word, to endeavour to find the true fenfe of it, and to live according to it *. I can fee no reafon, fays a judicious author, for undervaluing revelation, in order to exalt reason, nor on the other hand to difparage reafon, fince they jointly concur in furnishing us with the most noble and unexceptionable principles of religion. What but revelation gave to Wollafton fo much the fuperiority over Cicero in his delineation of the religion of nature, particularly with regard to the unity and moral perfections, and providence of the Deity, and the duties owing to him?: All this will be readily acknowledged by Proteftant Chriftians of every denomination, while others perhaps do not eafily perceive the reafons upon which this principle of their faith is founded, and they raise a variety of objections to the authenticity, perfpicuity, reafonableness, and excellency of the Chriftian revelation; the most confiderable of which will be taken notice of in a following fection.. I fhall, firft, endeavour to afcertain the proper import of the term Truth, its importance, &c. Truth is a term ufed in a variety of Truth defined. fenfes, and applied to different fciences and fubjects. Logical truth is the conformity of things with the ideas themselves. Moral truth is the conformity of words, gestures, and actions, with the heart t. Mr. Chambers defines logical truth to be in direct oppofition to falfhood, and is applied to the propofitions which anfwer, or accord to the reality of the thing, whereof fomething is affirmed or denied ||. And Mr. Wollafton fays, thofe propofitions are true, which exprefs things as they are, or truth is the conformity of thofe words or figns by which things are expreffed to the things themfelves §. Truth, likewife, fignifies veracity, or a conformity of words to thoughts, pure, Quoted by Mr. Wright in his Sermon at Salter's hall against Popery, page 52. Martin. Ibid. Chambers. Wollafton. or or unadulterate; exactnefs or conformity to rule; reality, as opposed to fiction; honefty, integrity, &c. || It is used for the doctrines of the gofpel, Gal. iii. 1. as opposed to Jewish ceremonies, John, i. 17. and as the genuine or original, as opposed to fpurious*. These are fome of the principal fenfes in which it is ufed; but as the right use of reason, in the enquiry after truth, is what constitutes the fcience of logic, variety of other definitions and diftinctions relative to this fubject may be seen in peculiar treatifes on that fubject. The different fenfes in which I have confidered truth, or to which this term is applied, convey to our minds an idea of its nature and importance, and that there is a real effential and abfolute utility and advantage in the poffeffion of it. Indeed the purfuit and acquifition of Importance truth is of infinite concernment to mankind; of Truth. hereby we become acquainted with the nature of things, both in heaven and earth, and their various relations to each other. It is by this means we discover our duty to God and our fellow-creatures; by this we arrive at the knowledge of natural religion, and learn to confirm our faith in divine revelation, as well as to understand what is revealed. Our wifdom, prudence, and piety, our prefent conduct, and our future hopes, are all influenced by the use of our rational powers in the fearch after truth +. The love and defire of truth is a principle implanted in the nature of man; it has generally an easy accefs to unbiaffed minds, and will affume its empire and triumph over error, even in fpite of popularity, intereft, and undue influence from others; and religious truths have been often known to arm the mind with integrity, fuperior to the fevereft perfecution. Hence Polybius, the Roman historian, observes, that Cruden. Johnfon. truth truth may be oppofed, but it cannot be fubdued; and Cicero, to the fame purpose, that truth always carries fuch a force with her, that fhe cannot be overcome, neither by the flattery of art, nor ingenuity of men; and though fhe had no advocate or patron in her cause, yet she would be able to defend herself. But this is not univerfally acknowledged. There are men of a sceptical turn of mind, who affert there is no poffibility of diftinguishing truth from falfehood: and therefore they have abandoned all pretences to knowledge, and maintain ftrenuously that nothing is to be known. The first men of this humour made themselves famous in Greece by the name of fceptics, that is, feekers. They taught, that all things are uncertain, though they allowed that fome were more probable than others. After thefe arofe the fect of the Pyrrhonics, from Pyrrho, their mafter, who would not allow one propofition to be more probable than another. But of this fect an ingenious author observes, that their own doctrine