be referv'd only to God himself. And fince he has with fo good Judgment lodged it in him, here, with all Humility and Adoration let us leave it, as an incommunicable Branch of his Royal Prerogative, and a Flower of his Imperial Crown, without being either so impious as to deny this fuperexcellent way of underftanding to Him, or fo foolifhly vain as to affume it to our felves. For in this fenfe alfo we may truly fay with the Pfalmift, Such knowledge is too wonderful and too excellent for us, we cannot attain

unto it.

14. We have here gone over a great deal of Ground, and have now but one Field more to beat, and fo begin to draw near, if not to what we feek after, yet at least to the end of our Enquiry, fince if we do not find what we look for here, we must e'en give over all Hopes of finding it any where, and fit down in a fatisfied and quiet (tho' not lazy) ignorance of the manner of our Knowledge, contenting our felves with the poffeffion of the thing. But tho' we have found no fatisfaction in any of the foregoing Ways or Attempts for the unfolding this myfterious Secret of our Intellectual Nature, unlefs it be that only of Scio me hactenus nihil Scire, it would however be too foon to give over yet, fo long as there is room for any further fearch: For if we will find Knowledge and Understanding, we muft (as the wife King advises) feek for it as for Silver, and fearch for it as for hid Treasures. And therefore having examin'd

the

the four firft Hypothefis of our Divifion, and discover'd the infufficiency and falfhood of them, let us now apply our felves to the Confideration of that which remains. And that our accefs to it may be the more gradual and less furprifing, before we offer any thing more immediate and direct, we will firft interpofe a Chapter concerning the poffibility of it, which is as follows.

CHAP. XI.

That 'tis poffible that the Ideas whereby we understand, may be the Divine Ídeas, and confequently that there is no neceffity of having recourfe to any other.

1.

T

HO whatever is poffible is not forthwith actually true, yet whatever is actually true must be poffible, and confequently poffibility is one step towards actual Truth: And a very confiderable step too it is in fome cafes. If God be a poffible Being, that is, whose Nature or Effence implies no contradiction or Repugnance that he fhould be, then it neceffarily follows that he actually is, fince, if he were not, it would be utterly impoffible that he fhould

Part II. fhould ever be. That's one Cafe, and a very rare and fingular one it is (as all things concerning God are ;) for here the poffibility plainly and immediately infers the Act; and perhaps 'tis the only cafe wherein it evidently does fo. But there is another cafe wherein it bids fair for the recommending it, and that is when the poffibility feems to lie only on one fide. 'Tis true indeed, that mere naked poffibility, tho' prefuppofed to the actual truth of a thing as the Ground and Foundation of it, will go but a very little way in Argument towards the inferring it, there being many things in themselves poffible, which yet never were, nor perhaps ever fhall be. But when all other ways of folving an apparent Effect that can well be conceiv'd, feem defperate and impoffible, then to fay that it may admit of a Solution in this or that way, is a confiderable Offer, and if proved, a confiderable Argument. And therefore fince it is fo, and we have fhewn all the other Suppofitions or conceivable Accounts concerning the way and manner of Humane Understanding to be falfe, it will be a great Point gain'd if we can prove that which remains to be fo much as poffible, and that 'tis at least so much as that (whatever becomes of the actual truth of it). is the Conclufion which is here undertaken to be proved.

2. The Pofition of this Chapter involves a fuppofition. It is here fuppofed that there are Divine Ideas, or that God has in himself the Ideas

deas of all things. This I beg leave to fuppofe here, because I have already given a large and profeffed' Account of it in the former Part of this Theory. But if the Reader of this Part which I can by no means advise) should happen to be a stranger to the other, or fhould have forgot it, and not be willing to renew the perufal of it, he may take this fhort hint in his way for his prefent fatisfaction. God when he made the World muft have the Ideas of thofe Creatures which he made, or else he could not have made them: And fince when he made them there was nothing in actual Being befides himself, thofe Ideas cannot be conceiv'd as any thing really diftinct from his own Effence, but only as the feveral intelligible Degrees or Perfections of it, and fo he has the Ideas of all things in himself. And accordingly these Ideas as being really Co-effential with him, tho' reprefentative of things without him, I call Divine Ideas. This is what I would here fuppofe. That which is here afferted, is, that 'tis poffible that these Divine Ideas may be the very Ideas whereby we think or understand, or (as I have otherwife expressed it) that are the immediate Objects of our Thoughts in the Perception of things.

4. Now of the poffibility of this there can be no reasonable doubt if we confider in the first place, that these Ideas are in themselves most Intelligible, and fo fit to be the immediate Objects of Thought, or elfe nothing can be fo.

God is the moft Intelligible Object in himself: For as Aquinas well argues, fince every thing is Intelligible fo far as it is in Act, God who is the most pure A&t without the leaft mixture of Potentiality, must be in himself most Intelligible. And therefore fince thete Ideas of things which are in God, have a real Indentity with the Divine Effence (as by the Doctrine of the Schools themselves, every thing that is in him is concluded to have) it follows that they must be in themselves of the moft Intelligible Nature: Which may also be argued from their most perfect Spirituality, and the great proportionablenefs which they thereby have to the Mind or Understanding.

4. But we are further to confider, That as these Ideas are by reafon of the Spirituality and Divinity of them moft Intelligible in themfelves, fo nothing hinders from the nature of the thing, but that they may be Intelligible to us: And that because they are intimately pre fent with us, and have an immediate Union with our Minds. 'Tis moft certain that God himself hath fo; and accordingly the Apostle in his Difcourfe with the Athenian Philofophers takes notice (which he would not do if it had

Acts 17.

not been Strictly and Philofophically true) that He is not far from every one of us, and that in him we live, and move, and have our being. And therefore fince these Ideas in the reality of their Nature are the fame with God, it follows that

they