ons of the United States might have to be employed may afford an opportunity to reconsider past reluctance to use certain positive control measures, such as the installation of permissive action links (PALS) on nuclear weapons deployed at sea by the United States and the installation of post-launch destruct mechanisms on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed by the United States, as long as appropriate security measures can be developed to protect the integrity of such destruct mechanisms. (7) On September 15, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCS) in Washington and Moscow.

(8) The NRRCs have made a useful contribution to lowering the risks of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war and are capable of taking on expanded roles.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress

(1) that the President of the United States and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are to be commended for their June 1, 1990, joint statement to pursue additional nuclear confidence-building measures; and

(2) that, in keeping with that joint statement, the President

(A) should invite the Soviet Union to join with the United States in conducting separate but parallel, comprehensive reviews of each nation's own nuclear control procedures and failsafe mechanisms; and

(B) should propose to the Soviet Union that representatives of the two nations engage in discussions with the objective of agreeing on additional roles and functions that could be assigned to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers to further lessen the risks of the outbreak of nuclear war as the result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident.

(c) REPORT ON ADDITIONAL MEASURES.-Not later than March 1, 1991, the President shall submit to Congress a report (in both classified and unclassified form) assessing additional nuclear risk reduction measures which could be implemented pursuant to the joint statement of June 1, 1990, referred to in subsection (b), including the following:

(1) Assigning to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCS) such expanded roles as the following:

(A) Serving as a forum for discussions between the two nations on responding to possible nuclear terrorism.

(B) Transmitting notifications that may be required under future arms control treaties.

(C) Transmitting non-urgent notifications and information requests required under Article 5 of the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

(D) Providing a forum for discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on restricting nuclear, chemical, and missile proliferation.

(E) Serving as a meeting place for high-level military discussions on nuclear doctrines, forces and activities, and regional security concerns.

(2) Installation of post-launch destruct mechanisms on all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed by the United States.

(3) Installation by the United States of permissive action links (PALS) on all nuclear weapons at sea.

SEC. 1442. START AND STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva.

(2) In the Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms signed in June 1990, the two sides reaffirmed their determination to have a START agreement completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990.

(3) Under the provisions of a START agreement, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms. (4) In the Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms.

(5) The objectives of these negotiations will be to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries.

(6) The President's effort to negotiate such agreements is dependent upon the maintenance of a vigorous research and development and modernization program as required for a prudent defense posture.

(7) The Soviet Union has maintained a robust strategic modernization program throughout the course of the START negotiations which continues today.

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that

(1) the Congress fully supports United States efforts to enhance strategic stability; and

(2) the United States should pursue stabilizing strategic arms reduction agreements while maintaining a vigorous research and development and modernization program for United States strategic forces as required for a prudent defense posture.

SEC. 1443. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS AGREEMENT

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that the President, before concluding an agreement in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, should provide to Congress

(1) a report on whether the SS-23 INF missiles of Soviet manufacture, which the Soviet Union has confirmed have been stationed in the territory of the former German Democratic Republic and in the territories of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, constitute a violation of the INF Treaty or constitute deception

in the INF negotiations, and whether the United States has reliable assurances that those missiles will be destroyed; and

(2) a report on whether the Krasnoyarsk radar, which the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union admitted is a clear violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty, has been verifiably dismantled in accordance with United States criteria.

FORM OF REPORTS.-The reports under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) should be submitted in both classified and unclassified form.

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f. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991

Partial text of Public Law 101-189 [H.R. 2461], 103 Stat. 1352 at 1539, approved November 29, 1989

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

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TITLE X-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL

SEC. 1001. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT ON TRIDENT PROGRAM

(a) REPORT.-Not later than April 1, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a comprehensive report on the Trident program under a possible Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreement. The report shall address the following issues:

(1) The objective for the size of the Trident submarine force fleet both with and without a START agreement.

(2) The implications for United States strategic force posture under a START agreement of a fleet of 21 or more Trident submarines, each with 192 warheads on 24 ballistic missiles, under two different assumptions, as follows:

(A) All such warheads are accountable under START limits.

(B) The warheads on one-to-three Trident submarines are not accountable under START limits.

(3) A net assessment of the implications for United States security of a START agreement that allows the Soviet Union as well as the United States to have an equivalent number of warheads on submarines that are not accountable under START limits.

(4) The technical feasibility and cost implications of various options for reducing the number of warheads on Trident submarines, including those submarines already built, those under construction, and those yet to be built.

(5) The verification challenges to the United States posed by such options if the Soviet Union were to adopt them in its ballistic missile submarine forces.

(b) FORM OF REPORT.-The President shall submit the report under subsection (a) in both classified and unclassified versions.

(c) WAIVER.-The President may waive the requirements of subsection (a) if he has signed a START agreement or other strategic

arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union before the date by which the report is otherwise required to be submitted.

SEC. 1002. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON THE VERIFICATION WORK THAT HAS BEEN CONDUCTED WITH REGARD TO MOBILE ICBMs UNDER A START AGREEMENT

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States must have confidence that any agreement achieved through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (START) in Geneva will be effectively verifiable.

(2) The position of the United States at the START negotiations, from 1985 until September 1989, was to ban the deployment of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under a START regime unless an effective verification regime could be identified and implemented. In September 1989, the United States announced that it was withdrawing its proposal for the ban of mobile ICBMs, contingent upon Congress providing funds for mobile ICBMs to be deployed by the United States.

(3) The Soviet Union has deployed two mobile ICBM systems, the SS-24 and the SS-25.

(4) The President conducted a strategic review during the period between January 20, 1989, and the resumption of the START negotiations on June 15, 1989.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL REPORT.-Not later than March 31, 1990, the President shall submit to Congress a report (in classified and unclassified form) describing all studies that have been performed between March 1985 and August 1989 by agencies of the United States Government with regard to the capability of the United States to monitor and verify a START agreement which allows mobile ICBMs. The report shall include the following:

(1) A description of each study conducted by United States Government agencies during the strategic review referred to in subsection (a)(4) to determine the ability of the United States to verify limitations on mobile ICBMs of the Soviet Union under a START agreement, including a summary of the conclusions reached under each such study.

(2) A description of any so-called "Red Team" study conducted between March 1985 and August 1989 with regard to the existence of mobile ICBMs under a START regime, including a summary of the conclusions reached under each such study.

(3) A description of each study conducted by United States Government agencies between March 1989 and August 1989 to assess the value of various options relating to the verification of mobile ICBMs (such options to include the option known as "tagging" and the establishment of designated deployment areas), including a summary of the conclusions reached under each such study.

SEC. 1003. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON START TALKS

Congress hereby reaffirms the sense of Congress expressed in the second session of the 100th Congress (in section 902 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law