gives their profeffion the lie; because they determined concerning every propofition, that it was uncertain, and believed that as a certain truth, while they professed there was nothing certain †. The most important queftion then on this fubject is this, what is the criterion or diftinguished mark of truth? How fhall we know when a propofition is true or falfe? There are fo many difguifes of truth in the world, fo many falfe appearances of truth, that not only one man differs in his fentiments from another, but one fectary abfolutely deny what another esteem undoubted and fundamental. Let us therefore enquire what is the general criterion of truth; and, in order to this, it is proper to confider what is the reason why we affent to the truth of one propofition, and Polybius in Excerptis, lib. xii. Cicero Orat. in Vatinium. + Watts's Logic, p. 172. deny deny another; and this will be found to arise from a clear and diftin&t perception, or full evidence of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas to one another, or to things; for fince our minds are of fuch a make, that when the evidence is exceeding plain and strong, we cannot with-hold our affent, we fhould then be neceffarily exposed to believe falfhood, if compleat evidence fhould be found in any propofitions that are not true. But furely the God of perfect wisdom, truth and goodness, would never oblige his creatures to be thus deceived; and therefore he would never have conftituted us of fuch a frame as would have rendered it naturally impoffible to guard againft error*. There are two defires interwoven in the frame of our beings, the defire of truth, and the defire of happiness; in both which there is a kind of infinity, which arifes after this manner. By the contemplation of my own foul, I gain the ideas of feveral perfections with which I perceive it to be adorned; following therefore the impulfe of my own mind, I enlarge the profpect, and widen my ideas more and more, till loft in the conception of a being, who poffeffes all these perfections, and very probably many more, with the additional characteristics of infinite and eternal: Now it is the nature of the understanding, and of the will, to pursue the fupreme truth, and the fupreme good; and confequently while I have a being in view, in whofe idea is lodged infinite truth and infinite good, which alone is able to answer that idea of fomething like infinity that is in our defires, I fhall never rest fatisfied in any allotment among the creatures, though in the finest apartment in the universe, and accommodated with every good, fhort of a correfpondence and intercourfe with the Deity +. It is true there are fome fpeculative points which God hath placed beyond our reach; and there are Dr. Watts. † Grove, vol. I. p. 92. others others of an abftrufe, ambiguous nature, in the various branches of fcience, &c. that require much previous learning, ftrength of natural abilities, ftudy and application, in the use of proper helps to understand and explain. These can in no wise be the concern of all, and can only with any propriety be the fubject of enquiry to a few, whofe difpofitions and abilities, leifure and profeffion in life, may render it at all eligible; and after all, a diverfity of fentiments will neceffarily arife. Nor can we reasonably expect the fame degree of evidence in all cafes or fubjects, that properly concern us to make the fubjects of our enquiry. There are many things in this dark and imperfect state, wherein we must be content with probability, where our beft light and reafoning will reach no further; we must balance arguments as juftly as we can; and when we cannot find weight enough on either, fide to determine the scale with fovereign force and affurance, we must content ourselves perhaps with a fmall preponderation. This will give us a probable opinion; and these probabilities are fufficient for the daily determination of a thousand actions in human. life, and many times even in matters of religion.Suppose, for inftance, I had been honeftly and long searching what religion I should chufe, yet I could not find that the arguments in defence of chriftianity arose to compleat certainty, but went only fo far as to give me a probable evidence of the truth of it; though many difficulties ftill remained, yet I fhould think myfelf obliged to receive and practise that religion; for the God of nature and reafon hath bound us to afsent and act according to the best evidence we have, even though it be not abfolute and compleat; and as he is our fupreme Judge, his abounding goodness and equity will approve and acquit the man, whofe confcience honeftly and willingly feeks the beft light, and obeys it as far as he can discover it *. Dr. Watts's Improvement of the Mind, p. 208. Here |