mean a free agent, so the former must mean an agent acting by necessity; for abstract notions are idle to the purpose.

It is true, we ascribe to God a necessary existence, not caused by any agent; but this is our imperfect manner of expressing a thing of which we can have no adequate idea. Two things are therefore undeniable: first, that when a fatalist asserts that every thing is by necessity, he must mean by an agent acting necessarily; and secondly, that the necessity by which such an agent is supposed to act, does not exclude intelligence and design; so that, were the system of fatality admitted, it would just as much account for the formation of the world, as for the construction of a house, and no more. After all, the fatalist must be reduced to allow that his necessary agent deliberates necessarily, chooses necessarily, designs necessarily, changes necessarily, combines, discriminates, compares necessarily; all which is very difficult for a plain man to conceive..

On the whole, then, it is clear that the opinion of necessity does not destroy the proof that there is an intelligent Author of nature, and a natural Governor of the world. Let us see of what force it is against the supposition that we are in a state of religion. It is plain, that if a child were educated in this idea. of universal necessity, in such a manner as to efface every thought of praise or blame, of punishment or reward for his actions, and were to form his behaviour upon that system, he would find, upon the application of the principle to the affairs of life, that it would mislead him into dreadful situations. He would find it, on trial, totally impracticable in the course and constitution of this world. Why may not then the application of the same principle to the

affairs of religion mislead us in the same analogous manner, with respect to a future more general and more important interest?

Religion is a practical subject; and as this system is clearly inapplicable to practical subjects, it is surely not to be depended upon, since it teaches that we are free from the obligations of religion. If, therefore, the evidence of religion be conclusive on a supposition of freedom, it remains so on a supposition of necessity; because the notion of necessity is not applicable to practical subjects; that is, with respect to them it is as if it were not true. And here a difficulty presents itself, which shakes the very foundations of the doctrine: for, if the notion of universal necessity be true, why should it be dangerous to believe it and to act upon it? Can it be against the interests of mankind to make truth the basis of their actions? Moreover, we feel that we have a will, and are conscious of a character; now if this will and this character be reconcileable in respect to man with the notions of fate, they are reconcileable with them in the Author of nature. The Author of nature, then, is of some character or other, in spite of necessity: and this necessity is as reconeileable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice in him, which attributes are the foundation of religion, as with any other character.

Now mark the inconsistency of these fatalists: they say all punishment is unjust, because it is inflicted on men for doing what it was not in their power to avoid; as if the necessity which is supposed to destroy the criminality of an action, did not also destroy the injustice of punishment! Thus the notions of justice and injustice remain as fixed as ever, notwithstanding our endeavours to suppose them removed. They are indelibly imprinted on

are

our nature, and will continue to force themselves into our thoughts and reasonings, while we framing suppositions which we think will destroy them.

The opinion of necessity cannot destroy that internal proof which we have of the moral government of God, in the moral sense impressed on our nature; for this is a matter of fact, a thing of experience: nor can it destroy the conclusion, for this is immediately deduced from the fact: neither can it operate to the prejudice of those proofs which are drawn from the external condition of things. From all this reasoning, it appears that necessity, supposed possible and reconcileable to the plain constitution of things, does in no sort prove that the Author of nature will not, or invalidate the proof that he will, finally, in his eternal government, render his creatures happy or miserable according to their behaviour; and if it do not destroy the proof of natural religion, it evidently makes no alteration in the proof of revealed.

I shall dismiss my readers, with a word or two in explanation. There are two general kinds of necessity maintained by the Fatalists: the one is superior to the Deity, and placed in the nature of things; the other is existent in the decrees and ordinances of the Deity, and flows in an inevitable series of causes resulting from him. There are other distinctions which do not deserve consideration. The Epicureans appear to have held the first opinion, the Stoics the second. The reader will see that the arguments in this paper are equally conclusive against both, though both are not distinctly examined. The common Pagan notion was on the side of an universal necessity over-ruling the power of the gods: την πεπρωμένην μοιραν αδυνατα εςι αποφύγειν και τω EW." Herodot. Herodot. It is impossible for the Deity

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himself to avoid the established decrees of fate." There were some who held a material necessity, without any Diety in the universe; and such is said to have been nearly the doctrine of Democritus. From this sprung the Atomic philosophy, in which Epicurus was a considerable sharer, and with which Pythagoras is said to have been pretty much tinctured. The Monads of that philosopher are concluded by many to be the Atoms of Epicurus. Anaxagoras and Empedocles were also favourers of this philosophy, and most of the ancient Physiologists had some taint from this poisoned source.

N° 53. SATURDAY, MAY 18.

Ad quem ita subridens: Felicia tempora! que te
Moribus opponunt; habeat jam Roma pudorem :
Tertius e cœlo cecidit Cato.

JUVENAL,

With a disdainful smile he cried, Blest times,
That made thee Censor of the age's crimes!
Rome now must needs reform, and vice be stopt,
For a third Cato from the clouds is dropt.

DRYDEN.

To the Reverend, but Officious, Mr. Simon Olive

branch.

Sir, I HAVE been a long time floating between contempt and surprise, at the presumptuous impertinence with which you take upon you to interfere in every thing that is going on in this great city. You have no respect to rank or office, but have usurped a title of so catholic a kind, that even princes themselves are expected to bow before it. Believe me, sir, it is not the temper of the times to acknowledge such a supremacy. Nay, to deal plainly with you, you are already denounced at a club of Patriots, where I heard it declared, that, in their list of intended decapitations, your head comes next to the Pope's.

Let me advise you, sir, not to be so busy with the times in general; but particularly beware of coming up to London, the rumour of which intention has already reached every corner of the metropolis. How this hardy design of yours has got wing, I can