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these I think M. Malebranche has laid out a very juft and comprehenfive Divifion, when he fays, That it is abfolutely neceffary, that those Ideas which we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects, which we do not perceive by themselves, fhould come from thofe very Bodies, or from thofe Objects: Or that our Soul has a power of producing thofe Ideas Or that God has produced them with the Soul when he Created it: Or that he produces them whenfoever we think upon any Object: Or that the Soul has, in her felf, all thofe Perfections which The fees in thofe Bodies: Or, in fine, that she be united with an all-perfect Being, and that includes in himself,after an univerfal manner,all the Perfections of Created Beings. This Enumeration feems fo full and adequate,that we cannot well doubt, but that the true way ofour understanding the Objects that are now under Confideration, is contained within the compass of it. And accordingly I think the best method to find out what that is,will be to proceed upon the fame Heads, by intermixiug with what this great Man either here, or elsewhere fays upon each of them, fome further Reflections of our own, as there fhall be occafion. For indeed I should be very unjust to my Argument, as well as unkind to my felf, fhould I refufe what Light or Affiftance I may receive in the management of it from fo great a Head. And truly, confidering what moderate affiftance I have had hitherto in the Profecution of this Work from other

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Part II. Mens Thoughts,as writing upon a Subject which few Men have thought much about, I have the lefs reason to decline it now. And befides, having travelled fo much alone in the former Stages, a little Company now towards the close of the Journey may be convenient; wherefore having fo good a Companion, let us forthwith advance upon the foregoing Heads, only taking the liberty to word them a little otherwise than they are expreffed here, that we may the better accommodate them to the Contexture of our Discourse, and make them fall in the more aptly with the order of our general De fign.

CHAP

CHA P. VII.

That the Ideas whereby we perceive fuch Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from thofe Objects; with Some occafional Confiderations upon the Intellectus Agens of the Schools, Mr. Lock's Principle of Senfation, and that Scholaftick Maxim, That there is nothing in the Understanding but what was firft in the Senfe.

I.

IN

N that part of our Account of Humane Understanding which concerns the manner of it, the Reader was made acquainted, that in inquiring how we understand, our defign was to inquire what was the immediate Object of Thought in our Perception of things. Now this we have fhewn to be the very things themselves in fome Intelligible Objects, as in God, Ideas, and eternal Truths. In our Perception of these things the immediate Object of our Thought are the very things themselves. But now as to things that are out of God, those of them that are Material,we have shewn to be known by Ideas, as alfo according to the greatest probability, those also that are Spiritual, as Angels and Humane Souls. And here

not

not the things themselves; but the Ideas of them are the immediate Objects of our Perception. Now as to those things which are Selfintelligible, I look upon the manner of our knowing them to be already fufficiently accounted for; fince whence 'tis fhewn, that fuch or fuch things are perceived immediately by themfelves, 'tis as much as need, or indeed can well be faid of them. But as to thofe things which are known by Ideas, the greatest part of the Enquiry remains yet ftill behind, and that is to confider, according to the best light we have in this State of Darkness, what those Ideas are whereby we have the knowledge of them. Towards the Refolution of which grand Queftion, I think we may reasonably make our entry with this plain Affertion, That the Ideas whereby we perceive fuch Objects as are mediately Intelligible, do not come from thofe Objects.

2. So I chufe to exprefs the Propofition of the Chapter, rather than to fay with our Author, That material Objects do not fend forth any Species that refemble them. And that because this latter is not, as I conceive, fo properly the Propofition that is to be proved, as one of the mediums of proving it. For having made an enumeration of the feveral ways of our perceiving things, that is, of the feveral forts of Ideas, whereby we may be fuppofed to perceive them, and being now to confider by which of them they are perceived, I think the train and purfuance of our Difcourfe requires that we fhould

fay,

fay, that the Ideas, whereby we perceive fuch Objects, do not come from thofe Objects, rather than that fuch Objects do not fend forth any. Befides, I chufe to fay, Objects mediately Intelligible, rather than Material Objects, partly becaufe I would diftinguifh them against thofe Objects which are Intelligible by themfelves, and not by Ideas, and partly becaufe of the greater Latitude of the Expreffion, which being more general, will take in Spiritual as well as material Beings; fome of which Spiritual Beings (viz. all that are Created) we have fupposed to be of the number of mediately Intelligible Objects. Thefe M. Malebranche has here left out, confining himself to fuch Objects as are Material, not becaufe he thought thofe were the only Objects which were to be known by Ideas (for he intimates the contrary when he fays, I believe there is no Substance purely Intelligible but that of God, that there is no feeing any thing with Evidence, but in his Light, and that the Union of Spirits cannot render them visible) but, as I fuppofe, because he thought we had at prefent no Ideas of any other; which, I believe, is very right. But yet however, fince Spirits are fuppofed to be Intelligible only by their Ideas as well as Bodies, and fince we fhall at least hereafter have an Ideal Perception of them, as well as of the other, upon this Confideration; as alfo, that our Dif course may be more juft and intire in all its parts, we fhall first make good our Propofition

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