes it affords an opportunity of hearing fuch objections advanced by our opponents, as we were not only ignorant of before, but often furnish us with the proper answer to thofe objections, by another hand, which our then prefent fuperficial inquiry into that point had not fuggefted to us. A perfon, in his ordinary connections and intercourse with others, will fometimes unhappily fall into the company of perfons, where he may have his faith perhaps defrauded of its proper fupports, by means of fome fubtil reflections, and probably be hardly able to ftand the fhock; whilft the diligent inquirer after truth, from the advantages he has reaped from converfation with the judicious, and frequent debate on the subject of inquiry, will be able to vindicate the cause of truth, and not only answer the fubtil objections of his adverfaries, but filence, and perhaps convince his opponent. This may be illuftrated by an application of it to the right of private judgment, the establishing rational religion in the room of fuperftition and enthusiasm, but will be found of equal ufe to afcertain and enforce the genuine principles and duties of our holy religion againft fceptics and deifts. This will be farther confidered under the advantages of free inquiry

*

The reason of man is as little able to ftand by itself, or proceed alone through the feveral branches of useful fcience, as his perfonal ftrength is to defend himself against the violence of every invader: for both these ends he ftands in need of the counsel and affiftance of others. The commerce of fcience and learning is as naturally advantageous for defence, ornament or improvement, as any of the common conveniencies of life. Nature feems to point out to us the neceffity of fuch a communication of knowledge, by diftributing to different perfons, taftes and capacities for different * Watts's Improvement of the Mind, p. 124,

f 4

inquiries

inquiries and science, which through the imperfect nature of man cannot be compleated at once, owes its progreffion to these very causes, that not being obliged continually to renew the labour of invention, we improve upon the ftock of others, and daily increase the precious depofit. This is the only patrimony which can defcend from one mind to another; and which, whatever it is that we derive from our ancestors, if we are not unjuft or idle managers, we fhall tranfmit with fresh improvements to pofterity. It is likewife what we impart to others without envy, and grow richer by an exchange of thoughts and conceptions. This communication of our fentiments with each other's, and freely canvaffing the various fubjects of religion, philofophy and letters, whether by converfation or writing, I call debate and controversy; and affirm it to be the moft natural and ufeful inftrument of knowledge*.

Here it may be proper first to take notice of some of the principal ABUSES of FREE ENQUIRY.

It is the observation of Dr. Fofter, that there is not a more valuable bleffing in human life than liberty. Civil liberty is the bafis of all focial happiness; and liberty of confcience, the only foundation of a rational religion. When the latter is reftrained, we are treated rather like brutes than men, i. e. creatures endowed with moral powers, and accountable for actions and therefore, it is one of the chief excellencies of the Christian religion, and very far from the air and spirit of an impofture, that it preferves the rights of confcience facred and inviolable. But, because the world is apt to run into extremes, the writers of the New Teftament, like perfons who had a thorough knowledge of human nature, have taken care in this refpect, as well as in all others, to guard against excefs and irregularity. Thus St. Paul advifes the Galatians not to * Library 467.

mistake

mistake licentiousness for Chriftian liberty; or in other words, not to imagine, that because they were freed from the expenfive and burtheníome obfervances of the Mofaic inftitution, which are elegantly defcribed as a ftate of fervitude, they were discharged likewife from moral obligations, which are an eternal and immutable law to all rational beings. I fhall enquire into fome of the chief abufes of free-thinking, by which it happens, that what is really the peculiar honour and greateft advantage of our intelligent nature, becomes a reproach to it, and is attended with moft injurious confequences. And,

1. Embracing the principle of liberty, has ended with many in infidelity, or a disbelief of all religion. It is most evident, that infidelity never more abounded than in this age of free inquiry: and those who are most loofe in their fentiments with refpect to the obligations of religion in general, and of Chriftianity in particular, are, in profeffion at leaft, enemies to bigotry and implicit faith. Nay, it may be allowed further, that it is likely they would never have gone fuch a length as to throw off all religion, if they had continued in a blind attachment to the principles of their education, and to established and popular opinions. Whence now can this arise? We who believe, that religion, in all the parts of it, is ftrictly rational, can never allow that it is the natural confequence of a free and impartial examination of it; but muft fuppofe, on the contrary, that the more thoroughly it is confidered, and the more nicely weighed in the balance of true and unbiaffed reason, it will be the more heartily believed and fubmitted to. This melancholy event may however be fufficiently accounted for from other caufes; and that it not only may, but oftentimes does proceed, not from a fuperior understanding, or more adequate and enlarged views of things, but from ignorance, fuperficial inquiry, and even from that prejudice and implicit faith, which the monopolizers of reafon and free

thinking

thinking fo loudly difclaim. I would not be thought, by any thing I am now advancing, to difcourage the moft rational and free examination of all religious principles, be they ever fo facred and venerable, and tranfmitted down with ever fo much awe and folemnity by our forefathers; nor would I be thought to affert, that any man is obliged to receive a revelation, which, upon mature deliberation, appears to be unworthy of God, and repugnant to the reafon and nature of things: for my only defign is to point out fome falfe principles, which are all an abuse of the true principle of liberty; and by which it is highly probable, many of the profeffed admirers, and zealous espousers of it, have been led to a difregard both of revealed and natural religion.

2. Another abufe of the principle of liberty is this, that fome men feem to think, that because they have a right to reject all pretended principles of religion, which are contrary to reafon, to the perfections of the fupreme Being, and the eternal laws of piety and virtue, they may likewife throw off the belief of every thing that they cannot fully account for; and are no more obliged, for example, to believe a Providence, because the vifible courfe of things is perplexed and intricate, full of disorder and seeming injuftice, and not fuch as they imagine it would be, if the universe was governed by an abfolutely wife and good Being; than they are to receive fuch doctrines as affert that God is a rigorous, fevere, and inexorable Sovereign, one that delights in the mifery of his creatures, and deftroys the neceffary and unalterable diftinction between moral good and evil. This, I fay, is another too common abuse of the principle of liberty, leading to a difbelief even of the first principles of natural religion; an abuse that argues great narrowness of mind, and is what perfons of any compass and freedom of thought cannot be guilty of t.

Dr. Fofter of the Abufes of Free-thinking, vol. I. p. 127 & feq.

3. Some